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PREFACE

This thesis contains the following revisions, based on examiners'
reports, as requested by the Postgraduate Subcommittee, Graduate
Faculty, University of Wollongong.
Revision 1.

Provide a summary conclusion justifying the major aim of this
thesis as stated on p.xviii.
(Appears at the end of Chapter One, pp.20-24. See also
Conclusion at the end of Chapter Two, pp.51 -55).

Revision 2.

Define and discuss clearly what is meant by the "evolutionary
step in the development of the emotional process".
(Appears in the Introduction, pp.xviii-xx).

Revision 3.

Explore more of the contemporary literature on emotion and
cognition (Averill, Lyons, Neu, Frijda).
(Appears in Chapters Two and Three, pp.46-55 and
70-76).

Revision 4.

Place Chapters One, Two and Three with an epistemological
position.
(Appears in the Introduction, pp.xiii-xviii).

Revision 5.

Define some terms e.g. self, ego.
(Appears at the end of the Introduction, pp.xxix-xxx).

Revision 6.

Support and reference the material dealing with the
theories of emotion based on evolutionary theory in
Chapter Three.
(Appears in Chapter Three, pp.63-66).

Revision 7.

Extend Appendix I by applying the central argument of the
thesis in one case. That is, by presenting an example of
emotion analysis and showing its relationship to the
process of construing.
(Appears in Appendix I).

Revision 8.

Answer criticisms of the treatment of philosophers.
(Appears in the Introduction, pp.xxi-xxiv).

In addition, small adjustments have been made in the thesis generally,
where appropriate, to incorporate the revisions.

ABSTRACT
The aim of this thesis is to establish that, in the history of human
thought on emotion, a gradual development has been taking place that
reflects the ways in which our emotional processes have been changing,
and gives us an indication of the ways in which they may yet change.
Within this general aim, the claim is made and substantiated that certain
perspectives on emotion can be abstracted from the many theories put
forward in the history of western thought. These perspectives are yielded
by the different ways in which emotions have been conceptually related to
cognitive processes, physiological processes, ethical concepts, motivation
and creativity - that is, by the ways in which past thinkers have related the
personal experience of feelings to physiological states, to ways of thinking,
to the practice of morality, to our reasons for acting, and to the creative
process in its many forms.
A further supported claim is made that psychological theories of
emotion emerging in modern times were developed in a scientific and/or
psychotherapeutic context. However, they too could be scrutinised within
the framework of the perspectives that emerged from philosophical
backgrounds. They can also be seen to establish new levels of awareness
of the development of emotional processes, most particularly in the work of
Sigmund Freud and George Kelly.

The claims are also made and

supported, that within Freud's Theory of the Instincts there exists a more
complex, cognitively based theory of emotions, and that within Kelly's
Theory of Personal Constructs there exists a theory of emotions that posits
the closest relationship between thinking and feeling yet conceived. It is
argued that a more satisfactory use can be made of Kelly's process of
construing if it is preceded by a personal analysis of emotions based on
Freud's theory. That is, I have argued that Kelly's process of construing
involves both feeling and thinking as a rational process, and that a personal
awareness of the ways in which we feel and structure our feelings (such

awareness being assisted by the knowledge yielded by Freud's work) is
important to the development of the construing process in each of us. A
brief description of a technique of emotion analysis based on aspects of
Freud's psychoanalytic technique is presented in the final chapter, with an
account of how the emotional awareness gained thereby contributes more
fully to the construing process. An illustration of this process is given in
Appendix I.

INTRODUCTION
Why emotions are important

That emotions are important is clearly visible in the ways in which they
affect individual lives and societies, civilisations and history. Their power
and the problems they create have been acknowledged and pondered
over by major thinkers dating back, in our culture, to early Greek
philosophy.

Yet very few philosophers before modern times produced

complete theories of emotion as a major aim, or by intention - rather, such
theories emerged as a by-product of inquiries into the nature of knowledge
and people's "place in the universe". Although I have highlighted ideas on
emotion in looking at the development of the concept, these ideas were a
part of wider epistemological or ontological enquiries and were often
prescriptive as well.
In looking at the way the concept developed (as opposed to simply
reviewing philosophers) I have sought to bring out a particular trend, to
show how thinking on emotion has gradually become more complex as the
human race progressed towards modern times.

Such a progressive

development is not always visible when it occurs in the background of
much more obvious developments such as the development of scientific
concepts, and especially

alongside the materialist

philosophies

as

prevalent at this time. Further, the trend or development that I perceived in
my inquiry was of a particular kind, evolutionary in its action and reflecting
people's changing experiences. This was identified not in a specifically
cultural or historical way in terms of events, but in terms of the general
effects of time and experience. A development occurring at that level can, I
think, be very easily lost or made invisible by the particulars of history and
cultures. And that may be at least a part of the explanation of why, even

though the importance of emotions has always been apparent, present day
philosophers and psychologists are making statements such as:
"The importance of emotions both for the individual and society
can scarcely be overestimated. For the individual emotions are
both ends in themselves and means for the attainment of other
ends. For society emotions are involved critically in social
control, role performance and interpersonal interaction.
Emotions are matters of profound concern to everyone."
(Rosenberg, 1990)
and
"Emotion and knowledge are far more personal than the
traditional emphasis on reason and understanding - as opposed
to passions - would suggest ... For too long we have
emphasised the impersonal demands of knowledge instead of
the passion to know, and both knowledge and passion have
suffered ... These [emotions] are not momentary intrusions into
our lives, but their very core, and the source of our ideas ... "
(Calhoun and Solomon, 1983, p.40)
And indeed, the serious problems of present-day culture seem more
than ever to be connected with the way in which people feel about things.
Policies about environment pollution, political systems, and quality of life,
for example, may be made as a result of carefully thought out advantages
and disadvantages, but the implementation and success of such policies
seems to depend on how people feel about clean air, clean water, people
in politics, the quality of their lives and, these days, the future of the human
race.

If this were not so, simply knowing of the advantages and

disadvantages of certain things would be enough to bring about certain
behaviour.

But it has been recognised in a number of ways that people

need to care, they have to feel, and be encouraged to feel, that certain
things are important enough to take a stand.

The most recent and spectacular example of this was the action of
the Russian people during the political events there this year.

All their

experience and knowledge of the Soviet System and the ways in which it
dealt with political uprising would have told those people that taking a stand
during the coup in Moscow would end in tragedy for them, as it did so
terribly in Hungary and other places. On the basis of such knowledge and
prediction any uprising would seem to be futile, and indeed the rest of the
world waited for the tanks to roll. From the live transmission of events and
from first-hand accounts it was clear worldwide that people's feelings were
the basis of their stand, their desire to see the end of a dictatorship. That
such feelings may have been related to sound reasoning at some level
(such as the knowledge of imminent economic collapse, a prospect that
was evident to ordinary people there) does not detract from the fact that at
the time of the coup emotion was the power of that resistance. It has also
long been recognised that such powerful emotion can be evoked and
used, both positively and negatively, by political authorities.

Hence the

emotive advertising on issues such as pollution, AIDS, health, nutrition,
fitness, in politics, and in connection with disadvantaged people and
countries.

But such emotive advertising would hardly be necessary, I think, if
people knew more about their feelings, were more aware of their individual
ways of feeling, and the feelings of others.

Finely tuned, imaginative

feelings would not need to be battered with painful over-stimulation and
excessive example to bring about certain attitudes and action. Nor would
they be as easily exploited for negative purposes.

Maze (1983) draws a

distinction between being conscious of something and being aware that
one is conscious of something.

He argues that these processes do not

occur together automatically or necessarily. To be conscious of something
is one mental act of awareness, and to become aware that one is
conscious of something (an act of se/f-awareness) is a separate act of

awareness, which may or may not occur (Maze, 1983, p.90). This, I think, is
very clearly the case with the conscious experience of feelings.

People

may well experience certain emotional states consciously, they may "live"
their feelings, without the further mental act of awareness that they are
doing so. To be more fully aware of oneself in this way does not seem to
be automatic with emotions or knowledge.

People often surprise

themselves by becoming aware of things they know or feel but not realise
they knew or felt, though the knowing and feeling must, in some real
sense, have been conscious.

Unconscious knowledge or feeling, in the

sense of repressed knowledge or feeling, seems to fall into a different
category. Given that in our society there is a great deal of evidence to
suggest that people are not fully aware of their feelings, and that such
awareness may be crucial to our attitudes to some very serious problems, I
would argue that emotions have taken on an especially urgent importance.

Traditionally

the

pursuit

of

knowledge

has

been

based

on

problem-solving. That emotions have such a direct bearing on our ability
to solve problems must emphasise their importance.

I have sought to

show however, that the importance has not been a sudden manifestation,
but that the qualitative development of our emotional processes can be
traced back through writings on emotion to the earliest available in our
culture.

An epistemological

context

The epistemological context within which I speak of levels of
emotional awareness allows for, and stresses, the importance of personal
experience in the acquisition of knowledge.

Throughout the thesis I am

speaking from a position that claims that knowledge has an essentially
personal nature both in the knowledge of particulars and in more general
ways. In this sense, knowledge is related to personal judgement, personal
skills,

meaning

and

understanding

rather

than

any

"objective"

topographical, mechanical (or quantum-mechanical) idea of knowledge.
This position has been expounded in great detail, and developed over a
number of years by Polanyi who has argued that "a topographical atomic
account of the Universe ... ignores all our normal experience and can
answer no questions about it" (Polanyi, 1975, p.29). He posits a theory of
personal knowledge that relies on "ordinary experience" to amass "a vast
range

of

everyday

knowledge,

conveying

delicate

and

complex

conceptions, that serves as a guide to biology, medicine, psychology, and
to the manifold disciplines that study man and society" (ibid., p.32). Such
personal knowledge can be corrected and expounded by the sciences
"which rely in their turn on the further personal knowledge of the experts"
(ibid.).

Polanyi speaks of two different kinds of awareness - "subsidiary
awareness" and "focal awareness" where the "subsidiaries" enable us to
"focus" on something else, a "joint image" which is the integrated view of
the subsidiaries and gives them a meaning (ibid., p.34). He calls this "tacit
knowing" which can be taken as a typical pattern or structure of the
process of coming to know something.

This kind of knowing has three

distinct aspects - the functional, the phenomenal and the semantic. Polanyi
illustrates this by describing the structure of the act of reading a printed
sentence. The sight of the printed word, he says, guides our immediate
attention away from the type, to its meaning (the focus).
functions

The type

as a guide to the meaning (the semantic aspect).

The

phenomenal aspect lies in the fact that the word looks different from the
way it would look to someone with different experience, for example, to
someone to whom it was completely foreign. The familiar use of a word

"which is our subsidiary awareness of it, renders it in a way bodiless, or as
is sometimes said, transparent" (ibid., p.35).
Within this structure of coming to know, there are three "centres of
tacit knowledge" - the subsidiary particulars, the focal target and the
knower who links the first to the second. The link occurs by "the act of a
person" who integrates one to another, the act being the "creative
imagination" in action which, for Polanyi, is the way in which knowledge is
extended and acquired (ibid., p.38).

In other words, to follow Polanyi's

illustration, the printed type on the page (the subsidiary) and the meaning
of it (the focal target) are related only as the knower relates them. If the
knower chooses to change or break the relation, for example by making
the black marks on paper the focal target, then the other relation (the word
and its meaning) is dissolved for that moment.

In this way the knower

needs only to focus on a subsidiary to change the relation between
subsidiaries and focal targets.

Polanyi claims that our awareness of

subsidiaries can exist on any level of consciousness (including the
unconscious) but focal awareness is always fully conscious (ibid., p.39).
Subsidiaries are anything at all which we use to help us find meanings, and
meaning itself becomes a subsidiary when we go one step further in the
acquisition of knowledge and focus on understanding.

Polanyi describes

subsidiaries as "tools of observation" with which we identify while we use
them. He calls this a process of "indwelling" by which we "pour ourselves
into" the subsidiary. This may apply to physical tools (such as a hammer
which becomes an extension of our arm and hand as the nail becomes the
focal target), and to conceptual tools (such as a theory, through which and
within which we examine other things). Such tools "amplify the powers of
your body" (ibid., p.37).

Polanyi's epistemology which I have adopted as a framework, has
been a particularly useful tool, to use his own image, for examining the

development of emotion in the way that I have wanted.

Within this

framework I have been able to use the relationship between subsidiaries
and focal targets in ways that helped me move towards the understanding I
was seeking. Beginning with the view that people's knowledge of emotion
and their articulation of thought about emotion comes from the pool of
normal experience, I focussed firstly on the different ways in which people
thought about emotion, as they were presented in the writings available.
The subsidiaries were the thoughts of the philosophers, selected to show
those ways most clearly. Hence the philosophical material is not meant to
be a full coverage of any philosopher's thought, or any justification of it
(such a task would be a thesis in itself, as I found when I attempted it in the
early stages of planning this thesis), but a selection of thoughts that
illustrate the developmental trend for which I was searching. The first part
of that trend was that people had different ways or perspectives for thinking
about emotion, and those ways seemed to be related to the particular
problems which the experience of emotions raised.

I develop this point

further at the end of Chapter One.
Secondly, I focussed on how psychologists approached the study of
emotion from the point of view of the then new discipline of psychology
which had its own needs in trying to establish itself as a discipline. In this
case, I used as subsidiaries, the ways that emerged from eariy thought and
attempted to relate them to psychological thought. Thirdly, I focussed on a
particular psychologist

(George Kelly) when I became aware, in a

subsidiary way, that he appeared to have integrated the different ways of
thinking about emotion to provide a new, creative relationship between
thought and feeling.

Fourthly, I focussed on another

psychologist

(Sigmund Freud) when I became aware, again in a subsidiary way, that he
appeared to provide the means whereby the relationship between thought
and feeling emerging from Kelly could be more effectively realised and
used to acquire more understanding of emotion both in personal ways and

more broadly.

Fifthly, I focussed on the new awareness of thought and

feeling that seemed to be possible from the complementary relationship
between the work of Freud and the work of Kelly.
Polanyi's

epistemologica!

framework

is compatible

with

Kelly's

philosophy of Constructive Alternativism (Neimeyer, 1980), and also allows
for various other positions I have spoken from both directly and by
implication.

It allows for an inner/outer distinction in terms of people's

"inner environment" (that is, their world of awareness and self-awareness,
and the unique and private character of the world of thought, so central to
Polanyi's idea of knowledge), as opposed to "external environment" which
can be taken to be all that lies outside the world of thought. It also allows
for a dualistic view of mind and body, which, while it is not central to this
inquiry, is assumed by implication in a number of ways both theoretically
and within the technique proposed later in the thesis, for analysing and
furthering the understanding of emotional processes. It also allows for the
assumption that our concepts of things are "loaded" with the meanings we
attach to them through personal experience, as well as having a more
general or commonly-held meaning (which may be loaded in another way,
culturally, politically etc, but still allowing for an "unloaded" meaning which
we recognise as its bare definition). For example, the concept of sadness
has a general or unloaded meaning whereby we all know what we mean by
"sadness". But for each individual, the concept also has a meaning derived
from that person's experiences of sadness.

In the latter case, the

subsidiaries are the experiences, bringing to bear on the focal target which
is the meaning of sadness. This idea was very well illustrated recently in an
edition of a primary school magazine where some children entered items
that described feelings. Sadness was described as

"Sadness is dark blue
It tastes like a rotten apple
and smells like smoke rushing through your clothes
It looks like tears falling into a glass jar
and sounds like a baby crying.
Sadness feels like a wet sponge."
(Walsh, East Corrimal Primary School Magazine, 1991).
There are several other examples of feelings described in this way
including joy, fear, friendliness, love etc, all of which give clear examples of
the ways in which personal meanings are built into words and concepts
from an early age.

For Walsh, sadness is dark blue, for someone else

happiness may be dark blue, depending on the association (it is certainly
easy to imagine how a dark, velvety blue sky could be associated with
happiness ...). In the next section of the Introduction I describe the aims of
this thesis more formally.
The aim of this thesis

The major aim of this thesis is to show that in the history of
human thought about emotion, a gradual development has
been taking place that reflects the ways in which our emotional
processes have been changing, and gives us an indication of
the ways in which they may yet change.
In fulfilling this aim I have sought to establish firstly that the gradual
development referred to has been the emergence from the history of ideas,
of five distinct ways in which people have thought about emotions.
Secondly, I have sought to show that these five ways reflect the changes in
human emotional processes as these operate in increasingly complex
patterns in the context of the relationship between thought, feeling and our
interpretation of events. By "emotional processes" I refer to people's ways
of experiencing, understanding and articulating emotions.

Finally, I have

sought to show that the complex relationship between thoughts, feelings

and our interpretation of events, as it emerges eventually from the work of
Freud and Kelly, indicates the ways in which these three mental events may
be more fully integrated within the human personality.
That this whole pattem of development has an evolutionary character
I posit in the light of Huxley's exposition of the nature of evolutionary action.
Huxley (1953) argues for the existence of two levels of evolutionary action.
He speaks of the biological (genetic, reproductive) level of evolution and a
secondary or "superimposed" level which shows the appearance of "new
capacities" during the evolutionary process. These involve the appearance
of special characteristics such as "the emergence of mental capacities"
(ibid., p.viii).

He refers to the world of language, meaning, individual

experience and pooled experience as a "new kind of environment for life to
inhabit ... the world of the mind" (ibid., p.122). This world, he claims, has
its own evolutionary action which he calls the "psycho-social sector" of the
"human phase of evolution" (ibid., p.8).

He describes this action as a

unique progressive line belonging only to humans, and unique also "in that
it has enabled life to transcend itself, by making possible a second
mechanism for continuity and change, in addition to the genetic outfit in
chromosomes. This is man's method of utilising cumulative experience ..."
(ibid., p.ix). Huxley argues further for the primacy of the human personality
in the evolutionary process claiming that "whichever objective standard we
wish to take, properly developed human personalities are the highest
products of evolution; they have greater capacities and have reached a
higher level of organisation than any other parts of the world's substance"
(ibid., p.165).

In addition, the fact that progressive evolution involves the

realizations of new possibilities leads to a further thesis "that the nearest to
an ultimate that we can discern in human life is not an absolute, but a trend
- the trend toward greater realization of possibilities by means of the
co-operation of integrated individual personalities" (ibid., p.165).

Support for the idea that there is an evolutionary character to the
development of mental processes can also be found in some of the later
writing of Popper (1984) who refers to the evolutionary character of the
development of the products of the mind (these being knowledge, feelings,
cultures) and most especially to the evolutionary character of theories
which survive, he claims, by a process of natural selection, this being the
survival of the fittest in terms of problem solving.

Thus we are being

provided with "better and better information about reality" (Popper, 1984,
p.239).

Hawking (1991) refers to the Darwinian principle of natural

selection operating in connection with human reasoning where some
individuals will be better able to draw useful conclusions about the world
around them.

They are then more likely to survive and so have their

patterns of thought and behaviour emerge as dominant ones

(Hawking,

1991, p.14). This idea again supports the notion that there is more than
one level of evolutionary action. All three writers refer in different ways to
the impossibility of ignoring the progressive developmental character of
people's ways of thinking, feeling and experiencing the world.

Huxley

states that if, as he was aware, people objected to the wider use of the
term 'evolution' then some other term will have to be invented to account
for the comprehensive process of psycho-social development (Huxley,
1953, p.2).
It is within this context and understanding of the whole process of
evolution and within the epistemological context of personal knowledge,
that I speak of the complex development of the relationship between
thought and feeling - that is the emotional processes and the thinking
processes, and the ways in which they may interact to provide the kind of
progress that contributes to the greater realization of possibilities and the
greater development of the human personality.

Within this context, I

propose that it is appropriate to speak of "thoughtful feeling and feelingful
thinking" as "an evolutionary step".

From the major aim of this thesis then, five secondary aims emerge
which form the structure of the work. Each proposition is now presented
and briefly discussed.
(1) That the history of human thought on emotion yields certain
perspectives from which we may understand more about the
complexity of feelings.
In Chapters One and Two I have traced the thinking on human
emotion from presocratic times to modern theories, outlining the major
traditions that have emerged. These have included the ways in which
feeling has been related (and not related) to thinking, the relationships
posited between emotion and ethical concepts, emotions and motivation,
emotions and creativity and emotions and physiological processes. From
the seventeenth century onwards, in particular, emotions were most clearly
separated from many other concepts, notably ethical concepts. The major
emphasis in philosophical thought moved closer to aspects of reasoning,
carrying the separation of thinking and feeling into the modern age. Letwin
(1987) claims that "Kant ... presents the Platonic disjunction between pure
reason and irrational passion in an even more acute form. He sees reason
as a unifying, harmonising force, leading all rational beings to the same
true and morally correct conclusion. Passion he sees as utterly disjoined
from and opposed to reason" (Letwin, 1987, p.3). Hobbes also took the
stand that reason must oppose passion, whereas Hegel, Aquinas,
Descartes, Spinoza and Hume all attempt, in different ways, to draw a
closer relationship between "reason and the passions".
In each case I have attempted to describe the particular way in which
each philosopher selected has tackled the problem of emotions and their
place in the human psyche, as well as to show how their thinking is
connected to the thinking already established. The aim has been to

present material that reflects as far as possible the particular trend I have
sought to make visible.

This has involved selecting those active and

original ideas about emotion that reflect the growth in complexity of the
concept. I have taken it as "given" within the epistemological framework of
this thesis that such growth reflects the increasing complexity of human
experience.

This has been argued very capably by Polanyi, as I stated

earlier.

The way in which the philosophers have been selectively treated
requires, perhaps, some justification.

In each case the aim has been to

demonstrate something and to lead to a particular conclusion, rather than
to justify or to argue for, or against, any particular idea.

Almost all the

philosophers I have dealt with have distinguished themselves more
forcefully with other ideas, and those other ideas are, or can be, related to
their ideas on emotion. Also their ideas on emotion are usually presented
within a broader epistemological context of their own, but insofar as the
ideas on emotion have been able to stand on their own, I have not found it
necessary to present, each time, those complex and major frameworks.
For example, in presenting my selection of ideas from Spinoza I have not
entered into any discussion of his major concept of conatus because with
this concept he is explaining and justifying his position as regards the origin
of emotions. Conatus, or his idea that "Everything, in so far as it is in itself,
endeavours to persist in its own being", is put forward with supporting
propositions, as a justification for his saying, a little later, that emotions can
be explained in terms of the mind passing from states of greater and lesser
perfection (i.e., from pleasure to pain). And that, in turn, is used to give his
position on what he considers to be the primary emotions (Spinoza, 1955,
pp.136-8).

My interest in Spinoza however focusses on the way in which he has
classified emotions (e.g. active/passive, pleasure/pain, memory/ideas, part

of a perfect natural plan, and able to be 'scientifically approached') rather
than on his explanation or justification of that position. His actual position
(rather than his justification of his position) reflects, I contend, the trend of
increasing complexity, and the type of complexity that he specifically
contributes. If I were discussing his theory of motivation as a central aim, I
would discuss the concept of conatus as his actual position and,
depending on whether or not I was attempting to describe his justification
of that position, would introduce specific other propositions. Otherwise, I
could simply describe what is meant by conatus, without attempting to
assess his justification.
It is in this descriptive, and sometimes mildly discursive mode, that I
have presented a philosophical context for the psychological points I aimed
to make as the central aim of this thesis.

With early philosophers the

selections emerged more easily, as many ideas were being presented in
their initial form, especially the powerful idea that there was a profound
separation between feeling and thinking processes.

With more modern

thinkers the task became more complex as, in some cases the separation
of thinking and feeling became greater and in others arguments against
such a separation emerged strongly.

In the latter case such arguments

seemed to be based primarily on the creative and aesthetic aspect of
emotion. Kant, for example (who formally saw emotions as irrational, as
Letwin (1987) points out) presents a theory of emotions within an aesthetic
context in his lesser known work. Observations on the Feeling of the
Beautiful and the Sublime. In Chapter Two I have presented a description
of this theory as being the developmental step, rather than his formal
position.

I have not entered into a discussion of Kant's more prominent

and encompassing theory of moral duty, though obviously this would have
been necessary had I been attempting to present any sort of justification of
Kant's position, and had I been looking for internal consistency as a major
aim. I have also described Nietzsche's idea that emotions are the product

of a creative outpouring of the personality, and Sartre's idea that emotions
are people's ways of "transforming the world". The creative aspect of
emotions can be traced back to presocratic thought, but these
philosophers refine and highlight it.
Of the present day philosophers. Heller (1979) argues, that "to feel
means to be involved in something, feeling being essentially a relation to
something, positive or negative, where "something" can be anything, even
another involvement (Heller, 1979, p.60). Averill (1980) describes emotions
in terms of rigidity and flexibility; Rorty (1980) explores the relationship
between thinking, beliefs and feeling; and Solomon (1976) attempts to
"sweep away the myths of emotion" by positing a creative harmony
between thinking and feeling. Each of these philosophers has followed a
developmental thread of one or other of the major perspectives on
emotion, bringing it into modern day thinking. In each case the selection of
material has been made to highlight another complexity or dimension being
added to the concept of emotion. Although I have valued many excellent
commentaries and analyses of various philosophers, I have attempted as
far as possible to work from original sources since my aim has been to
present ideas that form a certain pattern, rather than arguments or
justifications, and then to give an interpretation of that pattern. Insofar as
the concept of will concerns my inquiry, I have dealt with it only indirectly as
a part of the motivation aspect of emotion. To raise the question of will as
a separate issue is not an aim of this thesis, as it invariably seems to
involve taking an argumentative stance, rather than a descriptive one, if
anyone's position on will is to be made clear. Although such a task would
be an interesting one, it would swing too wide, I believe, from the central
task of this thesis.

(ii)

A further proposition was that modern psychological theories, though
emerging from different contexts, did not abandon these developing
strands, and in fact contributed to them further.

In Chapter

Three

I have attempted to show that

psychologists

beginning from different vantage points, psychological, behavioural and
psychotherapeutic, began reflecting a new phase in the development of
emotions; and that psychology itself could be argued to be a part of the
socio-evolutionary process in connection with emotion.

Three major world symposia on emotion have been held since 1927
(The Wittenberg Symposium, 1927, The Mooseheart Symposium, 1947,
and
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Evolutionary theories of

emotion began to emerge alongside physiological, cognitive and existential
theories. The psychological theories could be categorised however within
the perspectives of emotion outlined at the end of Chapter One.

Within

these perspectives I have discussed early physiological theories and the
development of major theories from Freud onwards.

Chapter Three

concludes with an argument that Freud and Kelly, with the scope and
direction

of their theories add a new and

major dimension

to the

understanding and development of emotional processes.

(iii)

The next proposition to emerge was that Kelly, within his theory of
Personal Constructs has presented a theory of emotions that posits
the closest relationship between thinking and feeling yet presented.

In Chapter

Four I have outlined Kelly's (1963) theory of personality

and attempted to show how, despite no formal intention to do so, Kelly has

presented a substantial theory of emotions. I have attempted to establish
that within his concept of construing there exists a close relationship
between thinking and feeling, and that such a relationship is essential to his
process of testing constructs by way of prediction and validation.

I have

claimed however, that in presenting such a close relationship between
thinking and feeling, Kelly has not explained how we may structure our
emotional processes to become more aware of the ways in which we use
them in constming.

I maintain that Kelly has, in fact, presupposed the

existence of such personal emotional awareness.
(iv)

The next proposition then, was that the means to the personal
emotional awareness necessary for the full use of Kelly's method of
construing as a way of making sense of the world, was to be found in
the work of Freud.
I have sought to demonstrate that within

Freud's Theory of

Psychoanalysis there exists a theory of emotions that is more complex and
cognitively based than his more formal Theory of the Instincts.

I have

argued that his most complex Theory of Emotions, positing three levels of
emotional processes, makes it possible to engage in a system of emotional
analysis based on the psychoanalytic technique of association.
In Chapter Five Xhereiore I have outlined Freud's (1964) theory of the
instincts and the place of reason and emotion within it. In Chapters Six and
Seven I have attempted to show that Freud said much more about
emotions than his Theory of the Instincts allows, and that his other
references, when considered together, begin to form a pattern that adds
new levels to the Theory of the Instincts. The aim of these chapters has
been to present an emerging pattern of statements that form the basis for
an elaboration of Freud's theory.

From the Standard Edition of Freud's

works therefore, I have attempted to find the mainstreams of his thinking

that appeared to run beneath his formal statements. To that extent, it was
not primarily a chronologically developmental search, but a search for the
"question marks" in his thinking, and indications that he was aware of such
question marks.
Mackay (1986) has argued that psychoanalytic theory changes and
develops over the course of Freud's writings with some hypotheses added
and others removed or changed.

He argues however, that despite such

changes there was an underlying unity of form, and the changes
represented revisions of aspects of the theory rather than really different
theories (Mackay, 1986).

My argument is that, as well as an underlying

unity of form concerning the instincts, there was an underlying concept of
feeling that was never given the articulation given to the instincts. I have
argued this on the basis of the many statements made by Freud that did
not fit into his Instincts Theory and seemed, at times, to be at odds with it.
The Theory of Emotions from Freud that I have proposed in Chapter
Eight does, I argue, resolve many of the apparent inconsistencies in
Freud's thinking. The path to such a theory has been necessarily complex,
involving as it did, much of Freud's writings and the need to tackle his
various attitudes to knowledge and feelings. It has not been my intention
to present a negative view of Freud in these chapters. If I have referred to
his arrogance

it has been in the sense of creative

philosophical

presumption (as in, for example, his claims to truth) rather than in any
personal sense. The theory I have posited as emerging from his writings
is, I contend, the richest framework within which to explore feelings that
has yet existed, and one that was increasingly at the edge of his thinking.

(v)

The final proposition in this thesis was that, on the basis of Freud's
Theory of Emotions and his analytic technique, and Kelly's Theory of

Personal Constructs, we have the direction to go forward to a new
awareness of thinking and feeling.
I have put forward in Chapter Nine the idea that both Freud and Kelly
have

moved substantially

fonA/ard in the

understanding

of

mental

processes, and that there are more complementary connections in their
thinking than seems apparent. I have also presented the beginnings of a
technique for personal analysis of emotions to demonstrate how this may
be implemented and used to follow Kelly's process of construing more
effectively.

The technique is necessarily in an abbreviated form, with

suggestions of the kind of elaborations possible.
psychotherapeutic technique, nor one that

It is not primarily a

is based on ethical or

motivational assumptions, but it is meant to increase personal emotional
awareness and knowledge of oneself and others.

It is based on the

assumption that we do have private "emotional worlds" with their own
meaning and stnjcture, and that it is possible to discover and articulate
those worlds.

These assumptions are related to Freud's structure of

mental processes and to the philosophical idea of "possible worlds".

It

remains to give a more detailed account of the technique and the ways in
which it relates more fully to the psychoanalytic process during its
implementation.

However, in the present form its structure is visible and

the relevance to the central aim of this thesis is, I hope, clear.

I have added two Appendices to the thesis.

Appendix I is an

illustration of how the technique of emotion analysis works in one particular
case, and how the knowledge and awareness yielded by the analysis may
be used to elaborate construing. This is intended as an illustration only
and not as any sort of empirical test, which is beyond the scope of this
thesis.

Appendix II describes how empirical possibilities might be
approached in connection with the theory and some of the problems
involved. There is also a brief discussion of how emotion analysis may
possibly be used in connection with current research.
Finally, what I have attempted to do is to pose the question "What is
an emotion?" indirectly, and to move closer to an answer by seeking a
greater awareness of the many processes of definition involved. For this
reason I regard this work as primarily psychological rather than
philosophical, though perhaps any theory of emotions belongs somewhere
between. Regarding the definition of the term "emotion" I have
distinguished between "sensation" and "emotion", using the former in a
physiological context and the latter as a process that incorporates both the
physiological and cognitive experiences of feeling. The terms "feeling" and
"emotion" I have used interchangeably, based on the latter definition also,
except in Chapter Eight where, within Freud's multi-level theory I
distinguish between "instinct", "sensation", "feeling", "emotion" and
"emotional state". The term "reason" I have used both in the Humean
sense as "that which judges a truth and falsehood" (Hume, 1969, p.465)
and in the sense of the process of the conceptualisation and ordering of
experiences.
The term "self" I have used to denote individual consciousness
(including self-consciousness) in a generally applicable way, but the term
"ego" refers to the self in the Freudian sense, that is, as that part of the
psyche which stands in a certain relation to the Freudian concepts of the
Unconscious and the Superego.
The term "emotion analysis" I have used to describe the process of
analysing the emotions of any individual. This process is presented as a
specific technique in Chapter Nine and in Appendix I. It was difficult to find

a suitable term to describe this process and while "emotion analysis" is not
ideal, no other term seemed any more suitable. It is used simply to mean
"analysis of emotion", just as "data analysis" is used to describe "analysis of
data".

The term "emotional processes" I have defined as "the ways in

which people experience, understand and articulate emotions". Other
terms in this thesis are defined, where appropriate, in the text as they
occur.

CHAPTER ONE
EARLY PHILOSOPHICAL TRADITIONS
IN THEORIES OF EMOTION

Section I: Early concepts of emotion

The concept of emotion has been present in human deliberations as
far back as the history of human thought has been recorded. Going back
as far is the concept of reason, and also attempts to understand and posit
a relationship between these two. The seventh century (BC) poet Hesiod
wrote:
and Love, who is fairest among immortal gods, loosener of limbs
by whom all gods and all men, find their thoughts and wise
councils overcome in their breasts (Barnes, 1987, p.56).

Hesiod thus links emotion and thought very early in a way that
foreshadowed one of the major traditions in the analysis of these concepts,
the tradition that emotion, feelings or passions, control or overcome
reason.

The second tradition holds that reason can, and should,

overcome, or at least regulate, the passions. Philosophically there are very
early

subscribers to

both positions.

The

Presocratic

philosopher

Empedocles took the view that Love and Hatred ("Strife") dominated the
very creation of the universe.

In the cycle of creation the four elements

were forever being brought together by Love and torn apart by Strife. In
man,
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She [Love] is thought to be innate also in the limbs of mortals,
by whom they think thoughts of love and perform deeds of
union, calling her Joy by name ... Her, you must regard with
your mind ... (Barnes, 1987, p.166).

Here love is seen as the force of creative motivation and reason is
given the function of understanding this. Love is regarded as the means
whereby reason can be exercised as in "Intelligible things are made similar
by Love, whereas perceptible things are overpowered by Strife and torn
further apart ..." (ibid., p.169). This very early idea does not see emotion
(at least not the basic emotions of Love and Hate) as confined to human
experience, but sees human experience as one manifestation of these
forces. In this context. Love and Hate are seen as primary forces of the
universe that impart something of themselves into each created thing. The
human experience of emotion becomes the experience of joy, harmony,
unity, symbolising the bringing of things together, and the experience of
misery, disharmony and destruction and decay, symbolising the tearing of
things apart. As broad as this idea is, the beginnings can still be seen of
the kind of theory that claims emotion or feelings dominate the psyche and
that reason, at best, can only recognise, identify, learn about these things.
But Empedocles also suggests a close relation between thought and
feeling, associated with Love and "Holy Mind" active in the cosmos (ibid.,
p.163), when he says, having outlined the way in which we recognise each
thing by its like: "... all things are fitted together and constructed, and by
these they think and feel pleasure and pain" (ibid., p.191). The suggestion
here is that emotion (pleasure and pain) is both felt and thought, which is a
dimension of emotion theory that has been picked up and developed in
present day thinking (Solomon, 1976).
Democritus (about 470 BC), the most prolific and ultimately most
influential of the presocratic philosophers (Barnes, 1987, p.244), had

something to say about the passions in connection with his thoughts on
knowledge.

Reason, which he called genuine knowledge, he saw as the

"standard of truth", but he is reported as having had three ultimate such
standards - for what is unclear or obscure in the realm of knowledge, the
standard is the apparent (the "apparent" being the sight or understanding
of what is unclear); for investigation in the realm of knowledge the standard
is the concept (the "concept" being that which the investigation is about);
and for knowledge of choice and avoidance, the standard is the passions
(the "passions" being an indication of what we find pleasant and therefore
to be chosen, and unpleasant and therefore to be avoided) (ibid., p.254).
This posits quite an interesting relation between reason and the passions
since reason here is used to know what to choose and what to avoid, and
it must do this, apparently, by observing feelings that are pleasant and
unpleasant. Presumably, if reason chooses to pursue those things which
give pleasure and avoid those which give unpleasure, the more pleasure is
gained overall, so it would seem that it is in the power of reason to bring
about or not to bring about certain feelings.
Democritus claims however that passions can be overwhelming and
that the soul (as distinct from the mind) is responsible "inasmuch as it had
destroyed some parts of the body by negligence or dissipated them by
drunkenness, and had ruined and ravaged other parts by its pursuit of
pleasures" (ibid., p.264). But at the same time, "medicine", according to
Democritus, "cures the diseases of the body, and wisdom clears the soul of
passions", and "reason is a powerful persuader" (ibid., p.264).

So,

although passions may rule the body, it is up to reason, as the seat of
knowledge and wisdom, to choose and regulate that it should be
otherwise.

The soul, which needs to be "cleared" by wisdom is the

"dwelling place" of happiness, which Democritus calls contentment,
well-being, harmony, orderliness, tranquillity.

This is constituted by

"distinguishing and discriminating among pleasures, and this is the noblest

and most advantageous thing for niien" (ibid., p.265). So happiness, rather
than pleasure, is the ultimate goal for men, since pleasures may be "good"
or "bad", and reason must choose happiness (good pleasures) or misery
(bad pleasures) (ibid., p.266). The mark of good pleasures is moderation
"for men gain contentment from moderation in joy and a measured life:
deficiencies

and excesses tend to change and to produce

large

movements in the soul, and souls which move across large intervals are
neither stable nor content" (ibid., p.269).
Democritus

makes

many

more

remarks

on

the

value

of

"temperateness" (such as "Temperateness increases joys and makes
pleasures greater" (ibid., p.271), which is curiously contradictory since
temperateness would seem to be leading to intemperateness i.e. greater
and greater pleasures), and the value of reason (such as "it is hard to fight
against anger: to master it is the mark of the rational man" (ibid., p.274))
but the final picture that emerges does not simply put reason in the primary
position. Clearly passions have the power to overwhelm and control and
while it is implied that reason is stronger, reason itself (i.e., the attainment
of wisdom and knowledge) is dependent on a good upbringing and
education which is not in the control of the individual. Democritus stresses
the importance of upbringing and education on many occasions and
makes it clear that he regards learning as the major key to a happy life.
Reason here is, of course, not only the reasoning faculty, the ability to
learn, but also learning or knowledge itself, so ultimately Democritus is
saying that when the reasoning faculty is successful in obtaining right
knowledge, then it is possible to control or regulate emotions. Therefore,
presumably, in the uneducated state, man is ruled by passions, perhaps
feebly moved by reason at times.
Conceptually this leaves emotions in an interesting position because
even if the moral element is removed (i.e. that some pleasures are "good"

and others "bad") we are still left with the idea that some pleasures produce
more pleasure while others produce less or actual unpleasure. The great
pleasure of stuffing oneself with a favourite food, for example, may be
followed by the great unpleasure of illness or possibly self-disgust. Or,
more conceptually, the great pleasure of thinking about revenge on one's
enemies, may be followed by powerful feelings of remorse, etc. And, of
course, the great pleasure of being able to assist a beloved person in
some way may be followed by the still greater pleasure of knowing one has
contributed to the further well-being of that person, and so on. It is easy to
see why even the earliest philosophers found it necessary to bring in ideas
of "good" and "bad" to sort out such complexity.
In Nature it was readily observed that "like begets like" yet here it was
that pleasure could beget unpleasure, so a further category was needed,
and it was the moral category that emerged and remained central to the
concept of feelings and emotion for an extraordinary length of time. In one
sense this is not surprising of course, since the human tendency to make
value judgements is as strong as any other part of the human psyche, and
no account of human nature has ignored this. What is surprising is that
feelings conceptually seemed completely bound up with or swamped by
the moral category. At the point where it became obvious that some
pleasures led to further greater pleasure and other pleasures led to less or
to the opposite of pleasure, the nature of pleasure itself (i.e. this curious
feeling that could generate more of itself, or turn into its opposite) was
somehow explained away by positing "good" and "bad" pleasures.
If emotions are viewed in the context of human actions rather than
feelings only, then it is easier to see how the concept of emotions became
so closely bound up with the concept of good and bad. In his book
Discovery of the Mind, Snell (1982) spends a chapter tracing the origins of
Greek thought on virtue and "the good". He points out there that the first

"call to virtue" in Greek literature is sounded in the opening book of the Iliad
where Achilles, about to attack Agamemnon in anger, is restrained by the
goddess Athena. She comes "to put an end to his passionate impulse" by
stopping his action (Snell, 1982, p. 155). She does not do this by offering a
moral reason (though the murder of Agamemnon would have been
considered morally wrong) but rather by offering inducements ("gifts") as a
reward for self-control.

This equation between the good and the

advantageous marked early Greek thinking on ethics in many ways (ibid.,
pp.156-7). The advantageous of course brought pleasure in one form or
another. So the notion existed even then that a good act brought reward
(pleasure) and a bad act brought nothing or punishment (unpleasure). In
practical terms then, good and bad became tied with feelings of pleasure
and unpleasure. In political terms also, it followed that some actions were
to be chosen and other avoided, not only to achieve something called
happiness (a state of mind) but also to protect those things connected with
good actions, i.e. rewards, prosperity, honours, etc.

Section II: Themes from Plato and Aristotle

It was not until the time of Socrates that the notion of happiness for its
own sake appeared, (i.e. the assurance of having done no wrong), and
then, it could be traced to the religious notion of permanent happiness in
an afterlife as a reward for having lived a good life (ibid., p.164). The
concept of happiness began to include the notion of a feeling, a
phenomenon of the mind, as well as a complete state of prosperity or
well-being tied to the notion of a morally good life. Plato in his writings did
not speak directly in any detail of the nature of emotions, or present a
fomial theory, though the concept was introduced many times in

connection with his ideas on ethics, education, religion, and society and
politics.

In The Republic, a study of society that includes thoughts on

these topics, Plato introduces the dialogue with a discussion of justice and
what it could mean. One of the very early ideas introduced is the notion of
feelings and good character as being connected. When Socrates speaks
with Cephalus, an old man, on the subject of life, Cephalus points out that
old age gives a certain freedom from intense desires. Referring to feelings
of sexual desire, Cephalus agrees with Sophocles the poet (so he says)
who saw such feelings as a "fierce and frenzied master" (Plato, trans. Lee,
1974, p.63) and says that "in old age you become quite free of feelings of
this sort and they leave you in peace; and when your desires lose their
intensity and relax, you get what Sophocles was talking about, a release
from a lot of mad masters" (ibid., p.63).

Unhappy old people, claims

Cephalus, are unhappy not because of age but because of character, for "if
men are sensible and good-tempered, old age is easy enough to bear; if
not, youth as well as age is a burden" (ibid., p.63). The discussion then
goes on to speak of "good and sensible men" and the ethical requirements
of that state. What this dialogue shows in connection with emotions is that
there was obviously a concept around then that linked feelings with desires
and sensations, as well as with satisfactions of being morally on the right
track. "Good and sensible men" were those who were not too torn apart
by the "mad masters" of desire. Old age brought its own set of feelings
however, that were different in quality from youthful feelings, so feelings
were clearly more than intense desires, just as they were different from
goodness and good sense.
Still pursuing the notions of justice, Plato carries the discussion on to
the relation between happiness and the just and unjust man. The theme of
happiness is explored at some length in The Republic, the notion being
one rather different from the usual English understanding. The common
Greek word for happy ("eudaimon") "implies less an immediate state of

mind or feeling than a more permanent disposition of character, something
between prosperity and integration of personality, though of course feeling
is involved too" (ibid., p. 102). The "feeling" involved is presumably the
immediate state of mind which accompanies the disposition of character
and prosperous state of the person. But if happiness is not a clear "feeling"
to pursue, the notions of pleasure and pain are.

In Book Nine of The

Republic, Plato addresses the actual nature of feelings of pleasure and
pain, while still talking about the relation between happiness and character.
This dialogue explores feeling as a kind of movement in the psyche which
is in some way perceived by the mind. The dialogue begins by establishing
that pleasure and pain are to be regarded as opposites, and then it is
asked:

And is there not a state in which we feel neither pleasure nor
pain? ... it will lie between the two, I suppose, giving the mind
rest from both ... What is more, both pleasure and pain when
they occur are processes of mental change, are they not? ... But
didn't we see just now that to feel neither pleasure nor pain is to
be in a state of rest between the two? ... Then can it be right to
suppose that absence of pain is pleasure or absence of
enjoyment pain? ... (ibid., pp.408-9).
The answer to the last question in the dialogue is "no" thus leaving the
way open for Socrates (Plato) to discuss what he believes to be the "true
character" of pleasure and pain, and the state in between. So far he has
defined them as processes of mental change (with rest being cessation
from change). He goes on to argue that there is a level of "pure pleasure"
that is difficult to achieve except

by learning and wisdom, most people

being caught in the illusion that absence of pain is pleasure and absence of
pleasure, pain. He draws a parallel with the natural world where there is a
"top, a bottom and a middle" and claims that most people move from the
bottom to the middle and down again believing this to be the real world.
One ascension to the top however (brought about only by contact with the
unchanging reality of wisdom and truth i.e., learning) is enough to make

one realise that all one had seen before was grey and black - not black and
white (ibid., pp.410-11).
So the feeling or state of "pure pleasure" is conceived by Plato to be
sonnething that is bound to the unchanging and eternal realities whereas
other feelings stemming from pain and absence of pain, belong to the
changing and ordinary (or illusory) realities of the everyday world.

This

concept of feelings and emotional states relies on some quite unprovable
presuppositions (such as the existence of different levels of reality, and a
height of "pure reality", eternal unchanging) but the significance for emotion
theory is that Plato clearly was not satisfied to define emotions only as
degrees of pleasure and pain. There was a place in the human psyche
where feelings were experienced in terms of a complete state of being, as
far as he was concerned, and the levels of purity were connected with the
quality of feeling, which may be contemplated outside an ethical context if
one is simply looking at what a feeling might possibly be.

However for

Plato this is clearly something of an aside, since The Republic is concerned
with an inquiry into the nature of justice and its political, social and ethical
ramifications as they affect "the ideal state".

Nonetheless, a concept of

emotions emerges that is complex, developing on the one hand the idea
that education and learning are essential to understanding feelings, and
indeed to having feelings, and introducing also the idea of degrees of
reality (or quality) to feelings.

Aristotle gives a direct discussion of emotions in the Rhetoric and
refers to emotions in De Anima and the Nicomachean Ethics. The notion
of happiness is once again connected to the Greek meaning of the term
and is used by Aristotle much more widely than in connection with feelings,
but he does speak of pleasure and pain, of anger, pity, fear, love, etc. In
the Rhetoric, Aristotle defines the emotions as "all those feelings that so
change men as to affect their judgements, and that are also attended by

pain or pleasure" (Aristotle, trans. Ross, Vol.XI, p.1378).

With this

definition, Aristotle does not define emotions in a way that throws light on
what a feeling might actually be in psychological terms, but he formally
establishes two important notions: firstly, that feelings affect judgements
(so there is a certain relation between feeling and thinking or emotions and
reason) and secondly that emotions are always accompanied by pleasure
or pain, which are in themselves regarded as feelings. In this early thinking
on emotions then, pleasure and pain are used as a way of categorising
emotions formally. Further, Aristotle makes it plain as he defines anger that
some emotions are accompanied by both pleasure and pain. "Anger," he
says, "may be defined as an impulse, accompanied by pain, to a
conspicuous revenge for a conspicuous slight directed without justification
towards what concerns oneself or towards what concerns one's friends".
He adds, "it must always be attended by a certain pleasure that which
arises from the expectation of revenge ... It is also attended by a certain
pleasure because the thoughts dwell upon the act of vengeance, and the
images then called up cause pleasure, like the images called up in dreams"
(ibid., p.1378).

This definition (though perhaps arguable on the grounds that feelings
of anger and feelings towards wanting revenge could be separated even if
they remain closely related) gives us another powerful component of the
concept of emotion, that of emotions being caused, or brought into being
by thought, or imagination, in the form of images. In this case feelings of
pleasure are being brought about by thoughts dwelling on the act of
revenge.

The relationship here is an interesting one: anger which is

defined in terms of an impulse towards revenge, brings about (causes)
thoughts about the act of revenge which in turn causes feelings of pleasure
"of a certain kind". The anger in the first instance was caused by the act of
another.

So embedded in the emotional process are the notions of

feelings, thoughts, and actions. And in fact, in the Nicomachean Ethics,

Aristotle claims that the virtuous man must not only act correctly, but also
feel correctly, deliberation and practical reasoning being the means to this
achievement (Aristotle, trans. Thomson, 1983, p.545).
In De Anima Aristotle claims that "all the affections of soul involve a
body - passion, gentleness, fear, pity, courage, joy, loving and hating; in all
these there is a concurrent affection of the body" (Aristotle, trans. Ross,
1941, p.537). He argues further that since the body is involved as well as
the soul, the definitions of "affections" (also referred to here as "feelings"
and "emotions") ought to have a corresponding character, giving the
example of anger being defined both as an "appetite for returning pain for
pain" and "a boiling of the blood or warm substance surrounding the heart"
(ibid., p.537). In these statements, Aristotle is attempting to define the soul
CpsycheV'anima') and to describe the relationship between body and soul;
but while he presents the soul as the form of the body (and not a distinct
thing attached to it), he also introduces the powerful notion that a feeling is
something more than a physical or material manifestation.

Aristotle

describes the other dimension as the "form" or "formulable essence", and
the idea of a "form" or "essence" in the case of affections involves cognitive
processes as part of their reality. So to have an emotion, it would seem
that we need both to experience or undergo the bodily change associated
with a feeling and be able to abstract from that sensation to a level of
recognising, categorising, and conceptualising what we are experiencing.
In our own experience of emotions it would seem obvious that this is so,
but it is very difficult to define adequately, and indeed many modern
thoughts on emotions have persisted in attempting to reduce feelings to
some form of physical process only.
Aristotle also categorises emotions in pairs of opposites, referring to
growing calm being the opposite of growing angry - calmness being also
gentleness, mildness, placability, patience, etc. (Aristotle, trans. Ross,

Vol.XI, p.1379). His account of growing calm is "a settling down or quieting
of anger" (ibid., p.1379). The notion of emotion as being some sort of
discharge of tension is also introduced "for men become calm when they
have spent their anger on somebody else ..." (ibid., p.1380). Curiously, in
his comments on anger versus hatred (ibid., p.1381), Aristotle speaks
almost as though hatred is not a feeling in the terms of his definition (e.g.,
as being accompanied by pleasure or pain). He contrasts hatred with
anger by claiming "anger is accompanied by pain, hatred is not; the angry
man feels pain but the hater does not" (ibid., p.1381). Hatred has some
special status (possibly spiritual since it seems connected with evil) but
Aristotle does not define this any further, and he then gives fear the same
dual status or level - it is painful at one level but when it reaches certain
proportions or takes on the quality of evil, then it is beyond pain (ibid.,
p.1382). This seems to be both a qualitative and quantitative distinction,
and is not made in connection with other emotions. Aristotle discusses in
the Rhetoric friendship (friendly feelings), shame, kindness, unkindness,
pity, indignation, envy and emulation. However, Burnyeat (1980) discusses
Aristotle's notion of "noble joy" and "noble hatred" (i.e., loving what is noble
and hating what is base) thus giving again a qualitative dimension to
Aristotle's position on emotion - the quality of a feeling being in turn
dependent on a good education to a great degree. The child's sense of
pleasure, "which to begin with and for a long while is his only motive,
should be hooked up with just and noble things so that his unreasoned,
evaluative responses may develop in connection with the right objects"
(Burnyeat, 1980, p.80). Instinctive reactions such as fear need to be
trained into the virtue of courage; feelings cannot be eliminated in a human
being (and are in any case recognised as a basic part of being human),
therefore they have to be trained (ibid., p.82).
Further, in the Nicomachean Ethics Aristotle claims that actions and
passions (but not all) have a "mean" i.e., the state which contains neither

excess or defect as appropriate to that passion and its context.

This

"doctrine of the mean" has been extensively analysed since Aristotle
introduced it, though its central idea, that of appropriate moderation, was
much spoken of by Democritus. The state of virtue is related to finding the
mean appropriate to the circumstances, or in recognising that in some
cases (e.g., spite) a mean does not apply (since spite is not an excess or
defect of some possibly virtuous state but is in itself bad (Aristotle, trans.
Ross, 1941, p.959). Although the idea of the mean is central to Aristotle's
notion of virtue, it also tells us something important about Aristotle's
concept of emotion in that, with or without reference to virtue, emotions
admit of degrees both quantitatively and qualitatively. In many cases the
mean feeling or state is a point between opposites.

Aristotle gives the

example of courage being the mean between feelings of fear and
confidence (ibid., p.969). Further, when a mean is a state it is not defined
as a feeling in itself, though feelings may be attached. For example, when
we speak of someone as "a brave man" we are speaking of their character,
not necessarily their feelings.

They may or may not have feelings of

bravery at any given time. One may be brave without necessarily feeling
brave. It seems to be the case then that for every passion or feeling there
seems to be, in Aristotle's system, a corresponding state which may (or
may not) be said to be a disposition or character trait and which is not
dependent on the presence of corresponding feelings at any given time.
The state however, seems to predispose a person towards having certain
kinds of feelings to a certain degree and of a certain quality (be it the mean,
excess or defect).
While Aristotle does not give an account of what a feeling actually is in
terms of its nature in the psyche, he comes very close to just such a point
by the time he has outlined the relation of feelings to the soul, to reason, to
virtue, to the body, and spoken of the kinds and degrees of feelings that

we experience. There is no subsequent theory of emotion that does not
incorporate or elaborate on at least one, if not most, of these ideas.

Section III: Themes from Epicurean and Stoic philosophy

Whereas the concept of emotion in Presocratic, Platonic and
Aristotelian thought was developed in the context of a world that was
committed to a close social life and social morality, both Epicureanism and
Stoicism gave rise to concepts in the context of the large, impersonal
kingdoms and empires of the Hellenistic and Roman worlds (Maclntyre,
1968, p.108). Epicunjs developed the doctrine inherited from Democritus
that morality is concerned with the pursuit of pleasure, virtue being the art
of pleasure.

But Epicunjs does argue that many pleasures thoughtlessly

pursued result in pain and that some pain is worth enduring for the later
gain of pleasure.

He also argues that freedom from intense desire is a

condition of pleasure, the ultimate pleasure being tranquillity (ibid., p.108).
Epicurus denounced religion as being a great source of fear (which was to
be assiduously avoided) and sought a metaphysic that did not rely on any
religious influence (Russell, 1980, p.254).
In this context, the concept of pleasure as something that could easily
change to pain without proper regulation and choices is posited once
again. The notion that it was possible to avoid some feelings (unpleasant
ones) and to bring about others (pleasant ones) through some rational
process of choice and discrimination is also present. The idea of a "state of
rest" between the extremes of pleasure and pain (tranquillity) gives the
keynote to the Epicurean concept of feelings. We gain nothing about the
possible cognitive origins of feeling here except that while they are
essentially physically based (even the soul was made up of physical

particles for Epicurus) the "pleasure of the mind" was the contemplation of
physical pleasures (ibid., p.252). This separation of pleasure into physical
and mental is the only indication of a notion of a cognitively based aspect
of feelings but it does reinforce the earlier idea that the reflection on bodily
sensations does form a part of emotional development, albeit a minor part
in the Epicurean tradition.
Stoicism, led by the philosopher Zeno, saw human nature as a part of
the cosmos both material and divine. The cosmology incorporated a law of
the universe to which human beings automatically adhered along with all
other matter in the universe.

A part of the law is a universal rational

principle (the Logos) which governs change and a part of it is goodness
which is unquestionable (Maclntyre, 1968, p.105). Within this framework
man, as a rational being becomes aware of the principle and virtue consists
of assent to, and vice dissent from, the law through which human life
proceeds eternally through our eternally predetermined cycle. The Stoics
argue that evil is a kind of illusion brought about by the necessity of the
existence of contraries (opposite poles). Assent to divine law and dissent
from the law are also contraries (so dissent is needed to allow assent), but
it is only through dissent that other evils are encountered. The divine law
presents itself to humans as the law of nature and of reason, nature being
the cosmic status of the moral law and reason being that which recognises
and invites the practice of the four traditional virtues - prudence, courage,
temperance, and justice (ibid., p.106).

Pleasure, hope, fear, desire and

pain were regarded as being against reason and nature and therefore to
be avoided; the state to be cultivated was a "passionless absence of desire
and disregard of pleasure and pain" (ibid., p.106).

All emotion in this

framework becomes a part of the "evil" or the contraries which makes them
a part of the illusory nature of evil. To give way to feelings, to have them at
all, was to be understood as dissent from the divine law and a fall from
virtue.

This concept of feelings, that they existed only as some sort of

distorted form of virtue, as virtue gone wrong, was later picked up and
developed, though somewhat differently, by some Christian philosophy.

Section IV: Christianity and emotion

From the time of St Augustine to the Renaissance, Christian
philosophy became the main force in European thinking. During these ten
centuries some attempts were made to reconcile Christian thought with
earlier traditions.

As far as the concept of emotions goes, it remained

essentially recognisable as an extension of early thought. For one thing,
early Christians were dealing with a revealed religion (as revealed by Christ
and the Apostles) and as such, they did not have a formal philosophy.
Academically inclined Christians turned, naturally enough, to the traditions
of the day which were made up of ideas from Platonism and NeoPlatonism,
with some Stoicism.

These seemed most compatible with, or able to

provide a philosophical jumping off place for a Christian philosophy
(Copleston, 1954, pp.14-15). Early ideas from St Gregory of Nyssa display
some Platonism in regard to St Gregory's idea of the "ideal man" as
opposed to the earthly man. He also propounded the idea of God's world
created out of goodness and love, and freely, not from necessity. As the
founder of a systematic mystical theology, St Gregory also brought out the
themes of man's mind being "fitted to know sensible objects, and
contemplating these objects the mind can come to know something of God
..." (ibid., p.36). However, ultimate reality is not accessible to man so the
soul learns despair through being unable to reach the goal for which it
yearns.

Once again emotions are placed in the soul as their "dwelling

place". But the soul in the Christian context is that part of man that yearns
for God, that was created by Him in love. Full love or ecstasy is gained as

the soul moves further and further towards the knowledge and love of God.
The opposite poles of emotion in Christian thought then are love and
despair with love being degrees of closeness to God and despair being
estrangement. The Stoic ideal of happiness being the possession of virtue
for its own sake was developed by St Ambrose leading to an even greater
happiness in God.
St Augustine described happiness as knowledge of the truth (which
was knowledge

of God), and knowledge of the truth as wisdom.

Everything given to us (reason, feelings, sense, a body, etc) were all for St
Augustine starting points or tools in man's ascent to God, so in some
sense they were all forms of knowledge, all forms of truth by which to begin
discovering deeper truth.

The soul was created by God and was

non-material though animating the body. The human will St Augustine saw
as free to turn towards or away from God, a turning away running counter
to the divine law. The virtuous life was attained by loving God and people.
Love then is at the heart of the concept of emotion in Augustinian thinking.
Since love of God is to be sought for and love of self to be avoided (ibid.,
p.85) then love emerges as some sort of force able to be turned (willed)
into this direction or that.

In the individual St Augustine saw a struggle

between these two directions love could take "on the one hand the love of
God and submission to his law, on the other hand love of self, of pleasure,
of the world" (ibid., p.87). The struggle was won or lost by the will which,
though free, could be influenced by reason and love, as well as despair.
St Thomas Aquinas in the thirteenth century was the first of the
Christian philosophers to address emotions or passions directly. The first
section of Part Two of his Summa Theologiae inquires into the nature and
form of emotions.

In trying to locate the seat of the emotions Aquinas

argues that although the soul is non-material (and therefore incapable of
suffering) it may still contain the passions since on the one hand "to suffer"

may mean "to receive", and on the other hand, suffering (as in emotion)
may be experienced by the soul/body composite which gives it some place
in the soul "consequentially" (Aquinas, trans. D'Arcy, 1963, pp.5-7). In this
sense, thinking and understanding as involving reception could be seen as
"in some sense passions" in the Aristotelian tradition, according to Aquinas.
The physiological aspect of emotion is seen as the "materia" of each
emotion. Next Aquinas draws a distinction between "a passionate desire
for the things of God" and other passions, claiming that the former involves
no physiological modification so it may be located in the intellectual part of
the soul.

That sort of "passionate desire refers to acts of will which

produce the same result as action prompted by emotion but which in fact
are not accompanied by emotion.
In classifying the emotions, Aquinas distinguishes between "spirited"
emotions, such as fear, hope, courage, etc, which "it is difficult to attain or
avoid", and "affective" emotions which simply occur in the good/evil sense
such as joy, sorrow, love, hatred, etc, (ibid., p.21).

Emotions are not

regarded as good or evil in themselves by Aquinas, except in so far as they
are controlled or uncontrolled by reason. When uncontrolled they become
blameworthy or evil; when controlled they become a part of the virtuous life
(ibid., p.39).

"Good" emotions are described as those "which create a

favourable attitude towards something truly good or an unfavourable one
towards something really evil" and "evil" emotions are described as those
"which create an unfavourable attitude towards something truly good and a
favourable one towards something truly evil" (ibid., p.43).

Aquinas also

sees emotions in terms of cause and effect with some emotions causing
others, e.g. pleasure causing love. The four "principal emotions" are seen
as joy and sadness, hope and fear - joy and sadness because in them all
other emotions have their end and fulfilment; hope and fear because when
the object of an emotion is some good, the movement of the soul begins
with love, passes into desire and ends in hope. When the object of the

emotion is some evil, the movement of the soul begins with hatred, passes
into aversion and ends in fear.

Thus hope and fear become the final

stages of movement in the soul.
Aquinas then deals with a number of emotions individually - love,
hatred, desire, aversion, pleasure and sadness - giving each of them
sensory and cognitive status, e.g., in the case of love, there is "natural love"
(such as heavy body's affinity with its natural place); then there is "sensory
love" and "intellectual or rational love": which "apply to the attachment,
sense of affinity with some good, the feeling of its attractiveness felt
respectively by the sensory orexis, or the will" (ibid., p.65). As well, he
relates emotion with knowledge in that something can only be the object of,
for example, love in so far as it is to some extent known, but a thing could
be loved better than it is known (ibid., p.79).

With these kinds of

statements on emotion, Aquinas is giving the concept of emotion a new
dimension, though throughout his writings he refers back to the Aristotelian
position.

The difference is that whereas Aristotle inquired into and

classified emotions in the context of morality and the virtuous life, Aquinas
treats the moral life as, in a sense, subordinate to the idea of union with
God.

Aristotle regards the "good life" as worthy of being pursued for

sound, practical reasons and as something good in itself, whereas with
Aquinas one is always aware of the undercurrent that presupposes the
existence of a loving God without whom all striving, all desire, all emotion
would be meaningless, useless, and would turn to ashes. The effect on the
concept of emotions is not so much to create a new concept as to create a
new attitude to emotions.

Whereas the traditional Greek attitude was

based on practicalities, the attitude created by Aquinas' inquiry calls for an
approach based on a somewhat mystical sense of adventure, where
emotions can be seen as standing not only in some relation to reason, or
some part of the activity of the soul (or psyche), but also as having a
natural and non-natural dimension. This suggests and implies a potential

way of being for which emotions are a mere forerunner, where the effects
of emotion are separated form, and become more real than the emotions
we are familiar with.

In this sense "God and the Angels are without

emotion" but nonetheless are steeped in joy.

This stretching of the

concept does not properly belong in philosophy, but it does become
relevant to the psychology of emotion, as the work of G.J. Jung
subsequently showed (see Chapter Three).
In the philosophical sense, Aquinas reinforces the notion that reason
may control the passions, that passions contain a cognitive element, that
the intellect classifies emotions and seeks to understand the relation
between them (and that this is an essential part of understanding the
meaning of emotion), and that knowledge and emotion are closely related.
Conclusion
In this Chapter I have sought to demonstrate that theories of emotion,
as recorded in the Western tradition, have developed with progressive
complexity over time, moving from very general ideas to increasingly
detailed explorations of emotional processes. It may be observed that the
earliest recorded philosophers perceived both thinking and feeling as
forces in the body (as well as in the cosmos), with the possibility of either
one or the other dominating at any given time.

From this way of

interpreting feelings and their meaning arose related ideas of feelings being
of differing strengths and intensity, arising from different experiences and
reactions according to the examples used by philosophers. This in turn led
to the idea of feelings being of different kinds and attempts were made to
categorise feelings.

To do this, feelings needed to be adequately

described and communicated, and the relationships between some
feelings and others more clearly defined. This development can be traced

through earliest thought to Aristotle who presented the first systematic
attempts to give an account of emotions, and their relation to reason.
When the poet Hesiod wrote of love overcoming wise councils in all
men, he was addressing the experience of the strength of some emotions
and of the mind's apparent inability to control them. The corresponding
weakness in people is perceived in both physiological terms (love being a
loosener of limbs) and in cognitive terms (wise councils being overcome).
Empedocles addressed the strength of emotion by interpreting love and
hatred as creative and destructive forces generally in the cosmos, people
being agents of these powers and required to use their cognitive abilities to
understand this, and so participate more actively. A simple categorisation
of feelings as belonging either to love (joy, harmony, unity), or hatred
(misery, disharmony, destruction) is constructed, and a sense in which
pleasure and pain may be both felt and thought is suggested - possibly in
the sense of being both experienced and understood, which is consistent
with his idea of people needing to be both a part of creation and
understand it. Democritus introduces a further complexity by speaking of
emotions as the standard by which we choose some things (pleasant) and
avoid others (unpleasant) - which in turn leads to the need to distinguish
and discriminate among pleasures, these being categorised as good or
bad.

This very general moral idea underlies most early Greek thinking,

reaching its greatest development in the works of Plato and Aristotle.
By the time of Aristotle five quite distinct ways of thinking about
emotion have emerged, each reflecting the kinds of problems experienced
by people in connection with emotions.

The ways form certain

perspectives on emotion that set a pattern for the development of theories
to the present day. These are as follows:

(1)

The way in which feeling and thinking are perceived as forces in the
body,

and

physiological

experienced
perspective

as

physiological

sensations,

give

a

on emotion. All the early Greek thinkers

refer to the physiological effects of emotion, and the theme is most
strongly developed by Aristotle.
(ii)

The way in which feelings are described, labelled and categorised,
after having been experienced as differing in intensity, quality, kind and
effect, gives a cognitive

perspective

on emotion.

Early general

categorisations by the presocratics become more formal in the work of
Aristotle.
(iii)

The way in which feelings are perceived to be related to behaviour,
arising from the experience of feelings affecting behaviour, give a
motivation

perspective.

This includes the issues of choice and

avoidance and the idea of "right knowledge" leading to "right action", a
theme touched on by Democritus and strongly developed by Aristotle.
(iv)

The way in which feelings are perceived to be related to construction
and destruction (with their related ideas of order and chaos, harmony
and disharmony, beauty and ugliness), arising from the experience of
feelings having an effect on creative capabilities, gives a creative
perspective on emotion. The presocratics relate such experiences to
cosmic events and all creation and Aristotle brings the creative
concept back to individuals with his idea that people learn to create
virtue in themselves and so create virtuous (harmonious, beautiful)
things around them.

(v)

The way in which feelings are perceived to be related to value
judgements, to ideas of good and evil, and to ideas of personal
responsibility, arising from the experience of injustice and guilt (or

justice and righteousness), gives a moral perspective

on emotion.

The sense of good and evil is evident in the writings of the
presocratics, and is highly developed in the works of Plato and
Aristotle.
In relation to the major aim of this thesis, I have sought to show that
human emotional processes (that is, the ways in which people experience,
understand and articulate emotions) progressively moved to the point
where five distinct perspectives on emotion became visible, and that all
thinking after that continued to elaborate on these in ways that reflected the
increasing complexity of human experience.

As Polanyi argues, the

development of bodies of knowledge depends on "ordinary experience"
and the complexity of such experience will be reflected in the elaborations
in thought (Polanyi, 1975, p.32). I have also argued that the development
of

elaborations

involves the

perception

and

attempted

solution

of

problems, a position that I draw from Popper's argument that the
accumulation of all knowledge is brought about by the posing and solving
of problems (Popper, 1984, p.239).

The sorts of problems that are reflected in the early philosophical
writings up to Aristotle, are related to the five perspectives as described
eariier. The physiological experience of emotion is related to the problem
of how feelings affect the body and vice versa, and the problems of the
origins of feelings; the cognitive experience of emotion is related to the
problem of how to categorise, articulate and communicate emotional
experience; the creative experience of emotion is related to the problem of
the role feelings play in creative and destructive abilities and activities; the
motivational experience of emotion is related to the problem of how
feelings can appear to make (force) people to behave in certain ways, and
how feelings can appear to be outside conscious control; and the moral
experience of feelings is related to the problem of how and why we feel

some things to be "just" or "unjust", "right" or "wrong", "good" or "bad" in
ways other than being merely useful to us, or not. These problems, I claim,
form the basis for all subsequent inquiry into the emotions, and in addition,
provide a context for being able to perceive, over time, an increasingly
close and complex relationship between thought and feeling.
After Aristotle the Epicurean and Stoic philosophers developed the
ideas of a pleasure/pain categorisation of the emotions, and of morality and
virtue

being

the

"passionlessness"

art

of

pleasure

(Epicurean),

and

the

idea

of

being the greatest virtue (Stoic) the latter being

connected to the idea that people should not "give way" to emotions. The
Christian philosophers gave a love/despair categorisation within the context
of a belief in a loving God and the idea of people's emotional motivation
being the desire for union with God. The Christian philosophy developed a
morality of emotion along Aristotelian lines, with some Stoic ideas
developed as well, such as the idea of passionless leading to greater union
with God.

Aquinas developed a morality of emotion directly and forged

links between Christianity and Aristotelianism, addressing the problems of
control of the emotions (by reason) and the categorisation of emotions (in
terms of "good" and "bad") which depended on their context. Aquinas also
addressed the physiological/intellectual experience of emotion, claiming
that the only emotion that did not involve physiological modifications was
"the desire for the things of God".

He reinforces the role of reason in

control of emotion and in the understanding and categorisation of emotion.
In Chapter Two I look at the development of ideas by modern and
recent theorists, and show how they go on reflecting and developing one
or more of the five perspectives on emotion.

CHAPTER TWO
LATER PHILOSOPHICAL TRADITIONS IN THEORIES OF EMOTION

Section I: The modern approach to emotion

With the increasing influence of science and the decreasing authority
of the Church, post-medieval thinking underwent a number of changes.
On the one hand, while the influence of the Church decreased, the
influence of religion was carried on with concepts from Martin Luther which
bring the individual (as opposed to States and societies) to the fore. On
the other hand, the rise of science in the seventeenth century brought a
new approach to knowledge, to the formation of theories, and to the
direction of human thought. In itself the scientific approach was not new,
existing certainly in Greek thought and formalised by Aristotle; but
Aristotelian science, especially in astronomy and physics, was swept aside
in favour of a mathematical and mechanistic conception of the universe;
and more generally the approach, or attitude to knowledge and to
humanity as a whole was new.

The newness seemed to lie in the

beginnings of a kind of objectivity about humans and their position in
creation. No longer at the "centre of the universe", it seemed possible to
see the human race in terms of objective fact and to a great degree this
involved taking less notice of feelings or passions about things and more
notice of observable, measurable qualities such as physical manifestations,
actions, behaviour, the place of the person in science. Once again, this
was foreshadowed by Aristotle, but it was not until the seventeenth century
that evidence emerged that turned ancient ideas about the world upside
down irrevocably, and gave way to a new way of looking for and defining

"truth".

The implications for theories of emotion were far-reaching,

involving more clearly than before a complete distinction (intentionally)
between the concept of emotion and ethical concepts.

It became no

longer a necessary or desirable part of the "whole view" of man and the
world to combine feelings with "the right way to live" or "the good", and
indeed, the whole question of how we ought to do things became no
longer so closely related to the question of how we do do things. This
beginning of a shift in attitude was spectacularly demonstrated by
Descartes in the seventeenth century when he came to the conclusion that
knowledge must be sought for by first abandoning all the "prejudices and
errors" that our minds contained through being exposed from birth to past
traditions and ideas.

Knowledge began only with those ideas that had

been "squared with the norm of reason".

Theories from Descartes, Spinoza, and Hobbes

In Article 1 of Passions of the Soul Descartes abandons all previous
notions of "the passions" claiming that the "ancients" had nowhere
demonstrated the "defective nature of their sciences so clearly as well
speaking of the passions. He claimed further that it should not have been
so difficult a matter to inquire into the passions as "everyone has
experience of the passions within himself, there is no necessity to borrow
one's observations from elsewhere in order to discover their nature"
(Descartes, trans. Haldane and Ross, 1931, Article 1, p.331).

However,

what Descartes termed "the passions" are not so easily observable by
everyone as they obviously were by him.

He presents a complicated

theory in Passions of the Soul 'in which there is a relationship between the
cognitive aspects of the passions and the physical manifestations of

emotion.

"The Passions" Descartes defines as one of two sorts of

thoughts. "Thoughts" he defines as the only things that we should attribute
to the soul. The two "sorts" of thoughts are
(i)

the actions of the soul, and

(ii)

the passions.
He continues that "those which I call its actions are all our desires

because we find by experience that they proceed directly from our soul
and appear to depend on it alone: while on the other hand we may usually
term one's passions all those kinds of perceptions or forms of knowledge
which are found in us, because it is often not our soul which makes them
what they are, and because it always receives them from the things which
are represented by them" (ibid., Article XVII, p.340). In Articles XVIII and
XIX Descartes speaks of desires which terminate in the soul itself (such as
the desire to love God) and desires which terminate in the body (such as
the desire to walk followed by the action of walking); perceptions which
have the soul as a cause (i.e., perceptions of our desires) and perceptions
which have the body as a cause (i.e., through the objects which strike our
senses), and which consist of things like hunger, thirst, other natural
appetites, and also pain, heat and so on.

In Article XXV he describes

"feelings of joy, anger and other sensations" as relating "solely to the soul"
which are "sometimes excited in us by the objects which move our nerves
and sometimes also by other causes". In Article XXVII the passions of the
soul are defined as the "perceptions, feelings or emotions of the soul" and
in Article XXVUI perceptions are explained as thoughts which are not
actions of the soul, nor yet clear cognitions, but those perceptions
rendered "obscure and confused" by the "close alliance between body and
soul"; feelings are explained as being received into the soul in the same

way as objects of "our outside senses"; emotions are explained as those
thoughts which most "powerfully agitate and disturb" the soul.
For Descartes, the soul had its "principal seat in the little gland [pineal
gland] which exists in the middle of the brain, from whence it radiates forth
through all the remainder of the body by means of the animal spirits,
nerves and even the blood ..." (ibid., Article XXIV, p.347). The function of
the passions was to "dispose the soul to desire those things which nature
tells us are of use, and to persist in this desire", and also to motivate us to
action (Article Lll, p.3578). Six "primitive passions" are listed in Article LXIX
- wonder, love, hatred, desire, joy and sadness, all other being composed
of some of these and being "species" of them. When speaking of each of
these, Descartes does not categorise them as being accompanied by
pleasure or pain, but he does speak of them as being "agreeable" and
"disagreeable", and of love as being a desire "to join willingly" with objects
that appear to be agreeable' of hatred as the desire to be separated from
objects that appear to be hurtful; of love as having many objects as well as
being of many kinds (e.g., the love of a "drunkard for his wine" as well as
the love of a father for his children) (Article LXXXII, p.367).
With the definitions of joy and sadness Descartes directly introduces
the notions of good and evil, joy being the "enjoyment that the soul
possesses in the good which the impressions of the brain represent to it as
its own", and sadness being "the discomfort and unrest which the soul
receives from evil" (Articles XCI and XCII, p.372). There does not seem to
be any real point (unless concerned with morality) to connecting the
notions of good and evil with the definition of emotion at this stage.

Joy

could just as easily and consistently be defined as the enjoyment of things
perceived as agreeable, and sadness as the discomfort caused by the
disagreeable.

Descartes does not explain why he chooses to align

emotion with good and evil - a notion that he supposedly abandoned with

the "sciences of the ancients". In Article LVI (ibid., p.359) where Descartes
first introduces good and evil in an emotional context, he states that 'when
a matter is presented as relatively to us good, ie., as agreeable to us, that
causes us to have love for it, and when it is represented as evil or hurtful to
us, that excites hatred in us" - but this seems to be something of an empty
super-imposition

of "evil" on to "disagreeable"

and "good" on to

"agreeable". There is no explanation of why Descartes equates goodness
and agreeableness and evil with disagreeableness.

That such an

explanation would seem necessary can be indicated by the fact that it is
very easy to imagine agreeable things that could very well be evil (e.g. the
pleasure of revenge) and disagreeable things that could very well be good.
Further, human beings are well-known for their capacity to love things that
may be morally, or socially, or emotionally harmful to them and/or hate
things that could be morally, or socially, or emotionally good for them - and
this in fact is quite central to some powerful notions of morality, most
particularly the religious moralities that perceived life as a struggle between
much-loved "sins" and much-hated "virtues". The secular version perceives
life as a struggle between much-loved "chaos" and much-hated "order", a
theme which has many variations and contexts. When Descartes goes on
to say that "from the same consideration of good and evil, all the other
passions originate ..." (ibid., Article LVII, p.259), the equation between
"good" and "agreeable" still appears to stand and his following statements
are then based on what virtually amounts to a pleasure/non-pleasure
categorisation of "the passions". In Article LXXIV he also aligns emotion
with memory, claiming that the "utility" of the passions consists in their
"fortifying and perpetuating in the soul thoughts which it is good it should
preserve", the negative effect being fortifying and conserving those
thoughts "more than necessary ... or on which it is not good to dwell".

On the relation between the will, reason, and the passions, Descartes
describes the passions as not directly excited or removed by action of the

will, but indirectly controlled by "the representation of things which are
usually united to the passions which we desire to have and which are
contrary to those which we desire to set aside". So to incite courage and
remove fear in ourselves for example, we need to "apply ourselves to
consider the reasons, the objects or examples which persuade us that the
peril is not great; that there is always more security in defence than in flight
etc" (Article XLV, p.351).

In addition, the reactions in the body, which

powerful, render it more difficult to control the passions, the most being
possible to control actions, "for example, if anger causes us to lift our hand
to strike the will can usually hold it back" (Article XLVI, p.352). The strength
or weakness of the soul is judged by the ability to control the passions
(Article XLVIII,p.354).
Without really coming to terms with the precise relationship between
cognition and feelings, emotions within the Cartesian framework present a
picture, in the end, not unlike the Aristotelian theory minus the ethical
centralisation. There is the idea of emotions having a physical and mental
component (though the Cartesian "soul", unlike the Aristotelian "soul", is
radically distinct from the body being linked with it primarily by way of the
pineal gland); the idea of categorisation by use of pleasure and pain,
interpreted as agreeable and disagreeable.

This interpretation is

understandable in the light of Descartes' regarding pain as related to a
physical sensation, mental or psychological pain being a sensation of
something disagreeable, the idea of feelings and actions being closely
related, the idea of emotions being some form of agitation or disturbance
with the psyche, the idea of emotions as the cause of some actions and
vice versa, and the idea of a relationship between reason and emotions
where some definite and effective role is assigned to reason. In addition,
he attaches to the concept of emotion the dimension of a role in memory,
and the idea that as well as feelings being variations of six major emotions,
some feelings pertained to bodily appetites and others to "soul thoughts",

distinguishing thereby between, for example, feelings of hunger for food
and feelings of hunger for affection or recognition.
Spinoza (1955) wrote strongly against the Cartesian view of emotions,
particularly in connection with the idea that it was possible ultimately to
control emotions by the use of reason. Spinoza claimed that emotion was
a part of a whole and perfect natural plan, and therefore neither to be
"controlled" nor derided. In his Ethics he treats his analysis of emotions
"geometrically", giving a series of definitions where emotions emerge as
"the modifications of the body, whereby the active power of the said body
is increased or diminished, aided or constrained, and also the ideas of
such modifications" (Spinoza, trans. Elwes, 1955, p.130). Spinoza notes
that insofar as we are the cause of these modifications emotion is an
activity; insofar as we are not the cause, an emotion is a passion (or state
wherein the mind is passive) (ibid., p.130). In the form of geometrical
proofs, he considers a series of propositions about emotions, which
ultimately include the notions that love and hate are pleasure and pain
respectively, each accompanied by the idea of an external cause; that love
wishes to keep present the object of love and hatred wishes to destroy the
object of hatred; that when any two emotions are experienced at the same
time, the subsequent experience of one will prompt the experience of the
other; that appetites and desires are the same except that desire is
accompanied by consciousness of appetite; that all emotions stem from
the three primary emotions of pleasure (stimulation or merriment), pain
(suffering or melancholy) and desire (appetite with consciousness) (ibid.,
pp.138-40).
Spinoza argues that anything we conceive of pleasurably we will feel
love towards and anything conceived of unpleasurably will be
accompanied by hate (ibid., p.145); also what we desire, we conceive of as
good (as opposed to what is good is what we desire) (ibid., p.137). With

his emphasis on the relation between emotions and our conceptions of
things, Spinoza appears to be arguing firstly that emotions are dependent
on our conceptual (cognitive) functions, and secondly, that to the extent
that our conceptualising

is flawed or incomplete, our emotions

are

misconceptions of the world and ourselves. Calhoun and Solomon (1984,
p.72) also interpret Spinoza in this way in What is an Emotion?
series of notions, however, Spinoza still attaches to the

With this
concept of

emotion classifications based on pleasure and pain, a powerful cognitive
factor, a causal factor, and also a development of the memory component
in that variations of certain emotions and ambivalence or vacillation are
related to the memory of certain ideas originally connected with certain
feelings. Similar ideas later may be accompanied by different feelings and
the connection between the new ideas and the ones in memory give rise to
contrary emotions being experienced (Spinoza, 1955, p.142).
Spinoza's ideas on emotions are presented within a pantheistic
framewori< where the entire universe consists of a single substance which
is God (or Nature) and where everything that happens in the universe is
determined by God and therefore necessary. To this extent, his theory of
emotion is independent of the preceding Christian influence on thought
(there being no notion of a personal God in Spinoza's idea) and it is
consistent with attempts to present a view of human nature in scientific
terms, in this case, using the structure of geometry.
With Thomas Hobbes too, the notion of a Christian God seems
peripheral to his central theses about mankind.

He reverts to the

Aristotelian idea that, in the end, reason is the redeeming force in human
nature.

Hobbes argues in his essays On Man (De l-lomine) and The

Citizen (De Cive) that the greatest of goods for each person is his own
preservation, especially the avoidance of violent death, and that reason
ultimately is the means to such preservation (Hobbes, trans. Wood,

Scott-Craig and Gert, 1978, pp.48, 55, 93).

For Hobbes, emotions or

"perturbations of the mind" are "species of appetite and aversion, their
differences having been taken from the diversity of circumstances of the
objects that we desire or shun" (ibid., p.55).

Emotions also consist in

"various motions of the blood and animal spirits as they variously expand
and contract; the causes of these motions are phantasms concerning
good and evil excited in the mind by objects" (ibid., p.55). Hobbes claims
that emotions are "perturbations because they frequently obstmct right
reasoning ... in this, that they militate against the real good in favour of the
apparent and most immediate good, which turns out frequently to be evil
when everything associated with it hath been considered" (bid., p.55).
"Judgement", he claims, "originates from appetite out of a union of mind
and body (but) it must proceed from reason" (ibid., p.55).

Joy, hatred,

hope, fear all arise out of the presence or possible presence and
enjoyment of "goods" or the presence and suffering of evil (ibid., p.56). In
his description of various emotions, Hobbes relates them all to good (i.e.,
desired) objects and evil (i.e., shunned) objects (ibid., p.47).
pleasing, evil unpleasing.

Good is

Good is "real or apparent", as is evil, in that

some good things may belong to a "chain" of things that also carries evil
things and the "real" good may only be ascertained by seeing things in
terms of long-term consequences; similarly for evil (ibid., p.48).
Hobbes appears to be giving an account of pleasure and unpleasure
(as related to good and evil, or desire and aversion) where appetites
("delights") are related to the senses, and feelings or emotions are related
to the perception of the goods and evils of the world.

Within this

framewort< Hobbes sees the variety of emotions as "almost infinite" (ibid.,
p.62). In Leviathan he makes it clear that passions, without the moderating
effect of reason, are essentially destmctive to the survival of the state and
the individual. In a "state of nature", uneducated, undeliberating, man is at
his worst. But it is by virtue of certain passions (such as fear of death) and

reason (such as deliberation and thus knowledge of danger) that a state of
"felicity" (continual prospering) may be sought (Hobbes, 1986, p.188).

Hume

Hume said, one hundred years after Hobbes, that "nothing is more
usual in Philosophy and even in common life, than to talk of the combat of
passion and reason, to give preference to reason, and assert that men are
only so far virtuous as they confonn themselves to its dictates" (Hume,
1969, p.460). He goes on to claim that in fact "reason alone can never be
a motive to any action of the will and ... it can never oppose passion in the
direction of the will", despite modern and ancient claims to the contrary
(ibid., p.461). And further, "reason is, and ought only to be, the slave of the
passions ..." (ibid., p.462). However, what at first appears to be (and has
been taken as) an assertion that emotions are the prime motivator, is in
fact something quite different when Hume's description of what constitutes
a passion and what constitutes an emotion is taken into account.
A passion, says Hume "is an original existence ... and contains not
any representative quality which renders it a copy of any other existence or
modification" (ibid., p.462). Reason is of two different kinds: on the one
hand, it regards the abstract relations of our ideas, or those relations of
objects of which experience only gives us information; on the other hand, it
seeks to establish the relation between objects and their capacity to cause
us pleasure or pain, and, since it is our feelings or impulses that drive us to
avoid pain and embrace pleasure, any action arising from our reasoning on
cause and effect is motivated nonetheless by that original emotion or
impulse. In addition, since passion is an original existence (and not an idea
of an object) it is inappropriate to think of it as being contrary to reason

since such contradiction is related to a disagreement of ideas. Only insofar
as an emotion or passion is accompanied by a judgment, can a
contradiction occur (ibid., p.463).

And further, any passion can only be

considered unreasonable when either it is founded on the supposition or
the existence of objects which do not really exist, or when in exerting any
passion in action, insufficient means for the desired ends are chosen.
With these kinds of explanations, Hume moves from a position that
regards reason as the "slave of the passions" to a position where he merely
considers it conceptually inappropriate to speak of conflict between reason
and passion since they are different kinds of things and that in fact
passions may be considered reasonable insofar as they are experienced in
connection with existing objects and we choose (i.e., correctly judge)
appropriate means to fulfil designed ends. This raises the possibility of a
very close relationship between reason and the passions, a relationship
that sees them as complementary motivators since it is only reason alone
that cannot motivate in Hume's view (ibid., p.465). Further, it raises the
possibility of a true blending of emotion and reason in the idea of
"reasonable passions" or emotions, that is where the proper cause and
effect relation is established by reason between an emotion and its object,
and the subsequent actions prompted by passion and judged by reason
are sufficient for desired ends.
However, in this account, Hume does appear to be treating a passion
or emotion (he does not distinguish between them) as a primary sensation
only.

In denying that a sensation (a passion) is a representation of an

object, he also seems to be denying, or not addressing, the possibility that
an emotion could be the secondary, cognitive stage of a passion, that it
does indeed become an idea in the mind. Such an idea is formed by the
interpretation by the mind of a sensation, and the idea of the sensation is
connected to the idea of the object which represented it. Thus, in Hume's

terms, a contradiction becomes possible as we are dealing with two ideas.
The hint of such a possibility (i.e., the possibility of a difference between
passion and emotion) within Hume's framework is suggested when he
speaks of the certainty of "certain calm desires and tendencies which, tho'
they be real passions, produce little emotion in the mind ..." and he speaks
of these as being "confounded with reason by all those who judge of things
from first view and appearance" (ibid., p.464). He contrasts these "calm
passions" with "violent passions" which do produce "emotion in the mind".
Hume does appear in this context to be distinguishing between passions
(sensations) and "emotions in the mind". It seems worthwhile to consider
therefore whether Hume's "calm passions" in the mind can really be
regarded as separate from reason.

Insofar as Hume regards reason as

"that which judges of truth and falsehood" (ibid., p.465) then they must
indeed seem to be separate; if however, reason is allowed the added
function of being the means whereby passions are conceptualised and
ordered in terms of categorisation, and thereby become that which we
consciously think of as emotion (a secondary a process arising from the
sensations or passions) then Hume's "calm passions" become directly
connected with reason, and it makes sense to speak of a blending of
emotion and reason.

Section II: Later philosophical ideas-Kant, Nietzsche, Sartre

Most of the essential ways in which emotions have been interpreted in
the western tradition of thought are contained within the frameworks
discussed so far.

Later philosophers and psychologists developed and

elaborated on some of these ideas, yielding a new perspective, but using
the principles that had gone before. Some later philosophers, however, in
addition to developing earlier ideas, did contribute a new dimension in a
way that casts a significant light on established principles in connection
with emotion theories.

I will mention these briefly, not in an attempt to

present their whole framework of thought in any detail, which is beyond the
scope of this chapter, but in connection with the dimension I regard as
significantly new in theory of emotion.
Kant (1970) added such a dimension within his completely new
approach to theory of knowledge.

Whereas previous philosophers had

seen knowledge as essentially connected with real external objects
perceived by the senses, Kant claimed that the "laws of knowledge"
governed

the

transformation

of

sense

perceptions

to

meaningful

conceptual framewori^s and that these laws were to be known and
understood only by the activity of reason itself (Kant, 1970 trans. Liddell,
p.11). Moral knowledge also was only to be gained by the discovery by
reason of the fundamental principles of morality over and above experience
which had been generally appealed to as providing the means for forming
moral judgments.

Support for and objections to Kant's theory (as put

forward in his major wori<s, The Critique of Pure Reason, The Critique of
Practical Reason and the Critique of Judgment) are numerous, and the
theory does not put forward a formal theory of emotions.

In connection

with moral theory Kant regarded feelings as subjective and therefore
unsuitable as a standard for moral judgment (ibid., p.194).

However, Kant presented us with a new way of looking at emotion in
a work written before the Critiques, Observations on the Feeling of the
Beautiful and the Sublime. Using the same idea of "pure" rational activity,
he organises feelings as falling within the concepts of the "sublime" and the
"beautiful". In saying that feelings are subjective, he is also saying that "the
various feelings of enjoyment or of displeasure rest not so much upon the
nature of the external things that arouse them, as upon each person's own
disposition to be moved by these to pleasure or pain" (Kant, 1960, p.45).
On the one hand, Kant is using one of the established categorisations of
feelings with pleasure/pain, but he is also presenting what may be called an
aesthetic theory of emotions that comes before The Critique of Judgment,
his major work on aesthetics.
In the Observations Kant speaks of "finer, delicate" feelings that are
qualitatively different from sensuous feeling and at the level of fineness and
delicacy feelings may be "sublime" or "beautiful", where "the sublime
moves, the beautiful charms" (Kant's emphasis) (ibid., p.47). The sublime is
accompanied by earnest, rigid, astonished feelings, or even by dread or
melancholy, or quiet wonder. The sublime may be "terrifying" or "noble" or
"splendid". "Deep loneliness", Kant says, "is sublime but in a way that stirs
terror" (ibid., p.48). And "the sublime must be always great; the beautiful
can also be small.

The sublime must be simple; the beautiful can be

adorned and ornamented" (ibid., p.48). Many things are both sublime and
beautiful but the elements of each are easily distinguishable from one
another, as when a building may be sublime in its size and simplicity and
beautiful in its detail and ornamentation (ibid., p.49).

Both negative and

positive emotions fit easily into this framework, which throws new light on
the strength and complexity of human emotions, and also on the interplay
of emotions. "Even depravities and moral failings often bear, for all that,
some features of the sublime or the beautiful", Kant claims, referring to the
terrifying or horrifying nature of such feelings (ibid., p.53). This framework

also sheds interesting light on our ability to experience apparently
conflicting and sometimes disturbing emotions in connection with things we
consider to be good and bad. As Kant points out, a deceitful scheme can
arouse distaste, but also delight with its cleverness, delicacy and audacity
(ibid., p.53).
In his Observations Kant works through a great range of feelings,
giving each its place in relation to the human capacity to respond to a level
of feeling he defines as "finer feeling" which he distinguishes from the "kind
of feeling that can take place without any thought whatsoever (ibid., p.46).
The pleasure/pain categorisation

is indirectly

incorporated and the

categorisation of good and evil is also visible. By using the positive and
negative sides of the sublime, negative or painful feelings are given a
context. That the full range of feelings we experience is taken into account
is suggested by Kant when he says:
In human nature, praiseworthy qualities never are found without
concurrent variations that must run through endless shadings to
the utmost imperfection. The quality of the terrifying sublime
Kant's emphasis], if it is quite unnatural, is adventurous.
Unnatural things, so far as the sublime is supposed in them,
although little or none at all may actually be found, are
grotesque (ibid., p.55).
Finer feeling (as opposed to thoughtless feeling or sensation) is
dependent then on understanding and thinking (ibid., p.55) and the theory
indeed posits a blending of thinking and feeling that may be called sublime
in its scope and beautiful in its detail and implications (to describe it in
Kantian terms).

The incorporation of the sublime/beautiful into the

categorisations of pleasure/pain, good/evil and degrees of imperfection
leading to opposites, provides a powerful new dimension to explanations
and descriptions of emotion and one that has scarcely been developed in
the context of theory of emotion.

To limit this approach to the field of

aesthetics is, arguably, to limit severely our understanding of feelings.
There are related concepts that would need exploring (such as Kant's idea
of "natural" and "unnatural") but the richness of his concepts of the sublime
and the beautiful in connection with feelings is too obvious to be confined
to aesthetics.

Nietzsche (1968) has provided another unusual dimension to our
understanding of emotions with a series of strong statements about the
expression of emotion. His theory of affects is strongly tied to his doctrine
of perspectivism which claims essentially that any and every view of the
world is only one among many, that any number of interpretations are
possible, and none has any more claim to truth than others. The deeply
complex nature of Nietzsche's work and thoughts cannot be properly
discussed here, and any "short formulas" would of course be inadequate,
but he makes some statements on the expression of emotion that are
powerful and informative enough, I believe, to provide insights for us in this
context as they stand.
In The Will to Power Nietzsche speaks of "the whole conception of an
order of rank among the passions: as if the right and normal thing were for
one to be guided by reason - with the passions as abnormal, dangerous,
semi-animal, and, moreover, so far as their aim is concerned, nothing other
than desires for pleasure ..." (Nietzsche, 1968, p.206, S387).

He claims

that this conception degrades passions "as if it were only in unseemly
cases, and not necessarily and not always, the motive force" and also "in
as much as it has for its object something of no great value, amusement".
He claims that this is a "misunderstanding of passion and reason, as if the
latter were an independent entity and not rather a system of relations
between various passions an desires; and as if every passion did not
possess

its quantum

of

reason"

"misunderstanding" with the view that

(ibid.).

Nietzsche

contrasts

this

It is richness in personality, abundance in oneself, over-flowing
and bestowing, instinctive good health and affirmation of
oneself, that produce great sacrifice and great love: it is strong
and godlike selfhood from which these affects flow, just as
surely as do the desire to become master, encroachment, the
inner certainty of having a right to everything ... if one is not firm
and brave within oneself, one has nothing to bestow and cannot
stretch out one's hand to protect and support... (ibid., pp.208-9,
S388).
There are a number of assumptions and ideas implicit in these
statements that give a new perspective on emotions. My intention here is
not to weigh these ideas within Nietzsche's entire framework but rather to
highlight an added dimension, a new way of looking at emotions. Firstly,
Nietzsche implies that it is not necessarily "right and normal" that passions
should be viewed as, in some sense, lower expressions of human nature to
be guided by reason as, in some sense, higher. Secondly, he implies that
every passion has an intimate relationship with reason. Thirdly, he implies
that this relationship is one of relations between various passions and
desires; then he claims that affects or passions are the product of, an
outpouring of, a richness of personality, of a strength centred in a strong
sense of self. The dimension that provides a new angle of thought here is
the notion that emotions are an expression of personality, personality being
in part an inner sense of self, or richness, of abundance, of ability to give to
and support others. To the extent to which the personality is able to build
or acquire such strength, the emotions find expression and are given their
colour and their beauty.
The notion of the "will to power", so central to Nietzsche's philosophy,
is of course the vantage point from which he is viewing emotions, but the
picture he presents is one that sheds light on that aspect of our experience
of feelings where we give and receive feelings, where we feel exactly that
sense of richness and power in connection with especially our ability to
give and receive emotionally. Nietzsche directly and powerfully addresses

our experience of giving and receiving support through and because of our
feelings. He implies that the quality of our feelings depends completely on
all that is implied by being "firm and brave within ourselves". It has become
one of the tasks of psychology to inquire into the giving and receiving of
feelings between people, and Nietzsche provides the beginnings of one of
the rare paths that may relate to the precise nature of this exchange, and
the conditions under which it occurs both minimally and maximally.
Sartre (1985) also presents a picture of emotions that depends for
meaning on his total framework or system and once again, I will use some
of his key notions to highlight a dimension of his interpretation of feelings.
One of Sartre's key concepts is that of freedom, specifically our freedom to
choose how to be in the world and the immense responsibility for our lives
that this freedom places upon us (Sartre, 1985, p. 18). In this context, he
claims that we choose our feelings no less than we (i.e., our
consciousness) choose the ways in which we interpret the world. In The
Emotions: Outline of a Theory, Sartre claims that emotion "is a
transformation of the world" carried out when "the paths traced out become
too difficult, or when we see no path, we can no longer live in so urgent
and difficult a world" (Sartre, trans. Frechtman, 1939, p.58). The "new ways
and new relationships" we construct to deal with the intractability of our
circumstances are the manifestation of our emotional processes, and these
involve, fundamentally, changing ourselves since we cannot change the
world (Sartre, trans. Barnes, 1957, p.XV). Sartre rejects the idea that
emotions "sweep" over people and determine actions in any way. Rather,
emotion is one way consciousness chooses to live its relationship in the
world (ibid., p.XIV). He claims "we must act" in the world and our
transformations of the environment (i.e., our transformations of our
attitudes to the environment) "is not a game; we are driven against a wall,
and we throw ourselves into this new attitude with all the strength we can
muster. Let it also be understood that this attempt is not conscious of

being such, for it would then be the object of a reflection. Before anything
else, it is the seizure of new connections and new exigencies" (Sartre,
trans. Frechtman, 1939, p.58).
One example Sartre gives of such a transformation or change in
attitude which leads to a change of our body and its relation in the world
(directed by consciousness) is that of someone first wanting a bunch of
grapes (seeing them as desirable), then being unable to reach them and,
as a consequence, taking on the attitude that the grapes were too green
anyway. The new attitude is taken on to break the tension caused by the
frustration of a desire to obtain the grapes (ibid., p.59). We remove the
quality of being suitable for picking to the quality of not being suitable for
picking. Once again, it is not within the scope of this chapter to argue for
or against Sartre's idea, but what the idea does in itself is highlight our
direct experience of changing our feelings about something in order to
make situations more to our liking or more bearable. It is obvious to us
that on many occasions we can do this and that it take some sort of effort
to do so. Sartre provides a way of looking at this process and an
illumination on how this act of ours changes not only our perception of
things, but also our acts, as a consequence, which in turn affects other
events and people. The process of transformation must, in some way, be
connected with our organisation of the world, our categorisation of objects
and events, our connections between ideas and feelings, so that we may
effect the transformation appropriately.

But the process is also related to

the process of choosing and the notion of freedom which, in Sartrean
terms, suggests a kind of necessary activity.
This key notion, that we must act (and therefore have the freedom to
act) implies that even non-action is a kind of chosen action that has its
effect in the world. What we choose is a "way of being" and we must do
this as long as we have being. That this responsibility is upon us is, when

perceived, a source of fundamental and inescapable anguish (Sartre, 1985,
trans. Frechtman/Barnes, p.18). Anguish becomes then more than a
feeling in the ordinary sense - it becomes a condition of being, an
emotional state, an "anguish before myself" as opposed to fear which is
related to "something in the world" (Sartre, 1957, trans. Barnes, p.628).
The anguish before oneself is because "man is nothing else than his plan;
he exists only to the extent that he fulfils himself; he is therefore nothing
else than the ensemble of his acts" (Sartre, 1985, p.32). To act in ways
that will transform or change himself or herself, a person must then begin
by having certain attitudes or feelings towards himself/herself.
This seems a highly cognitive view of emotions on the one hand, but
one that also gives emotions enormous power in the regulation of our lives.
It is a curious and intensely close relation between reason (as an act of
assessing and choosing) and emotion (as a way of perceiving the world).
What it appears to illustrate is our direct experience of the necessity to
change our feelings when we cannot change our circumstances.
Interestingly, as Sartre so forcefully contends, our ability (or freedom, or
responsibility) to change our feelings does in fact modify our
circumstances in some way. In Sartre's "bunch of grapes" example a
change of feeling towards the grapes results in the act of moving on and of
leaving the grapes where they are, which will have some certain
consequences for others in due course, as well as for oneself. The notion
that feelings are a part of, and blended with the whole condition of being
and acting in the world is not unlike Nietzsche's idea of feelings as an
expression of the whole personality - each of these perspectives explain
something about the way in which our feelings affect ourselves and others
in a more direct and personal way, as opposed ot the more objective
formality of previous theories. The more subjective or personal approach
to accounts of emotion became an important dimension of later
psychological theories as will be illustrated in Chapter Three.

Section III: Recent philosophical ideas-Averill, Rorty, Lyons,
Neu, Solomon
More recent ideas about emotion have continued to add to the
complexity and detail of the five perspectives on emotion that form the
pattern of development. In many cases the contributions have been very
strong in the cognitive area though in some cases the cognitive
explorations have led back to discussions of physiological, motivational,
moral and creative perspectives.
Averill (1980) provides a theoretical framework for an interpretation of
emotions that treats emotions as "social constructions ... that is, emotions
are responses that have been institutionalised by society as a means of
resolving conflicts which exist within the social system" (Averill, 1980, p.37).
Averill casts interesting light on the ways in which emotional expressions
are channelled in society that sets down certain "rules of behaviour", but
the idea that I want to introduce here is his presentation of emotions as
"cognitive systems" within the individual as well as within societies. He joins
a person's emotional structures to other cognitive processes by positing
levels of structuralisation which vary in the tightness or looseness of
construction.

Structures are very loose at the level of "transcendental

emotional states (e.g., anxiety, mystical experience)" and at this level they
shade into the cognitive structures of thinking with such states as reverie,
dreaming, creative activity. At the next (higher) level of structuralisation,
where thinking processes are concerned with everyday problem solving,
where motivation is relatively high (in terms of self-preservation, ordinary
living and worthing), the standard emotional reactions of anger, fear, envy,
hope, etc, blend in. At still higher levels of structuralisation these emotional
reactions shade into what Averill terms "hysterical states" meaning the
exaggerated or unusual form of standard emotions.

He says "their

common characteristic is that they involve a rather severe dissociation of

consciousness and tend to be highly rigid and stereotyped" (ibid., p.42). At
even higher levels of structuralisation "hysterical reactions tend to become
fractionated and the affective component drops out, leaving only a part
response

which

may

symbolise

the

underlying

conflict.

Obsessive-compulsive reactions perhaps best exemplify this stage ..."
(ibid., p.43).
Presenting emotions in terms of flexibility and rigidity provides us with
a way of inquiring into our direct experience of feeling degrees of any
particular emotion and emotional states. We may feel irritation, annoyance,
anger or fury and we recognise that these, while having their own particular
flavour, are also degrees of one kind of emotion. To see this in terms of
tension gives us a view of some primary affective force; to see it in terms of
conflict (i.e., problem solving processes) is to give us a relation between
thinking and feeling, where emotion is given cognitive status, and where an
interesting (and necessary) parallel is shown with the two processes.
Rorty (1980) in her article "Explaining Emotions" focusses on our
experience of having feelings that do not correspond appropriately with our
thinking or rational processes. She claims however that by examining the
causal history of such feelings (i.e. taking into account a person's changing
system of beliefs and attitudes, the influence of societies and cultures, and
the genetic component) an appropriate correspondence can be found
between thinking, beliefs and feeling.

Tracing such a causal history

involves, in part, an inquiry into our capacity for self-deception, or the
holding of false beliefs.

The relationship between self-deception and

feelings is central to the problem of the discrepancy between thinking,
feeling and acting that we so often experience. Rorty's article very usefully
illustrates the difference between unintentional false belief (such as hearing
bad news and reacting emotionally to it, although the news turns out to be
untrue) and intentional false belief which is a product of self-deception.

Although Rorty's main task is to explain how and why such situations
occur, the dimension of emotion theory that comes into play is that as well
as events and beliefs having the effect of manipulating our feelings, we
ourselves may manipulate our feelings by using the causal relationship
between thought, belief, and feeling, with and without self-deception. The
implication for emotion theory, ultimately, is the need to examine emotions
in terms of personal responsibility and in terms of their reality, i.e., the need
to look at the difference between feelings which occur as a result of our
manipulations (self-deceptive or not) and those which occur for other
reasons - and whether or not there is a difference in their moral status and
in their reality status.
Lyons (1980) presents a theory of emotions which he defines as "a
causal-evaluative theory" where he explores emotions as an evaluation
process which caused "unusual physiological changes in the subject of the
evaluation" (Lyons, 1980, p.53).
occurrent

emotional

states,

He specifies that his account is of
rather

than

emotions

considered

dispositionally, and gives an account of this distinction both in connection
with his survey of classical theories of emotion (which he claims are
generally theories of occurrent emotional states also, though the distinction
had not been formally made in most cases) and in connection with his own
theory. To make the distinction, Lyons uses the example of vanity, saying
that we can refer to a person as vain, and mean either that the person is
giving an actual display of vanity (occurrent), or that the person has a
disposition to be vain, that is, a proneness to do vain things, such as
boasting, whenever the opportunity occurs (ibid., p.54).

In treating

emotions as an evaluation process Lyons sees the process as one of an
evaluation of a situation, which gives the person a set of beliefs about their
situation, which in turn causes the wants or desires leading to behaviour.
The evaluations and wants together cause abnormal physiological changes
and the subjective registering, as feelings (ibid., p.57). The example Lyons

gives is of a person's evaluation of the sight of a ferocious dog, where the
perception of threat leads to running away, the combination of which leads
to increase in adrenaline output, increase in respiration rate, which are
subjectively experienced as thumping heart, sweaty palms, constricted
chest, dry mouth (ibid., p.57).

In his discussion of this process, Lyons

addresses more detailed aspects of the physiological perspective on
emotion, the motivational perspective on emotion in terms of the kinds of
relationship between emotion and behaviour, and the moral/ ethical
perspective of emotion with his discussion on emotions and blame. In the
latter case he holds that a person can, to some extent, exercise control
over emotions, and to that extent can be held responsible for them (ibid.,
p. 196).

He deals, as does Rorty, with the human capacity to manipulate

emotions, in oneself and others, and he deals also with the idea of
emotions being useful or useless and whether such a distinction is
appropriate. This involves him in discussions of emotions as being useful
in terms of self-preservation and social acceptability (ibid., p.178).
Neu (1977) directly addresses the relationship between thought and
feeling in his discussion of the connection between the ideas of Hume and
Spinoza and psychological theories of therapy. He claims that "thoughts
are of greater importance than feelings (in the narrow sense of felt
sensations) in the classification and discrimination of emotional states"
(Neu, 1977, p.1). He stresses however, that the importance of thoughts
lies in their usefulness in discriminating mental states, not in making
feelings, and other elements constituting emotions, less important.

Neu

sees thoughts, in the form of beliefs, as "essential" in that without certain
beliefs in connection with emotion, discrimination between emotions (as
opposed to feelings/sensations) is not possible (ibid., pp.1-2).

In

supporting Spinoza's interpretation of thought and feeling, Neu is arguing
for the philosophic sense of Freudian, and general, analytic therapies, thus
providing one kind of direct bridge between philosophy and psychology.

His philosophic justification is based on Spinoza's cognitive interpretation
of emotion (that is on the necessary relation between thought, or belief,
and

emotion)

and on

Spinoza's

argument

that

emotions

may

be

transformed by examining (reflectively) the context of the emotion and its
reality status i.e. whether or not the emotion and the idea are related to a
real situation. Neu elaborates on Spinoza's distinction between active and
passive emotions, on the relation between emotion and action, and
supports an argument that emotions can be reasonable, in the sense of
being attached to ideas of real situations (ibid., p. 147).

In this sense,

Freudian analysis assists in the understanding of real and unreal situations
and the thoughts and feelings that may be attached to them, and the
adjustments in the understanding can result in the possibility of adjusting or
transforming emotions (ibid., p.147).
In his book The Passions Solomon (1976) is essentially concerned
with the elucidation of the reality of emotions in that he attempts to sweep
away the "myths", the deception and the self-deception, and to posit a
harmony between thinking and feeling that is "not mere coherence but
coherence with an optimal set of reflective judgements, which see in each
case, the emotional strategies that are most to our advantage, cutting
through the veils and fabrications of self-imposed fantasies, breaking
through the self-enclosed prisons of defensiveness to maximise, in every
instance, the possibility of intersubjectivity and mutual

esteem.

And

once we have reflectively seen such strategies it can be but a matter of
time and courage for us to carry them out through our emotions.

They,

too, desire nothing more than precisely this maximization of self esteem
which reflection, often better than they, is capable of comprehending"
(Solomon, 1976, pp.412-13; Solomon's emphases). With a complex series
of steps, Solomon traces and assesses traditional philosophical and
psychological thought on emotion coming eventually to a Sartrean-like
position as regards choice and judgement, a position of subjectivity as

regards free will and emotion (i.e., regardless of whether or not emotional
responses are determined, the subjective feeling is that we must make
choices in connection with events and feelings), and a position that also
posits a concept of "rational passions" used as a "creative means of
self-realisation, living our lives as 'works of art'..." (ibid., p.429).

Conclusion
With

The Passions

Solomon also provides a bridge

between

philosophy and psychology - but an unusual one in that, as a philosopher,
he presents psychological ways with which to begin

understanding

emotions while at the same time claiming that there are no real "guide
books for exploration". The guide book that he gives, almost in the same
breath, is that of learning to see our emotions as our "creative activities".
Within that phrase, a wealth of traditional thinking finds a place in
connection with the creative perspective on emotion. Presocratic thought
contained the notion of a creative element to emotion in a way that was
both personal and divine (in terms of love as a creative force in the
universe); Aristotle hinted at the ways in which the interplay of reason and
emotion created virtue or the virtuous man; Christian philosophy posited
creative love as the most powerful emotion; Kant's aesthetic theory of
emotion is closely tied to creativity; and Nietzsche and Sartre introduce the
element of creativity in unique ways, the former as a means of powerful
creative self-expression, the latter as a means of "transforming the world".

Each of these philosophers has added a layer of complexity to the
creative perspective on emotion and has thereby provided new ways of
perceiving and solving the problem of how feelings are related to the
creative process.

From the broad Presocratic idea of emotion being a

creative force in the universe (an indication of the personal experience of
the strength of emotion) the thinking gradually moved to such particulars

as how to control emotion to create virtue (Aristotle), how to love as a way
to create virtue (the Christian philosophers), how to dwell creatively within
the poles of beauty and ugliness (Kant), how to create new ways to
express ourselves (Nietzsche), and how to give new meanings to our
experiences and our worlds (Sartre).
Each of the remaining philosophers mentioned in this chapter also
added a significant new layer of complexity to one or more of the
perspectives on emotion, thus increasing its dimensions, and giving new
ways of solving the problems related to emotion.

Descartes' complex

theory describing the relationship between the cognitive aspects of the
passions

and

their

physical

manifestations

gives

new

ways

of

understanding the different kinds of desires, ways of categorising, and of
communicating.

He also provided a clear formal distinction between the

cognitive and moral/ethical perspectives on emotion, though he still relates
good and evil to kinds of emotions. He relates emotion to memory, giving
emotion the "use" of preserving good thoughts, and the relation he posits
between emotion and will (an indirect one) opens new ways of perceiving
motivation (why we do things, and how we can control thought, feeling and
action).
Spinoza also gives new ways of categorising emotions (the cognitive
perspective), which, while retaining the major pleasure/pain categorisation,
include the idea of some kinds of emotions being forms of desire.

His

complex notion of desire (appetite with consciousness) is related to the
way in which we perceive things, and an added cognitive complexity is his
idea that, to the extent to which we perceive things incompletely or in a
flawed way, our emotions can be misconceptions of the world and
ourselves. His notion that certain emotions are attached to the memory of
certain ideas, and that those emotions can be re-attached to other ideas
throws light on the problem of the experience of contrary emotions and the

conflict that usually accompanies such experience. Finally, his notion that
the entire universe consists of a single substance which is God (or Nature)
and where everything that happens in the Universe is determined by God,
and therefore necessary, allows us to contemplate our feelings as possibly
not always within our control, or entirely our responsibility (though able to
be transformed), a view that must be of use in dealing with the problem of
helplessness in the face of overwhelming emotional experience. Both the
motivational and moral/ethical perspectives are broadened by these ideas.
Hobbes reverts to the Aristotelian idea that reason is the redeeming
force in human nature and that the passions, unmodified by reason, are
essentially destructive. The layer of complexity that his ideas add however,
consists of his idea that good things and evil things (to which he relates
emotions) can be "real or apparent", that they may belong to a "chain" of
both good and evil things, and that their "true good" or "true evil" may
become apparent only over time. This, I think, adds a new dimension to
the moral/ethical perspective on emotion in that it indicates that good and
evil can be dependent on time and context, a notion that present thinkers
are still attempting to clarify. That feelings are equally dependent on time
and context (conditions and events of life), as Hobbes contends, yields a
new way of perceiving the problem of correct judgement, immediate
conflict, and fnjstration of desire.
With Hume the pleasure/pain categorisation is again apparent, and
the motivational factor is that passions drive us to avoid pain and pursue
pleasure. But a new layer is added when Hume claims that the passions
are not in conflict with reason (which judges whether objects cause
pleasure or pain) but that they are different kinds of things, with different
jobs - reason being used for judgement and choice, and emotions being
the indicators of pleasure and pain, thus positing a complementary
relationship.

Conflict is caused by opposing judgements or choices, not

opposing passions.

A further blending of emotion and reason is

suggested when Hume speaks of passions as being sensations (violent
passions) and passions being conceptualisations of a certain kind (calm
passions), a decidedly cognitive view.
In more recent thinking Averill adds a complex layer to the cognitive
perspective on emotion with his idea that emotions can be flexible or rigid,
tight or loose, that they are cognitive systems with various shadings. This
idea allows a new kind of categorisation and a new way of relating direct
personal experience to the understanding of emotions.

His idea of

emotions as social constructions is dealt with in Chapter Three, in a
psychological context.
Rorty formally introduces the idea that our experience of emotions
does not always appear to correspond with our conceptualisations of
emotions, thus highlighting the human capacity for self-deception, which
raises the problem of communication, and the problem of behaviour that is
consistent with beliefs. That the origins of such self-deception are posited
as being directly related to the perceptions of situations and experience of
emotions holds implications for both the cognitive and moral/ethical
perspectives on emotion, and, to some extent, for the motivational
perspective.
Lyons' distinction between occurrent and dispositional emotions, as
he discusses them, adds a more finely detailed way of distinguishing
between similar emotions (such as anger and irascibility, hate and
loathing), and giving some emotions first and second order status.

His

treatment of emotions as an evaluation process defines more clearly ideas
on the relation between belief and emotion, and shows how the
causal-evaluative approach can cover "the many facets and functions of

emotion", including the cognitive, motivational, physiological and moral
facets (Lyons, 1980, p.214).
Neu, though not directly outlining a theory of emotions independently,
elaborates on the Humean and Spinozist theories, giving a new relation
between Spinoza's theories and analytic therapies in psychology. As well
as providing a bridge between philosophy and psychology, he supports
the cognitive perspective on emotion by emphasising a necessary relation
between thought and emotion, by elaborating on the reality status of
emotions, and by putting forward the possibility of greater control over
emotions.
In this chapter I have sought to demonstrate the ways in which
modern thinkers have continued to add complexity to the five perspectives
on emotion that emerged at the end of Chapter One. In demonstrating
this, I have sought to support my claim that new ways of thinking about
emotion are, in each case, elaborating on a fundamental pattern
established by the five perspectives noted. In this context I have not
sought to compare the theories or ideas, or to justify Xhem, but rather to
show how enduring theories and ideas have contributed to a particular
trend or pattern. The growth or elaboration of that pattern I perceive as
being evolutionary in character, as explained in the Introduction. I perceive
it as evolutionary on the grounds that it does move in an increasingly
complex direction and that it does represent a development in
understanding, in Huxley's sense of evolutionary action. The importance of
recognising this trend lies in the way access to this pattern allows us to
relate thinking and feeling, not only as any one theorist relates them, but in
as many ways as it is possible to relate them by using the various
perspectives and their complexities as subsidiaries (in Polanyi's sense) to
focus on new meanings, and to create, and become aware of, new
experiences. Knowing that the five perspectives do represent genuine

ways of experiencing emotions also gives them a practical, problem solving
use. For example the cognitive and creative perspectives may be used to
focus on the problem raised by the experience of being hindered in
creative activity by certain emotions, or to understand (and therefore
enhance) the ways in which other emotions support creative activity.
Selection of the perspectives would depend on the kind of emotional
experience being dealt with, and its effects.
In Chapter Three, I will look at the ways in which psychologists
contributed further to these

perspectives

and

I suggest that two

psychologists, Sigmund Freud and George Kelly, contribute in ways that
represent the beginnings of a new evolutionary step in the general
development - that is, they provide the means for individuals to become
more directly aware of the action of each of the perspectives of emotion
within their own experience.

CHAPTER THREE
PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORIES OF EMOTION

Section I: The origins of psychological approaches to emotion

With the establishment of psychology as a separate discipline
towards the end of the 19th century, theories of emotion began to emerge
in a way that appears to be disconnected from the philosophical
developments. For someone attempting to trace the development thread of
emotion theory through psychology there seemed to be a substantial gap
between the ideas traced through philosophical traditions and the theories
being put forward by psychologists.

It became clear that psychological

theories did not consciously begin with philosophical assumptions. Rather,
they arose from physiological, behavioural and psychotherapeutic work in
psychology, being approached from a different direction.

And to

complicate matters still further in the search for connections, major emotion
theories were embedded within theories of personality which themselves
emerged

from

psychological

research

rather

than

philosophical

development.
The new direction however could not, ultimately, move too far away
from the philosophical origins of these theories, though it became a
complex matter to find the connections. Psychologists have mostly taken
the attitude that the field of emotions and feelings begin, for them, from
completely unexplored territory.

At the first major world symposium on

Feelings and Emotions held at Wittenberg in 1927 Tulloss said in his
opening address:
Of all phases of human behaviour the feelings and emotions
have most persistently resisted the attacks of the
experimentalists .. We have, as it were, made minor skirmishes
and done some effective scouting. But the field of feelings and
emotions remains for the most part an unconquered and
unexplored territory ... who will venture to say that we have gone
far into the understanding of the more ancient, fundamental and
deeply hidden elements of our experience and behaviour which
are involved in the feelings and emotions." (Tulloss, ed. Reymert,
1973, Appendix A, p.1)
Speaking at the same symposium, Reymert (1973) suggests that the
intangibility of feelings that has puzzled thinkers from eariiest times, and the
slowness with which science has attempted to "dissipate the fog of
emotional states" has been due partly to man's reluctance to study "his
own real self", partly to a certain kind of self-preservation that seeks to
prevent destructive emotions from surfacing too strongly, and partly
because feelings do not lend themselves easily to measured observation or
clear language (Reymert, ibid.. Appendix b).
Bentley, in his paper "Is 'Emotion' More than a Chapter Heading",
points out that, among psychologists, the term "emotion" has as many
different meanings as there are approaches to the study of human
behaviour (Bentley, 1973, pp.20-1).

Brett in his paper

"Historical

development of the Theory of Emotions" says that "while some subjects in
the field of psychology have been more or less adequately traced by
historians, there seems to be no adequate survey of the theories of
emotion ... descriptions and classifications have been recorded from the
earliest times and exist in bewildering confusion ..." ^bid., p.388).
Twenty years later at the second world symposium on Feelings and
Emotions (the Mooseheart Symposium), Reymert said he felt, still, that the

field of emotions "constitutes the very 'heart core' of man's problems in
relation to himself and other men at every level of interaction from the
strictly personal up to the internationar. He added that, since the last
symposium, when contributions were largely from academic psychologists,
psychiatry

and

psychoanalysis

were

all making their

contributions

(Reymert, ed. Arnold, 1970, p.viii). Amold (1970) points out however, that
in the twenty years following that symposium, emotion was once more
eclipsed, largely by the wave of behaviour theory.

By the early sixties

however, emotion, in the form of research and theories, was again visible,
and in 1968 at the third symposium (the Loyola Symposium) the
contributions were divided into sections - biological theories, cognitive
theories, psychological approaches,

mood theories, and personality

theories of emotion (Arnold, 1970).
These three symposia illustrate very well the way in which theories of
emotion arose in the psychological context - a context that set them apart
from the stream of emotion theory in philosophy though at each
symposium speakers referred to the problem of finding connections
between philosophical and psychological theories and the need to do so
for a better understanding of emotions.
To some extent philosophy itself contributed to the division. As Brett
(1967) points out, Kant's contention that science is characterised by
mathematical as well as empirical descriptions had a profound effect on
successive psychologists who "were very concerned about themselves and
the status and terms of reference of their developing inquiries ... It
introduced the craze for measurement in psychology and reinforced the
yearning for scientific respectability among psychologists ... " (Brett, ed.
Peters, 1967, p.533). The mechanistic approach to the understanding of
living organisms which dominated thinking by the middle of the 19th
century swept psychological inquiry further into the "scientific mode". The

argument as to whether psychology can truly be considered a science is a
complex one and cannot be entered into here, but the effect of the
scientific preoccupations of psychology on the study of emotions was
considerable.

It was responsible for the many attempts to explain

emotions in physiological and biological terms which often meant that more
cognitive approaches to emotion were kept in the background.

For

example, Herbart, in the late 19th century, developed the idea that true
knowledge implies feeling, and feeling directly affects knowledge. He held
that the ultimate object of education was to produce a union of knowing
and feeling (ibid., p.553). Herbart also anticipated the modern distinction
between sentiment and emotion, sentiment being the tendency towards
emotions of a certain kind.

But his quantification of his theories of

apperception (that is, that the pattern of ideas in the conscious mind is the
means by which new ideas are introduced) which anticipated modern
mathematical model approaches, formed the more recognised part of his
work (Wertheimer, 1969, p.55). In the same era Lotze developed an idea
that feeling was reducible to relations between ideas, a highly cognitive
view, that was left hanging until a century later (Brett, 1967, p.647).
Darwin (1977), though not a psychologist, contributed ideas during
the time of the emergence of psychology, which had far-reaching effects,
influencing later theories, such as James' theory that emotion is the
perception or awareness of physiological disturbance.

Although Darwin

was speaking in connection with his biological evolutionary theory in the
Expression of Emotion in Man and Animals, he implied, from the beginning
of his inquiry that the emotion and the expression of it are different things.
When he speaks of the difficulties of observing the expression of emotion
he refers to the need to show how far particular movements of the features
are really expressive of "certain states of mind", and that the most
"serviceable" way to seek evidence was to observe infants and the insane
since both these groups of people exhibited emotion with extraordinary

force. Evidence was not available so readily from other adults since they
had control over their expression of emotion to some extent (Darwin, 1977,
p. 13).

As Darwin continued with his inquiry he distinguished between

sensations and emotions (ibid., p.27); he referred to the relation between
the differing intensities of emotional states, and their expression (ibid.,
p.28); he distinguished between the "direct action of the nervous system",
and the will (ibid., p.29); he referred to the different ways in which men and
women could express the same kinds of emotion (ibid., p.35); he spoke of
the differences between reflex action, habitually acquired action, inherited
action and willed action, all of which he regarded as expressions of
emotion, and sometimes of the same kind of emotion (ibid., p.42); and he
speaks of a blush being unable to be caused, as can other emotions "by
any physical means, - that is by any action on the body.

It is the mind

which must be affected", the causes being self-attention, shyness, shame,
and modesty

(ibid., p.309).

With such references

Darwin clearly

establishes a mind/body relation that makes emotion something other than
only its physical expression.

Since however, he did not put forward a

theory of emotion (as distinct from inquiring into the physical expression of
emotion) these references have not been given the status of a theory to
support a cognitive view of emotion.

While James later relied heavily on Darwin's work to formulate his
theory of emotion (the James/Lange Theory), it is the behavioural
emphasis he uses, not the underlying cognitive assumptions.

James

states (together with Lange in 1922, who developed the same theory
independently during the same time) that "the bodily changes follow
directly the perception of the exciting fact, and that our feeling of the same
changes as they occur /S the emotion" (James, 1984, p.128).

James

claimed that "without the bodily states following on the perception, the latter
would be purely cognitive in form, pale, colourless, destitute of emotional
warmth. We might then see the bear, and judge it best to run, receive the

insult and deem it right to strike, but we could not actually feel afraid or
angry" (ibid., p.129).
The interesting thing about this theory, in the present context, is that if
you reverse it, it is equally strong.

That is, bodily states, without the

cognitive perception, would be no more than the awareness of sensations
of a beating heart, rushing of blood, heat in the body, water flowing from
the eyes etc, destitute of meaning or reason. We could flee or strike as the
case may be, but we could not know why, and could not be aware of the
differences between at least some emotional states, or indeed of having
anything other than a physical sensation. We need some sort of cognitive
activity to tell us that the tears flowing from our eyes and our awareness of
those tears are due, for example to perceiving a dead person we thought
to be alive, or an alive person we thought to be dead (grief or joy), or
indeed to tell us that someone in the kitchen is peeling strong onions.
Awareness of bodily disturbance simply is not enough to constitute the
having of an emotion - a point that has been argued by cognitivists since,
as will be seen in later sections of this Chapter.
However, James does, to some extent, anticipate problems when he
says at the outset of his writing on emotion, that he proposed to consider
only those emotions that had "a distinct bodily expression" leaving others
aside. The "others" consisted of examples of emotions, such as intellectual
delight, which would not be sufficient in degree to cause perceptible bodily
changes (ibid., p.128) - which position, admitting as it does of "other"
emotions, and of degrees of emotion being related to bodily changes,
does, if anything, strengthen the cognitive reverse face of his theory.
Cannon, a physiologist working at the beginning of the 20th century set out
specifically to test the James/Lange theory by examining the connection
between the awareness of bodily changes and emotion, and found that, in
normal conditions, bodily changes, though marked, do not provoke

emotion. Without the "psychical emotion proper", subjects could report on
bodily changes "without the feeling" (Cannon, 1984, p.150).
Section II: The development of psychological theories of emotion
Although the cognitive perspective on emotion was in evidence as
psychology became a discipline, physiologically-based theories continued
to hold the centre of attention, not least because, as Brett pointed out,
psychologists were pre-occupied with producing data, and physiological
theories could be tested in laboratories in ways that cognitive theories
could not. Early behaviourist theories of emotion had also emerged by the
beginning of the 19th century and they also fitted in with a scientific
approach, providing the possibility for laboratory work.

An early

behavioural theory from Dewey held that while a part of emotion would be
the "feel" of it in James' sense, that physiological "feel" still needed to be
"placed, with reference to the other phases of the concrete emotion experience" (Dewey, 1984, p. 164). Dewey argued that the "feel" or "quale"
had to be connected with the way of behaving, with certain "practical"
attitudes related to any given emotion.

In addition, the "feel" and the

attitude needed to be placed with their "object" or "intellectual content"
since an emotion is always "about" or "toward", or "at" or "on account of"
something, this prepositional reference being "an integral phase of the
single pulse of emotion" (ibid., p.165).

Although Dewey gives the most

significance to the behavioural component of emotion, claiming that the
"behaviour side of emotion was always uppermost in consciousness", it is
clear that there is a strong cognitive approach to emotion in his theory and
that, without its cognitive, or "intellectual" content, the theory would not
account for all the phenomena we associate with the subjective experience
of emotion.

The physiological

perspective

Theories of emotion based on biological evolution theory (Darwin,
1977, Plutchik, 1980) are supported by a great deal of evidence,
observational from Darwin and more stringently experimental by Plutchik.
Related biological theories (from Stanley-Jones, 1970, Schachter and
Singer, 1962, Tomkins, 1970) provide strong evidence for connecting
physiological

processes

with

the

experience

of

emotions.

The

physiological approach can be connected back to the early Greek
philosophers (notably Aristotle), but what the physiological approach alone
does not give a satisfactory account of, is the subjective, cognitive element
of emotional experience - an element that was also foreshadowed by
Aristotle and other early thinkers, and has in modem thought, been
increasingly developed.

No physiological process alone can give an

understanding of, for example, the difference between tears of joy, pain or
rage (Solomon, 1980).

Bettelheim (1976) explains the importance of

helping disturiDed children to understand their powerful and often
conflicting emotions. To learn to cope in a complex worid a child "must be
helped to make some coherent sense out of the turmoil of his feelings"
(Bettelheim, 1976, p.5). Physiological processes alone cannot provide that
kind of sense, though an understanding of them would obviously help.
There is an aspect of the evolution-based approach however that
creates an even stronger tie with previous thinking. This is the idea that
feeling and thinking was, and is, in a process of evolution even now, that
ways of feeling and ways of thinking change fundamentally according to
the demands of the environment and survival (Plutchik, Ed., Arnold, 1968,
p.9). This implies that early theories of emotion are themselves a way of
adapting and surviving in the environment, that man's understanding of his
own processes is necessary to survival, especially processes as powerful
as the emotions.

At that point, theoretically, evolution theory itself

becomes a way of surviving most effectively by making better sense of the
world.

Without evolution theory, for example, a number of other studies, in

zoology, genetics, etc, might not have developed as rapidly, if at all. That
the development and accumulation of knowledge is related to survival is
not in dispute. Hawking (1991) states "^hat it has certainly been true in the
past that what we call intelligence and scientific discovery has conveyed a
survival advantage" (Hawking, 1991, p.14). As a physicist, he also holds
the view that it is not at all clear that in the future however, scientific
discoveries might not destroy everyone, but that the regular evolutionary
action in the universe is one reason to suppose they might not (Hawking,
1991, p.14).

In other words, human theories and discoveries are

themselves a part of evolutionary action and are, ultimately, working
towards survival and development. Huxley (1953) supports this view in his
socio-evolutionary view of the world, and his idea that the theory of
evolution should be broadened to include the evolution of ideas has been
supported in recent years by Pollard (1984) who explores future directions
for the neo-Darwinian theory of evolution. Popper (1984) has presented an
evolutionary theory of knowledge that is based on an evolutionary
development of theories. Within his theory he posits that "the human mind
lives and grows in interaction with its products", greatly influenced by
"feedback" from those products which include all human invention such as
theories, cultural stmctures, art, books, music etc (Popper, 1984, p.252).
Popper also posits a "world of the mind" which consists of conscious
experiences, thoughts, feelings, aims and plans of action (ibid., p.252), and
it is this world that grows, changes and develops, as well as the physical
world.
This

attitude

of

seeking

better

understanding

and

attempting

consciously to modify oneself and one's environment is also a strong
feature of early Greek thought and must indeed form the foundation of the
steady accumulation of human knowledge.

When considering emotion

theories it becomes evident that the inner environment of man (i.e., the
inner mental processes), in both Popper's and Polanyi's sense, is as
important to man's development and survival as the external environment.
The power of human emotions - both constructive and destructive -has not
been disputed through the ages and within that context it is reasonable to
argue that it is as important to understand and adapt to the power of
emotions as it is/was to understand and adapt to (or modify) the power of
Nature. It may be even more important in the light of recent views that the
survival of the planet will depend on our attitudes to the environment and to
one another (Suzuki, 1987).

If the realisation of the survival and developmental value of the
understanding of emotions can be viewed as a part of the evolutionary
process then it would be reasonable to assume that a survival instinct was
at work, both in the experience of emotions and within the intellectual
activity of mankind's pursuit of emotional understanding.

Frijda (1986)

states that, in principle, "if emotions are, wholly or in part, biological
phenomena, they must serve a purpose for survival" (Frijda, 1986, p.5).
Such an instinct can be perceived in the patterns of early and later ideas.
One strong indication is that early philosophical thinking did not seek to
understand emotions only in biological and cognitive ways, but to suggest
ways in which feelings participated in creative processes, and ways in
which feelings could or should be mastered.

As stated at the end of

Chapter One, values were put upon feelings - some were "good", some
"bad" and goodness or badness were related to constructiveness and
destructiveness.

The reason versus emotion relationship was conceived

among other things, as a possible way to master emotions and channel
them constnjctively.

Psychology as a discipline moved partly towards finding ways to
understand

emotional

processes

in

the

therapeutic

context

-

a

development that could indicate, in the survival context, that the attempt to
establish reason as stronger than emotion had not been successful
practically, though theoretically it had made an attempt at understanding
and providing a direction for action.

In the evolutionary context, the

development of psychology as a discipline can be seen as a movement
from the general (philosophical) to the particular in order to solve a number
of problems. Brett (1967) claimed that psychology took about 2,300 years
to develop enough to differentiate itself from "a mass of very general
speculations" to address itself to particular problems (Brett, 1967, p.26),
and within Popper's theory, it is entirely appropriate to suppose that the
problems of psychology and the related theories, would eventually evolve
to some sort of independent status. Within psychology itself, theories of
emotion could evolve in a similar way. Overall, this relates well to Polanyi's
position that personal knowledge is central to the development of a body of
knowledge.

A new branch on the evolutionary theoretical tree in

connection with emotion theory was provided, I propose, by Sigmund
Freud with his articulation of the theory of psychoanalysis - a branch which,
I will argue in later chapters, has yet to reach full stature.

A different

branch, though as strong, has been provided by psychologist George Kelly
with his theory of personal constructs. As discussed in the Introduction, a
part of the central and major claim in this thesis is that, taken together,
these two psychologists represent the most recent significant step forward
in the evolutionary process of feeling and thinking, both theoretically and in
practical possibility.

I propose that, in practical terms, the evolutionary

process consists of a new awareness and use of a close, complementary
relationship between thinking and feeling.

The cognitive perspective
As discussed earlier in this Chapter, the early physiological theories of
emotion developed by experimental psychologists all seemed to have

underlying cognitive content.

Beginning during the same era, and in a

psychotherapeutic context, Freud and Jung were also working with
concepts of emotion that carried strong cognitive content. The exploration
of the cognitive element in Freud's theory is a long and complex procedure
which I have undertaken in Chapters Five, Six, Seven and Eight in order to
establish that Freud did in fact provide a complex, multi-level theory of
emotions as distinct from this theory of the instincts.

Jung, in his

Psychological Theory of Types, explores the different meanings given to
the use of the term "feeling", and differentiates between feeling as
sensation (i.e., perception through conscious sensory processes), feeling
as intuition (perception by way of unconscious contents and connections),
and feeling as the attaching of a proper value to something (an
interpretative or evaluative process) (Jung, 1984, pp.104-5). He arrives at
the idea that feeling in the latter sense is essentially rational, by positing two
types of persons - thinking types and feeling types - and by arguing that
although these two types are different they "have something in common
which I cannot designate except by the word rationality" (Ibid., p. 104).
Jung counteracts some objections to the idea of emotions being rational by
providing different definitions of feeling and by discussing the process of
thinking.

Thinking as consideration and reflection, he sees as clearly

rational activity; feeling as evaluation or interpretation, he sees as different
from thinking, but no less rational. He claims that if the distinction is made
between sensation, intuition and feeling, then "it becomes quite clear that
feeling values and feeling judgements - that is to say, our feelings - are not
only reasonable, but are also as discriminating, logical and consistent as
thinking" (ibid., p.105).

Jung holds the view that in a "thinking type", (i.e., a person in whom
the thinking function

predominates) the feeling function

is always

underdeveloped and is superseded by the functions of sensation and
intuition which are "precisely the functions which are not rational, not

logical, and not evaluating" (ibid., p. 105). This kind of close relationship
between feeling and thinking can be traced back to the early philosophical
connection between feelings and value judgements, and does in fact
provide an explanation of why, perhaps, that early connection was so
strong and obviously felt (in the Jungian sense) at the time to be so
relevant.
Social psychological theories, as presented within the Adierian
framework, provide a cognitive component which is related to the idea that
emotions are the outcome of human goals, that they have an aim which,
within any individual, is a rational aim within that individual framework. The
individual framework in turn is dependent upon the social framework within
which the individual is contained. Adier (1973) posits a clear relationship
between thinking and feeling when he discusses the way in which feelings
appear in connection with certain goals.

The feelings appear when a

person has a desire to approach a certain goal. They appear because the
person's

"attention

and concentration

have a tendency

to

exclude

contradictions and conflicting tasks and thus evoke the right feelings and
functions" (AdIer, Ed. Reymert, 1973, p.317).

AdIer speaks of feelings

being "never independent expressions and never in themselves real
arguments for action. They will, nevertheless, always be used in this way
and influence our secondary decisions from time to time" (ibid., p.319).
The ultimate goals in the Adierian framework are the overcoming of the
difficulties of life and the achievement of superiority.

To achieve these

goals the mind uses feelings, evoking them as a means of establishing
actions that lead to the desired goals. Feelings therefore emerge as being
rationally directed, even in the neurotic individual where goals may seem in
themselves irrational (ibid., p.317).
Other supporters of a social psychological view of emotions, such as
Fromm (1975), Homey (1945) and Sullivan (1978) rely heavily on the

concepts of anxiety and helplessness as the starting point for discussion of
feelings. Fromm views all people as having to cope with the one overriding
problem of "separateness", the experience of which arouses great anxiety,
distress and the range of negative feelings (Fromm, 1975; Fromm, 1980).
Negative emotions are closely tied to, if not identified with, the experience
of separateness from others in its many forms, and positive emotions are
seen as having a rational purpose.
Homey views the human as a sufferer of basic anxiety due to early
loss of security after birth, connected with negative influences in the
environment.

Since no environment is perfect, some degree of basic

anxiety is present in everyone. Anxiety and the desire for love combine to
evoke a range of positive and negative feelings depending on how
individuals resolve their anxiety (Homey, 1945). Homey sees individuals as
developing strategies to deal with anxiety and the need for love.

The

relationship between thinking and feeling emerges as one where thinking
provides solutions to the problems of feeling.

She regards neurotic

solutions as irrational, but the feelings themselves remain the logical
outcome of a faulty environment (Hall and Lindzey, 1978, pp.178-9).
Sullivan also sees anxiety as being the most basic and powerful part
of the human personality, beginning in infancy and being a part of the
interpersonal relations which he considers in turn to be the complete and
only framework of human personality (cited in Hall and Lindzey, 1978,
p. 188). The experience of anxiety is a product of threat, and, as such, is a
rational response to a situation in which existence is threatened.

The

cognitive analysis of the anxiety may at times be irrational (e.g., seeing
threat where there is none) but the feeling itself and the many associated
feelings are, in themselves rational.

They appear in response to a

message from the mind that threat is imminent. Speaking of the emotional
development of infants Spitz (1968) describes emotions as a "linkage"

which "takes place between a specific facial expression and a particular
experience" for which conscious perception of an emotional experience is
necessary - a view which demonstrates very well the necessity of a
cognitive component in the formation of emotion (Spitz, 1968, p.43). Such
a simple linkage by the infant is the obvious forerunner to the more
complex linkages between events and feelings in later life.
The social constructionivist view of emotion has focussed on the
necessity of obtaining an understanding of the language of emotions as it
develops in the context of social practices. Harre (1986) argues that the
tendency of philosophers and psychologists to "abstract an entity", call it
an emotion and try to study it leads us away from the "concrete world of
contexts and activities" and that we "reify and abstract from that
concreteness at our peril" (Harre, 1986, p.4). Dealing with emotions within
social practices, with an analysis of the differential uses of a vocabulary
leads the social constructionists into a theoretical world which opens up
the very complex nature of any emotion at both the individual and social
level, which includes the complexity of emotions across different cultures.
Within the social constnjctionist approach there may exist the five
perspectives of emotion yielded by the philosophical enquiry in Chapters
One and Two of this thesis - the physiological perspective, the cognitive,
moral, motivation and creative perspectives are all made visible by studying
the social context and language related to them. Harre speaks directly of
the ways in which some emotions can only be understood when viewed in
a moral context for instance - emotions like envy or jealousy requiring
"careful attention to the details of local systems of rights and obligations ...
attention to the local moral order" (Harre, 1986, p.6).
Averill (1982) also argues that a part of the problem of defining
emotions is "that psychologists in their search for simplifying principles,
have tended to ignore the very phenomena they wish to explain - anger,

fear, grief, jealousy, love, envy, hope, joy, and the myriad of (sic) other
emotions experienced in everyday life" (Averill, 1982, p.3). He argues for "a
middle

ground

between

the

intuitive,

quasi-literary

characteristic of the classic works on emotion, and

descriptions
over-simplified

'deductive or generative' principles", and posits a social constructivist view
that emphasises the social origins and current functions of emotions (ibid.,
p.4).
Averill argues that emotions are not simple, but consist of "levels" and
subsystems within the levels. For example there is the organisational level
where physiological and expressive reactions, feelings, cognitions and
instrumental responses are related.

Then there is the level of analysis

where the biological, psychological and sociocultural aspects are analysed
(and a subsystem for each on that level).

Within this idea of emotions

being related to behavioural and cognitive systems, he defines emotions as
"socially constituted syndromes (transitory social roles) which include an
individual's appraisal of the situation and which are interpreted as
passions, rather than as actions" (ibid., p.6).

Averill argues that in the

appraisal of the situation, the appraised object, or objects, is "probably the
most consistent and surest guide to the identification of the emotional
episode", stating that each kind of emotion had its own characteristic
objects, reflecting a particular set of appraisals. For example, the object of
anger typically involves some appraised wrong, the object of jealousy a
potenitial loss to another, and the object of envy, the good-fortune of
another.

The same physiological reactions, overt behaviour and so on

could occur for each of those emotions, so the distinguishing feature was
the object (ibid., p.11).

The emotion itself Averill regards as a passion

rather than an action, in that emotions are not viewed as something a
person does deliberately whereas an action is viewed as deliberate (ibid.,
p. 13). To overcome the problem of how people can be said to "suffer" their
own behaviour in this context, Averill posits the existence of a "phenomenal

self which is divided into two main categories corresponding to "actions"
and "passions" which refer to all deliberately motivated behaviours in the
case of the former, and all other states in the case of the latter. Hence,
looking is an action, seeing is a passion, aggression is an action, anger is a
passion (ibid., p.14). The "phenomenal self" is able to "monitor its own
operations" and can therefore consciously experience itself as being both
active and passive in certain ways (ibid., p. 14).
In defining an emotion as a "socially constituted syndrome" i.e., "a set
or population of responses that covary in a systematic fashion" Averill is
defining an emotion as a set of responses, thus classifying responses as
passions (ibid., p.7).

As primary grounds for interpreting responses as

passions (in the sense of being non-deliberate) Averill cites biological
imperatives, social imperatives (socially constituted response tendencies),
psychological imperatives (early patterns of reinforcement etc), systemic
conflict

(conflicting

disorganisation

(the

impulses or conflict with
interruption

processing information).

of

ordinary

reality)

and cognitive

cognitive

patterns

of

He uses these grounds for "interpreting (or

experiencing) response as a passion" to posit three broad classes of
emotional syndrome - the impulsive emotions (automatic desires and
aversions); the conflictive

emotions (social hysterias

resulting from

conflicting demands being placed on the individual by society); and
transcendental

emotional

states

(the

products

of

cognitive

disorganisation).
Averill explores his highly cognitive theory of emotions by focussing
on a single emotion, anger, (and its related phenomenon, aggression), "to
gain a better undersanding of emotional processes in general" (ibid., p.3).
His explorations include discussions of the biological perspectives on
anger, cross cultural variations, historical teachings (going back to Plato),
anger and the law, motivational aspects, and a series of empirical studies

of anger as experienced in various social contexts.

He concludes that

anger is a "conflictive emotion, that, on the biological level is related to
aggressive systems, and, even more important, to the capacities for
co-operative social living, symbolization, and reflective self-awareness; that,
on the psychological level, is aimed at the correction of some appraised
wrong; and that on the sociocultural level, functions to uphold accepted
standards of conduct" (ibid., p.317).

In discussing this definition, Averili

refers to the physiological, cognitive, specifically moral, and motivational
perspectives on emotion, and claims also that anger has evolved and is
maintained within the social system because it serves to uphold accepted
standards of conduct.
The social psychological contribution to emotion theory demonstrates
a certain kind of cognitive process that seems to be an essential part of
human emotion. This is the process of the recognition of others and the
accumulation of emotional processes that may exist only within the
framework of that recognition (i.e., the analysis of similarities and
differences) of others.

Social psychologists also justify and support the

early philosophical insistence that emotions are closely bound with the
cognitive functions of language, which in turn needs the existence of a
society, however small. The formal categorisation of feelings also relies on
language and being able to make comparisons between feelings as
experiences by more than one person, or within personal interaction. For
example, the feeling of anxiety engendered by a natural disaster is
categorised differently from a feeling of anxiety in connection with a
personal quarrel with someone, or the anxiety of being caught in a mob,
and different again within a fearful mob as opposed to an angry mob. In
each case the sensation of anxiety may be the same, the physiological
manifestations the same, the differences being perceived and indeed
created, by the understanding of each situation.

In a recent inquiry into emotions, Frijda (1986) describes his approach
to emotions as "cognitive (as opposed to behavioural)" but better
designated as "affective or conative". He states that "what is interesting
about emotion is the emotional. Feeling is not cognition, it is feeling - it is
responding 'yes' or 'no'. Striving is not behaviour, it is tending - toward,
trying to reach or avoid" (Frijda, 1986, p.5). Frijda develops a theory of
emotions as he presents a survey of the literature on emotion from Darwin
to the mid-eighties. He began his survey within the general framework of
principles that emotions in humans have a biological basis, that they are
related to norms, values, cognitive possibilities (i.e. reflective awareness
and intentional activity), and human modes of interaction, and that they
have a regulation or control component.

Within this framework he

discusses Darwin's description of emotional behaviour, pointing out that
cognitive control of expressive behaviour was not entirely absent, and that
such behaviour had a functional component as other theorists also
emphasised (ibid., p.12). He argues that the interpretation of expressive
movement as behaviour "with functional significance in the subject's
interaction with his environment is of central importance for clarifying the
relation between expression and emotion" and for clarifying what is meant
by emotion itself. In this context "expression suggests that emotions are
tendencies toward given modes of interaction", and expression then
becomes "merely those tendencies' embodiment, the manner (or a
manner) in which the tendencies are effectuated" (ibid., p.12).

That expressive behaviour could be suppressed or held in abeyance
led Frijda to conclude that there existed tendencies toward expressive
behaviour, present prior to, and independently of, the execution of
expressive behaviour - such tendencies being called "action tendencies"
(ibid., p.70).

He went on to posit a theory where emotions were

considered as "changes in action readiness" which, as well as including
readiness to execute certain types of behaviour, included "readiness or

unreadiness to achieve a given kind of end result". An "action tendency" is
thus defined by the end result aimed at or achieved, and is also a
"readiness for different actions having the same intent". For example, "one
action tendency is readiness for attacking, spitting, insulting, turning one's
back, or slandering, whichever of these appears possible or appropriate at
a given moment. Another action tendency is readiness to approach and
embrace, fondle, look at avidly or say sweet things, again according to
what the circumstances favour (ibid., p.71).
Frijda argued that such changes

had a quantitative

aspect

(activation), and a qualitative aspect (action tendency) and that they were
accompanied by autonomic changes.

Emotions differed in terms of the

mode of activation (i.e. the different urges activated by events), in the kind
of action tendency, and in the autonomic response.

Different emotions

were evoked by different stimulus constellations" as appraised by the
person, relevant variables being what the stimulus could do to the person,
and what the person could do in the context of the event (ibid., p.73).
"Stimulus constellations" could result in many different forms of action
readiness, depending on the pattern of events or "story". The "story" with
jealousy for example may be that "someone else enjoys something that I
have a claim to enjoyment upon, and which event is felt to interfere with
satisfaction of this claim", and this may evoke many different kinds of
"action readiness to change" - upset, excitement, stupefaction, grief, anger
etc (ibid., p.73).
An even more highly cognitive aspect of Frijda's theory is his
assertion that action tendency can take the form of "mental actions" having
similar intent to overt ones - turning to an object in thought, or away from it,
activities such as worry, planning, being in love, forms of nostalgia, grief
and other such emotions (ibid., p.76). He also presents a complex system
of categorisations, a detailed physiology of emotion, a theory of emotional

experience (relying on cognitions as an "essential ingredient"), and a theory
of "concerns" or desires, all of which elaborate on aspects of his theory.
He addresses the moral nature of concerns, and their related emotions, in
a section on values, and the creative nature of concerns and their related
emotions, in a section on aesthetic emotions (ibid., pp.353-5).

He also

discusses motivation in connection with concerns (ibid., p.361), concluding
that emotions were "heavily dependent on motivation" in being related to
concerns (ibid., p.372).

A neurophysiological review deals with the

physiological aspects of emotional response, with evidence to support that
component of his theory that deals with the biological base of emotions,
and to relate the neurophysiological and psychological aspects of emotion
(ibid., p.379). A discussion of the control and regulation of emotion (which
he claims is an essential component of the emotional process) seen as
both inhibitory in the Freudian sense, and as intentional, completes a
thorough and internally consistent account of emotions which relates well
to all the theories he surveyed (ibid., p.423). Frijda demonstrates very well
the ways in which the five perspectives on emotion outlined in this thesis
need to be addressed when dealing with emotions.

The moral perspective
The idea of emotions being "good" or "bad" in the moral sense is not
a strongly developed feature of theories of emotion in psychology. But the
version of a moral attitude adopted by psychology is the "positive/negative"
scale of emotions. I retain the idea that this is a version of a moral attitude
because once past the positive/negative categorisation, any attempt at
explanation of these poles leads invariably to the notions of good and bad
in some moral sense. For example, if one asks what is meant by "positive"
the answer may be 'constructive", or "that which pertains to happiness", or

"with the least amount of tension or anxiety", or even "the opposite to
negative".

But there are complexities since anger may be positive or

negative and indeed most emotions have a positive and negative
dimension on reflection except perhaps malice for which no redeeming
feature has been found.
constructive/destructive

But whether the difference lies within the
concept

or

pleasure/unpleasure,

or

high

tension/low tension, the question must then still arise as to why
psychologists, as much as anyone else, proceed on the spoken (or
unspoken) assumption that positive is to be preferred to negative in the
experience of emotions. Whether this is for the sake of mental health or
happiness, or development, the question then remains as to why any of the
latter should be pursued.

Even if it happens that positive emotions are

more conducive to survival as an individual, and as a species, there seems
to be, at the conscious experience level, some assumption that it is morally
better to co-operate with the instinct for survival rather than the instinct for
destruction. At the cognitive level it is not sufficient to argue that survival is
simply preferable to destruction, given that survival does not entail
happiness.
Recent cognitive theorists such as Averill and Frijda have addressed
the moral component of emotion directly, though not as a central issue in
their theories. Averill posits that anger is, among other things, aimed at the
correction of some appraised wrong (connected with the feeling of
injustice), and Frijda speaks of a moral connotation connected with
emotions that are related to concerns that deal with "ought" and "ought not"
(Frijda, 1986, p.353).
Psychotherapists proceed on the basis that there is a clear moral
obligation in the course of their work not to encourage the establishment of
destructive and self-destructive emotions in a patient or client.

Less

directly, Gestalt psychologists speak of feelings as having "an abundance

of qualitative nuances" (Kreuger, Ed. Arnold, 1968, p.98), and of emotions
which maintain the fullness of life and regenerate it (ibid., p.103).

They

contrast the "merely sensational" from the "genuinely creative" emotions
(ibid., p.105) and speak of the ways in which good and bad events, as well
as positive and negative events, arouse corresponding emotions with our
being attracted to the former and repelled by the latter. The attraction and
repugnance themselves become evaluative feelings with moral content
(ibid., pp.106,120).

Freud, though presenting no ethical component formally, uses the
language of a moral system frequently in connection with his work, the
exploration of which is carried further in later Chapters of this thesis. Kelly
also works with an underlying base of value judgements, as will be
explained more fully in Chapter Four.

The motivation perspective
The motivation aspect of concepts of emotions has been explored in
some depth by psychologists
theoretically.

both at the experimental

level and

The philosophical background for such exploration comes

from discussions throughout the history of philosophy on the relationship
between thinking, feeling and acting, and on discussions about freedom of
the will. Peters in The Education of the Emotions gives a clear account of
the rationale behind psychologists' interest in the connection between
feelings and motives (Peters, Ed. Arnold, 1970) pointing out that, if we
study a list of emotions we find that the terms on the list can mostly also be
used as names of motives (Peters, ibid., p.190).

He cites the "historic

dispute" between Leeper and Young about the facilitating or disrupting
effect of emotion on motivated behaviour, and suggests that if an emotion

is defined as an "appraisal" of a situation, then the overlap between
emotion and motive becomes clearly visible. Peters says that:
In cases where we apply the term 'motive', this appraisal of the
situation is regarded as providing the reason why we go on to
do something. We talk about motives only in contexts where an
explanation for an action is given or demanded, (ibid., p.190)
Thus certain emotions may be clearly seen as both a feeling and as a
motive for action. Jealousy, fear, anger can be both passive (as when one
is simply conscious of the feelings themselves), or active (as when one is
motivated to act in connection with those feelings) (ibid., p.191). That both
kinds of appraisal may occur simultaneously (and often do) makes it easy
to understand why emotions and motives are so easily confused.
Peters' explanation of the relationship between emotions and motives
assumes that emotional appraisals are, in turn, the explanation (or motives)
for certain behaviour.

In this he follows a philosophical thread which sees

emotions as being the cause of certain actions but since Peters sees the
experience of emotion as necessarily cognitive (ibid., p. 188), cognition
becomes equally causally linked to action. This link was (less distinctly)
foreshadowed by Plato, Aristotle, the Epicureans, Christian thinkers,
Descartes and Hume, as discussed in Chapters One and Two.
The idea that emotions are prime motivators can also be traced
philosophically and depends greatly on the way in which emotions are
defined.

With the re-emergence of cognitive aspects of emotion, it has

become difficult to establish emotions as prime motivators.

However, a

definition of emotions that goes back to the possible origins of emotion,
that explores the notions of energy, instincts and "primary" emotions, can
yield a different sort of motivational connection.

Such an approach was

made by Freud in the course of his work in psychoanalysis. The strength

of Freud's observations and his subsequent theory of the instincts has
made his approach one of the major influences on thinking about
emotions.

An added complication has been that Freud made many

ambiguous statements about emotions, and although formally he equates
them with the instincts, a primary force in the psyche, there is plenty of
evidence in his writings to suggest that links with philosophical traditions
are strong. These links yield a substantial theory of emotions where the
idea of motivation becomes more complex than his formal position
suggests, as discussed in Chapters Five, Six, Seven and Eight.

The creative perspective
The creative aspect of emotions has been one of the strongest
influences on theories of emotion both in philosophy and psychology.

In

presocratic times the experience of emotion led people to the idea that love
and hate were the creative and destructive forces of the universe
respectively, and from there theories evolved which viewed people as
creators of themselves, in terms of worth and reality, by the proper
expression of their emotions as discussed in Chapters One and Two.
The central notion in psychological theories of creation through
emotions is the idea that people create themselves psychologically through
the awareness, understanding and expression of their emotions. This idea
takes several forms. Rogers (1977) says that when a person experiences
any of the emotions that he/she is capable of in an "all-out fashion", that
person is in the direct creative process of becoming what he or she is
(Rogers, 1977, p.113).

In this context, emotions become the raw

substance of what a person actually is beneath the facades, masks and
structures that a person lives behind much of the time (ibid., p.114). In

following this idea, and especially in following that aspect of it which relates
to interaction between people, Rogers is following a thread provided by
Nietzsche who speaks of emotions as being the expression of the inner
self, the quality of emotion being dependent on strength and courage (see
Chapter Two).
Another approach to the creativity of emotions was taken by Schloss
(1976) in his exploration of psychopoetry as a therapeutic tool. Schloss
says that in the course of his work he has been particularly struck by "the
beauty, intensity and directness of emotional expression" in many of the
poems written by people in therapy. The benefit of such therapy lay in
allowing clients to experience and express feelings they had not been
directly aware of previously (Schloss, 1976, p.xv). The writing of poetry
has related to emotion in several ways, Schloss claimed. It was a means of
emotional expression, firstly, but it was also a means of heightening,
lowering or changing emotions. Schloss distinguishes between
psychopoetry and the writing of poetry in any other context. Psychopoetry
is specifically oriented towards the exploration of feelings and the term
poetry is defined as "any piece of writing which expresses or
communicates a strong emotion, regardless of its formal qualities" (ibid.,
p.4). The implications for emotion theory here are brought by one of the
questions Schloss raises - "What psychological processes help poetry
become a therapeutic tool?" (ibid., p.1). His answer to this question
involves an exploration of the relationship between emotions and creativity,
culminating in the idea that creativity is, essentially, the "articulation" of
emotion, the articulation taking any of the creative art forms. Such
articulation leads to new levels of self-awareness and the growth
(creation?) of a wider and richer variety of feelings (ibid., p.127). The
relationship that emerges then, is a two-way relationship, working
creatively both ways.

The idea of creativity in a Gestalt approach to emotion is that
emotions form the basis of all experience, that within emotions are created
perceptions,

memories,

clear

ideas,

experience (Kreuger, 1968, p.99).

firm

decisions,

all

organised

Kreuger defines emotion as the

"material origin of all other types of experience" claiming that other,
behavioural, approaches cannot be used to analyse emotion. He claims:
No constellation of stimuli can allow the prediction that any
emotion, let alone a particular emotion, will actually be aroused.
However, every change in our experience can become the
occasion for any kind and any intensity of emotion. On the
other hand, an actually experienced emotion will colour every
simultaneous experience. (Kreuger, 1968, p.100).
The idea that with our emotions we "colour" our experiences comes
from the Sartrean idea that our emotions actually create our worlds, that
the very way in which we perceive life (our worlds) is governed by our
feelings which we choose and have full responsibility for in the moral as
well as the creative sense.

Solomon utilises the same idea when he

speaks of emotions being the key to "living our lives as works of art", that
is, creating certain qualities and attitudes in our approach to living
(Solomon, 1976, p.429).

The emergence of Freud and Kelly
Freud and Kelly have both been briefly mentioned in this Chapter in
connection with some of the perspectives on emotion and I have claimed in
particular that, taken together, they represent a significant "cutting edge" of
present day thinking in emotions. One of the reasons 1 have made this
claim is that both these psychologists incorporated all the dimensions of

emotion theory, as I have outlined them, in their Theory of Psychoanalysis
and Theory of Personal Constructs respectively.

The physiological,

cognitive, motivational, moral and creative components of emotion theory
are all present in both theories, though in different ways.

This in itself

suggests that each of these theorists was able somehow to synthesise
previous thinking to produce a new level oi thinking on human personality,
and on emotions in particular.
In the case of Freud, the new level is provided by a theory of
emotions that is distinguishable from his theory of the instincts.

The

former, with the aid of psychoanalytic techniques, makes it possible, I
argue in Chapters to follow, to discover and articulate personal worlds of
emotions and emotion language and images.

The need to do this is

justified by Freud himself in his approach to psychoanalysis. The need to
do this in the more general (as opposed to psychotherapeutic) context
becomes visible in Kelly's new approach to personality and the notion of
construing.

The ways in which traditional thinking have been incorporated in the
theories of Freud and Kelly are as follows:
(i)

Both theorists refer to the physiological aspects of emotion, in the way
that emotion may be expressed physically and in the physical effects
of emotion.

Both also discuss the ways in which physiological

manifestations may (or may not) be used to identify emotions.
(ii)

A strong cognitive component is present in each theory of emotions. I
argue in later Chapters that Freud has a complex cognitive level of
emotions embedded within his theory, which deal with the differences
between "affect" and "feeling", and with the categorisation of feelings.
In Chapter Four I argue that Kelly's cognitive dimension is also

complex and includes the redefinition of feelings into cognitive states
of construing.
(iii)

The motivation aspect is central to Freud's thinking on affects which
he regards essentially as the prime motivator at the level of instincts. A
motivational component also emerges at the cognitive emotion level.
Kelly posits a relationship between feelings and motivation when he
refers to a connection between people's need to predict and the states
of happiness and misery. Motivation is also discussed in connection
with the process of reconstruing in order to allow better prediction, but
also to enhance or avoid certain emotional states.

(iv) The ethical aspect can be indirectly perceived in both Freud and Kelly.
Freud refers in personal ways to his ideas on the goodness or
badness of certain feelings, not only in terms of pleasure/unpleasure,
but in morally evaluative ways. Formally Freud does not give ethical
content to his theory of the instincts but in the construction of the more
complex theory of emotions ethical components emerge. Kelly implies
in his writings that a state of happiness or well-being is good in itself,
and to be preferred to misery, in an approach that is not only
utilitarian.

He also indicates that feelings connected with wanting to

help people in distress (as in the psychotherapeutic relationship) are
worthwhile.
(v)

The creative aspect of feeling is visible in both theorists. In the New
Introductory

Lectures

on

Psychoanalysis

Freud

refers

to

the

psychoanalytic process (with its manifestation of affective processes)
as a creative transformation from "senseless muddle" to a "logical and
intelligible mental process".
cognitive process.

Kelly sees construing as a creative

In my account of Kelly's theory of emotions and

the role of emotions in construing, I argue that, insofar as feelings play

a central role in constming, they are themselves a substantial part of
the creative process.
With both Freud and Kelly, a theory of emotions had to be sought for
within personality theories that attempted to present a whole view of human
nature.

In each case the theories emerged from the psychotherapeutic

context, and each claimed to make a new and radical beginning to the
understanding of human nature.
Conclusion
In this Chapter I have sought to show how psychological theories of
emotion developed from within the discipline of psychology, and how the
influence of the scientific movement in the 19th century affected that
development. I have argued that the major effect was that there was an
emphasis on the physiological and behavioural aspects of emotion, with
attempts to quantify and test emotional responses in an experimental
setting.

Theories

also

emerged from

psychotherapeutic

work in

psychology, and some theories of emotion were embedded within wider
theories of personality arising from research rather than philosophical
traditions. While this in itself was not a drawback, theories arising from
research being obviously significant, it did make the continuity of emotion
theories from earlier thought more difficult to find.
I have also argued that despite many theories being developed,
psychologists have continued to regard the emotions as a difficult and
obscure area of psychology and have argued that a connection between
philosophical and psychological theories did need to be clearly established.
I have looked at some of the reasons, arising in both philosophy and
psychology, for the apparent break in connections and have sought to
show that theorists from Danrt/in onwards did have a cognitive component

in their accounts of emotions, though this was not the focus of attention
until more recently.

I have also sought to show that each of the five

perspectives on emotion outlined at the end of Chapter One were
developed to some extent in psychological thought, and that, more
recently, cognitive theorists such as Averill and Frijda have addressed
some or all of these perspectives directly in their theories of emotion.
In

addition

developments

in

I

have

sought

theories

of

to

show

emotion

that

have

the
a

psychological
biological

and

socio-evolutionary character within the broader evolutionary development
of human thought processes. I have claimed that this development has not
gone unremarked amongst psychologists, especially in connection with
thinking about the functions of emotions, as related to the biological and
social evolution of emotional behaviour.
Finally, I have argued that Freud and Kelly have related theories of
emotion and that the ways in which they are related provide a new
theoretical and practical approach to emotional development.

I have

argued this on the grounds that both Freud and Kelly address all the five
perspectives on emotion within their theories, though both theories are
embedded within their general personality theories.

Although recent

theorists such as Frijda also address the five perspectives, I claim that
Freud initiated a new development both theoretically and practically in the
human approach to emotions and that Kelly initiated a new development in
our understanding of the ways in which people make sense of their worlds,
and a practical approach to developing more flexible ways of seeking
greater understanding. In the next Chapter I will seek to justify this claim
by exploring Kelly's Theory of Personal Constructs and the place of
emotions within it, and in subsequent Chapters I will explore Freud's
Theory of Psychoanalysis and argue that a complex, multi-level theory of
emotions is embedded within it. As I will be claiming that Freud provides a

"missing link" in the explanation of Kelly's process of construing, I will begin
with an account of Kelly's theory and then explore how Freud adds
meaning to it. With this order of exploration, I will be moving away from the
historical progression of theories to pursue my claim that the means to the
personal emotional awareness necessary for the full use of Kelly's process
of construing, is to be found in the work of Freud.

CHAPTER FOUR

A THEORY OF EMOTIONS FROM GEORGE KELLY

Section I: Finding emotions and reason within Kelly's theory of
personality

As I argued in Chapter Three, personality theorists could hardly avoid
addressing emotions directly or indirectly, and when they did, they
inevitably gave emotions a cognitive dimension and posited some sort of
relationship between reason and emotion. Kelly (1963) attempted to give a
complex and detailed theory of how people made sense of the world or
worlds they perceived.

As with many personality theorists his account

arose from clinical work initially but widened its scope to address human
nature in general. He presented a "new way" of looking at things, claiming
to leave behind many accepted notions and to begin a new conceptual
journey. One of the things he claimed to leave behind was the concept of
emotion, but in this chapter I will argue that, not only did he not leave that
concept behind, but also he posited, indirectly, a theory of emotion within
his personality theory, and one that incorporated prior philosophical ideas
about emotion. McCoy (1977) has argued that within Kelly's definition of
fear, threat, guilt and anxiety, emotions may be construed as signals of the
otherwise difficult to observe construing process.

Within the Personal

Construct Theory framework she expanded the set of emotions given by

Kelly to allow such signals to be more visible, especially for use in
connection with clinical work. McCoy also argued (1981) that within that
theoretical framework, emotions could also be construed as positive and
negative, positive emotions being "those which follow validation of
constnjing" and negative emotions being "those which follow unsuccessful
constnjing" (McCoy, 1981, p.97). I will argue in addition that Kelly adds a
new dimension to our way of perceiving emotions, the dimension of
perceiving many basic emotions as ways of thinking, thus bringing feeling
and thinking into a new relationship.

Earlier attempts by philosophers to blend feeling and thinking were
based on the general idea that the way we think can affect the way we feel
and vice versa, providing a loose blend that still allowed for a distinction
between thought and feeling. In Kelly's system, threat, however, is defined
as "the awareness of an imminent comprehensive change in one's core
stnjctures".

This, and other similar definitions of some basic emotions,

implies that such emotions are a kind of realisation based on a conscious
or unconscious reasoning process. Feeling thus becomes a dimension of
thinking, one that precedes the kind of thinking that organises and
reorganises perceptions.

In saying this, I am saying that Kelly makes a

powerful conceptual move from one kind of emotional awareness (the kind
most of us have now which allows a sharp distinction between feeling and
thinking) to another kind of emotional awareness that needs no such
separation.

In the final chapter of this thesis I will argue that some sort of bridge is
needed for making that move (a special technique) before full use can be
made of Kelly's theory. The task of this chapter however, is to establish
that Kelly does have a theory of emotions embedded in his personality

theory (though he denies addressing ennotions at all) and that emotions so
presented play an active part in Kelly's process of construing.

Kelly's personality theory
My aim in this section is not to present an exhaustive account or
critique of Kelly's theory, but to provide a context for the discussion of
emotions within Kelly's system.

I will restrict my account therefore to

Kelly's basic framework. He says that his theory of personality began with
two simple notions - one, l h a t man might be better understood if he were
viewed in the perspective of the centuries rather than in the flicker of
passing moments"; and two, "that each man contemplates in his own
personal way the stream of events upon which he finds himself so swiftly
borne ..." (Kelly, 1963, p.3). He claims then that the long range view of
man "leads us to turn our attention towards those factors appearing to
account for his progress rather than those betraying his impulses" (ibid.,
p.4).

As human progress has, by and large, been given the label of

"science",

Kelly

"man-the-scientist".

chooses

to

begin

from

the

vantage

point

of

He includes all people in this classification and

attributes to people a basic aspiration, as natural scientists, to "predict and
control" (ibid., p.5) Kelly bases this attribution on a long range view of man,
a perspective which shows, he claims, "a massive drift" of progress in
terms of a problem-solving scientific approach to life where man is "ever
seeking to predict and control the course of events with which he is
involved" (ibid., p.5). This created a common viewpoint for the historian,
the philosopher, the scientist and the clinician.

In setting the scene for his theory, Kelly says he speaks from a
philosophical base that assumes the existence of a real world, the

existence of people's thoughts as also real, and a continually changing
relationship between what people think exists and what does actually exist
(ibid., p.6). He also assumes that the universe is "integral", functioning as
"a single unit with all its imaginable parts having an exact relationship to
each other (ibid., p.6).

In a graphic example he claims that there is,

ultimately, as exact a relationship between the motions of fingers, the
action of typewriter keys and the price of yak-milk in Tibet as there is
between the fingers and typewriter keys, the apparent closeness of the
latter being a phenomenon of our time and our experience. The scope of
this philosophical view is vast, implying as it does that there are no isolated
instances of "accidents" in the universe; that, given enough time and
change, as Kelly says, any events may be brought into close and/or causal
conjunctions; and that. In a universe that is in a constant process of
change (in time) it is logically only a matter of time before all connections
may be truly perceived. It can be argued therefore that man-the-scientist is
behaving rationally and practically in attempting, both individually and
collectively, to seek and establish as many of these connections as
possible both in single lifetimes and in the course of broad spans of time.
Such endeavour, it may be concluded, leads towards a way of being in the
world that, ultimately, puts man's perception in exactly the right relationship
with ever-broadening reality.
From such a philosophical base, Kelly describes man as "living
creature [one part of the universe] ... able to bring himself around to
represent another part, his environment", which "emphasises the creative
capacity of the living thing to represent the environment, not merely
respond to it" (ibid., p.8).

Kelly claims further that, because he can

represent his environment, he can place alternative constructions upon it
and, indeed, do something about it if it doesn't suit him" (ibid; p.8).

With exact connections and relationships (such as perceiving a real
connection between fingers and typewriter keys) certain predictions can be
made and certain control may be exercised at least for as long as time and
change allow that connection to exist.

With inexact connections (as

created by man much of the time) less prediction and control are possible.
Kelly calls these pattems of connections "constructs" and describes them
as "ways of construing the world" (ibid., p.9).
People

seek

to

improve

their

constructs

by

seeking

wider

connections and new relationships between things and events and then
altering existing constructs In the light of the implications of the new
findings. Progress is impeded often by man's dependence on or "personal
investment" in his general system.
Given that man must obviously be construing himself in connection
with other things living and non-living, the construction of each individual
system would be closely tied to a sense of personal identity, hence the
deep-seated

nature

of

dependence

on

personal

systems.

The

communication of personal systems is limited only by the availability of a
language which may be easily available, or need to be developed to suit
particular needs and concepts (ibid., p.9).

Human knowledge may be

divided into realms of internally consistent connections (or facts) which
may overiap, merge or divide again.

These provide us with bodies of

knowledge, schools of thought, movements of various kinds, disciplines,
subjects and topics of conversation or thought.
Bodies of personal knowledge may be divided in the same way or in
any way imaginable.

Individual events may be considered in the light of

any or all of the realms or systems (ibid., pp.9-10).

Kelly claims "no-one

has yet proved himself wise enough to propound a universal system of
constructs ... We can safely assume that it will be a long time before a

satisfactorily unified system will be proposed" (ibid. p.10). In fact, given the
constantly changing nature of the universe, a completely unified system
could only be perceived from an "eternal" viewpoint.
While ever people are in the changing universe, their perception of
any

system

must

be

changing

also,

however

imperceptibly

or

unconsciously. If man will not change, then change is forced upon him.
Kelly describes the individual process of construing in detail, pointing out
common errors of reasoning (construing being described as essentially a
reasoning process), ways in which constructs are used to predict and the
ways in which man uses constructs to contribute his changes to a
changing universe. He describes how constnjcts are tested for validation,
often using "test tube proportions" at first to assess hazards. Hazards may
include the creation of an ambiguous or contradictory position that affects
prediction and control of oneself or one's environment (ibid., pp. 13-14).
However, Kelly posits that no situation is irredeemable, no-one need
"paint himself into a corner; this ability to revise and replace gives rise to a
"philosophical position" he calls "constnjctive alternativism" (ibid., p.15).
The assumptive structure of Kelly's theory is presented in terms of a
"fundamental postulate" and eleven "construction corollaries" which
describe the ways in which people construe reality (ibid., pp.46-104).
Within this stnjcture, Kelly refers to some constructs that relate to
"transition" such as threat, fear, anxiety, guilt, aggressiveness and hostility.
Although these are terms commonly associated with emotion, Kelly uses
them specifically to denote transition. They signify awareness of various
degrees or kinds of change to control or "core" construct systems, or
changes in perception or, in the case of hostility, the "continued effort to
extort validational evidence in favour of a type of social prediction which
has already been recognised as a failure" (Kelly, 1955, Vol.11, p.565).

Essentially, when people construe or make a construct, they are
attempting to perceive the real relationship between the objects of reality
being regarded. They do this by seeing at the same time the similarities
and differences among or between the objects where a relationship is
being sought.

So each construct becomes dichotomous or bipolar. To

perceive the causal relationship of the motion of the fingers and the action
of the typewriter, to go back to Kelly's example, is to perceive
simultaneously the relationship between no motion of fingers and no action
of the typewriter; to perceive a similarity relationship between fingers and
typewriter keys one may introduce the paper being typed upon to highlight
similarities. The similarity in that instance would be highlighted by being
able to perceive how fingers and keys are similar but different from the
paper. A relationship that emerges is that, for example, both fingers and
keys act or have an active dimension (fingers strike keys, keys strike
paper) whereas the paper is wholly passive in that context being struck
with letters but not itself striking.
Cleariy the process is complex and yields in each attempt a possibly
infinite number of variations. As long as new objects and events can be
introduced the relationships to be perceived are endless. Further, as long
as new ways of perceiving existing objects (both physical and mental
objects) can be imagined, the relationship between the objects will, or may,
be changed. For example, the passivity of paper may become activity if
one construes activity in terms of functionality. The paper does its "striking"
by containing and giving back the information on it when needed. The
keys and fingers become passive (and ineffectual) if paper is not available
to "take the message", or if a typewriter ribbon is not present, or if the keys
are damaged and illegible, and so on.
In this account of Kelly's theory (by no means exhaustive) I have
attempted to give a context where it may be perceived that emotion, as we

understand it, does indeed not appear to have a place, as Kelly says at the
outset. However, within the broader hypothesis pursued in Chapter Two
that, firstly, there is inevitably a theory of emotion embedded in any theory
of personality, however well disguised or unintentional; and secondly, that
there exists an essential relationship between emotion and reason in any
such theory, I will attempt to demonstrate that Kelly both addresses the
concept of emotions and posits a specific relationship between emotions
and reason.
In the introduction to his theory of personality, Kelly claimed that in his
"new way of thinking about Psychology, there is no learning, no motivation,
no emotion, no

cognition, no stimulus, no response, no ego, no

unconscious, no need, no reinforcement, and no drive'' (Kelly, 1963, p.xi).
He is referring to his having dropped such terms from his account.
Further, he claims that not only have these terms been abandoned, but
that the very concepts themselves "evaporate".

"If the reader starts

murmuring such terms to himself" Kelly says, "he can be sure he has lost
the scent" [of Kelly's "new way" of thinking] (ibid., p.xi).

Concepts and their meanings
While I endorse Kelly's view that such terms need to be abandoned
within the context of a new inquiry, I think the idea that the concepts
themselves evaporate needs further exploration and qualification. All that
can and should "evaporate" is the restricted meaning given to these terms,
the "loading" that they are given by various theorists. The terms are loaded
with particular meanings which are relevant to the framework adopted by
the theorist and which may be necessary to the explanation of the theory.
However, these "loaded terms" are then very often accepted in a much

wider, more general sense, this restricted meaning becoming often the only
accepted meaning. Naturally, anyone who wants to think or speak of the
corresponding concepts in a new or different way finds it very difficult to
shake the "loaded meaning" from the term and the concept. One way to
deal with this problem, which is essentially a problem of communication, is
to drop the terms altogether, which is the course adopted by Kelly.
However, the concepts to which such terms are attached are not so
easily dismissed.

Although the concepts are also vulnerable to loaded

forms (i.e., they incorporate for many people the various meanings
suggested by the loaded terms), they remain nonetheless real and present
in their "unloaded" forms (i.e., the forms in which they are a mental
representation

of

a

merely

observed,

but

not

yet

interpreted,

phenomenon). A distinction here between what I think of as a "processed
perception" and an "interpreted concept" (in the mind) will perhaps be
useful.

A processed perception gives rise to a concept of an observed

phenomenon, the concept being, in this form, a descriptive

concept

containing within itself no answers or possible answers about the
underlying nature of the phenomenon. An interpreted concept is one that
is broadened beyond its processed form to include deliberate explanations
or possible explanations of the phenomenon. Polanyi (1959) makes this
distinction in his theory of personal knowledge when he speaks of
"pre-verbal knowledge" as being the acceptance a-critically of the
"unreasoned conclusions of our senses", and "articulate kinowledge" which
is "established under the control of critical reflection" (Polanyi, 1959, p.17).
When such bodies of articulate knowledge are more generally accepted,
they can eclipse the development of further personal knowledge by being
themselves a-critically regarded.

It is to the latter form of concept that I

believe Kelly refers when he says "the concepts themselves evaporate"
(Kelly, 1963, p.xi).

The evaporation of preconceived notions and

meanings, however, still leaves behind uninterpreted concepts (or the

original conclusions of our senses) which Kelly has by no means
abandoned. This can be demonstrated I think by a consideration of the
terms Kelly has dropped, and their corresponding concepts.

When

introducing his theory, Kelly states that:
It may be unreasonable merely on the basis of a few pages of
academic prose to ask a reader to reconsider his notions of why
man does what he does. (Kelly, 1963, p.xii)
This sentence introduces the concept of motivation quite exactly,
though the concept need not carry any extra, rigid, or loaded meaning the
way the term "motivation" obviously does. To talk about "why man does
what he does" is to talk about motivation in its unloaded form. Motivation is
all about why certain things are done, why certain actions are carried out;
and this concept is central to Kelly's way of looking at and being in the
world (Henry, 1983).
On the first page of Chapter One of A Thieory of Personality, Kelly
refers to man's ability to "contemplate in his own personal way the stream
of events upon which he finds himself so swiftly borne ..." and "the ways in
which individual man may restructure his life" (Kelly, 1963, p.3). Here, once
again, he virtually defines the concept of learning, minus the theoretical
loadings it usually carries in Psychology. The concept refers simply to the
business of a person's ability to take in which is going on around him or
her, and to apply the information so gained.

Many psychologists have

given their explanations of this process, often introducing and defining
various terms in doing so. Sidestepping such explanations still leaves the
essential or common) concept in place and must do so if this aspect of
human personality is to be perceived differently.
When speaking of his venture to provide a theory that does away with
the notion of mental energy, Kelly says that "one of the possibly distressing

outcomes of this venture will be the discarding of much of what has been
accumulated under the aegis of learning theory, perhaps even the
abandonment of the concept of learning, at least in its present fornri' (p.37;
my emphasis).

Here Kelly shows awareness of the difference between

theoretically loaded and unloaded concepts, (i.e. the difference between
concept sthat are oriented towards a particular point of view, and concepts
that are more neutral, as described on pp.96-97) though he does not
elaborate the point. He also seems to recognise that the basic concept of
learning (the concept, not the term) is not so easily dropped though it may
be desirable or even necessary to drop its theoretically loaded forms.
Cognition is another term with strong theoretical loadings within
psychology.

But it refers essentially to the concept of what is going on

inside a person's head while he/she is exercising the ability to take in what
is going on around them. The interpretations of this process have been
extremely broad to date, and incorporate all sorts of notions about how the
mind

operates

automatically.

consciously

and

unconsciously,

deliberately

and

Kelly quite understandably wants to drop that bundle with

relief, but he is still very much concerned with what is going on inside a
person's head as he refers to the "currents and eddies of the streams of
consciousness",

the

"underground

springs

which

feed"

such

consciousness and, of course, he refers overall to man's ways of
construing his world (ibid., p.4).
Stimulus is a term that obviously makes Kelly, and many others,
wince, but the uninterpreted concept of stimulus is neither rigid nor horrific.
It refers simply to things in the world that have the power to act upon, to
influence, other things in the world, including of course, human beings.
Once again, at the heart of Kelly's writing is an "invitation" that is meant,
quite explicitly, to stimulate the reader into a new way of thinking.

This of course leads directly to response, which refers to what people
do when things in the world (including themselves and others) act upon
them. Kelly invites men and women to respond to his invitation (ibid., p.xii).
What exactly is he inviting us to do if he is not recognising and introducing
immediately the unloaded concept of response?
Ego is a term that will probably now never lose its association with
psychoanalysis,

but the concept that Freud was attempting to verbalise

was the notion of a kind of conscious self, a state of self-awareness which
is a concept without which it would be difficult to communicate in the way
that we do. Without it, we can hardly talk about T and "we", which Kelly
does frequently, as well as speaking of the individual and a person's "own
personal way" of doing things. I doubt that there is a single page of Kelly's
writing on personality theory that does not contain an explicit or implicit
reference to "selves". And, indeed, how could there be?
The unconscious is another term bound to psychoanalysis and its
language. But again, the concept does not need to be loaded. The term
was an attempt to verbalise the idea that there is a part of oneself, or of
one's mind, that is not accessible to self-scnjtiny directly; that there are
parts of one's mind that it is difficult to claim knowledge about; and that
there are things that we, in some way, know and have perceived at some
time, that are not present in our self-awareness, or, if present, are in a
disguised or distorted form.

Freud claims that the contents of the

unconscious mind have "representatives" in the conscious mind.

Kelly

refers to this notion when he speaks of the perceptions of badly deluded
patients (ibid., p.8).

He says that the fictitious perception of a badly

deluded patient will often tum out to be a grossly distorted construction of
something which actually does exist. Somewhere along the line, such a
patient must have had a genuine perception of some real thing of which he
or she was no longer aware.

His or her interpretation of that original

simple perception is what constitutes the delusion (ibid., p.8). The original
perception must, of course, be somewhere in the mind still, if it is being
interpreted in any way at all.
Need is a concept which refers to our state of existing as dependent
beings; and some concept of this state is absolutely necessary if we are to
speak of real human beings in a real world. Whatever we are dependent
on, we need. Dependence penneates our very physical existence and is
inextricably bound up with our psychological existence. Kelly refers to this
early in his writing (ibid., p.6) when he speaks of the universe functioning
as a single unit with all its imaginable parts having an exact relationship to
each other; a system where all things are, in some way, interlocked; and
this is presented as a condition of their existence. Break this relationship
and the existence of the parts will be threatened.

This is certainly

observable on all sorts of levels both scientifically and personally or
subjectively.

We are born into a situation where we stand in a certain

dependent relation to our environment.

Our survival, physically and

psychologically, depends on this relationship not being tampered with in
negative ways.
Reinforcement is a term associated in Psychology with the notions of
repetition and strengthening of certain behaviours by reward or practice.
Strip away the theoretical loading and we are left with a concept of which
Kelly makes strong use. At the very heart of his theory lies the business of
making, testing, and remaking constnjcts. This is of course necessarily a
repetitious activity within Kelly's framework. He also ties it in closely with the
idea of strengthening. As Kelly says, "man seeks to improve his constnjcts
by increasing his repertory, by altering them to provide better fits ..." (ibid.,
p.9).

Persistence (making, re-making, testing) is central to the whole

process (ibid., p.15).

The place of the concept of emotions
Showing how these "evaporated concepts" have been re-introduced
and used by Kelly is the preparation, of course, for the re-introduction of
the concept of emotions with which I am particularly concerned. As a term
(as well as concept) "emotion" is probably even more theoretically loaded
than any of the others. Not only is it formally loaded with various theories
of emotion, but it is especially subjectively loaded for each of us as we
define it in the context of our own experience.

But the simple unadorned,

unloaded concept is still identifiable both by us and in Kelly's writing. What
we are talking about is feelings, those personal reactions, with physical and
mental characteristics, that we all recognise as having in common to some
degree, and mostly to a very great degree. We recognise the common
language we have to describe the experience of feeling though we may
disagree about the "why" and the "how". On that basis Kelly re-introduces
both terms and concepts dealing with emotions, with, I might add,
reassuring regularity.

He begins as early as his introduction (yet again)

with his reference to "human distress" and to the "frightening invitation" to
each of us to reconsider our notions about things. He goes on to speak of
the "ever more hopeful ways in which individual man can restructure his
life" (ibid., p.3); of "liking our formulation (of life)" (ibid., p.8); of someone
reacting with "an angry rebuke" in response to another's experiment in
constnjing (ibid., p.13); of someone's "eagerness" to know something and
to "hopelessness" (ibid., p.13); of a person's "dreading" the outcome of his
experiments (ibid., p.14); and of the idea of the universe that doubled back
on itself as "highly amusing

(ibid., p.21).

Distress, fear, hope, liking,

anger, eagerness, hopelessness, dread, amusement, are all terms which
belong to our emotional vocabulary so in these kinds of references Kelly
has dropped neither the tenns nor the concepts.

Kelly also raises the concepts of freedom and enslavement (ibid.,
p.21) which, though not referring directly to emotions, are emotionally
loaded terms, and concepts. The notion of freedom is one of the major
themes in Kelly's theory and is central to his aim of looking anew at "why
man does what he does". However, although Kelly examines the concept
of freedom in the Freedom versus Determinism context, he does not
discus show people are in the state of freedom in terms of their state of
mind.

He does say that "ultimately man sets the

measure of his own

freedom and his own bondage by the level at which he chooses to
establish his convictions" (ibid., pp.21-22). He also says, about a certain
kind of freedom, that it "implies that man, to the extent that he is able to
constnje his circumstances, can find for himself freedom from their
domination" (ibid., p.21.

Domination is, of course, another emotionally

loaded term that implies certain, strong feelings.
Indirectly though, Kelly steps right into the heart of the concept of
freedom and its emotional implications when he says, in relation to freedom
in construing, that "each little prior conviction that is not open to review is a
hostage he (the construer) gives to fortune; it determines whether the
events of tomorrow will bring happiness or miser/

(ibid., p.22). In other

words,

are worth

constnjing

and flexibility

in construing

pursuing

consciously because they free a person, at least in part, from the shackles
of his or her circumstances and preconceptions, which in turn brings the
possibility of happiness.
Distress or unhappiness is addressed when Kelly speaks of the
"possibly distressing outcomes" of abandoning some established ideas as
one embarks on the venture of re-constming (ibid., p.37). Interestingly, he
does not say "confusing" or "disorienting" outcomes (though these are both
conditions that may accompany the giving up of established ideas) but
uses a much more emotive term, one which indeed entails a feeling. Being

distressed entails feeling distressed whereas one may be confused without
even being aware of it and without necessarily feeling anything about it.
There is considerable evidence that Kelly has chosen his words very
carefully in presenting his theory so it is difficult to view his use of emotive
terms as accidental.

In each case, he says something important, albeit

indirectly, about the human condition. We do in fact feel distress on giving
up familiar things, even, in some instances, when these familiar things are
undesirable and clearly better given up, such as certain environments or
situations. We all fear the unknown in one way or another.
At the centre of Kelly's theory, then, we find the concept of fear
embedded along with the concept of happiness. We are "victims of our
circumstance" when we are constantly faced with the unknown by being
unable to predict certain things in our lives. The whole business of
construing is bound up with the desirability of being able to predict and so
escape the misery of bondage to circumstances.

The process of

construing aims, apparently, to minimise a whole set of negative feelings
such as fear, distress, misery, discomfort, hostility, etc., and to maximise
the corresponding set of positive feelings such as happiness, well-being,
freedom from fear, and the feeling of contentment that accompanies having
some feeling of control over one's circumstances.

The possibility of a theory of emotions
While I feel, then, that I may claim that the concept of the emotions is
not only present in, but intimately connected with Kelly's theory of
personality, it is less clear that Kelly presents a theory of emotions within
his broader work.

In fact, with his claims of a new approach to

psychology, it seems that he studiously avoided attempting to provide any

such thing, and gives nothing formally. The question then is, is it possible
to glean, deduce, or if you prefer, construe a theory of emotions from the
things he does say. Some claims in this direction I think are possible. It
can be gleaned that, within Kelly's framework:
(i) Emotions do exist and they are states of mind at least in part;
(ii) they play an important part in our way of being in the world;
(iii) they fall into positive and negative categories, the first being desirable
and the second undesirable.
Further, from Kelly's discussion on individual differences within
personal construct theory it can be deduced that he does not regard
behaviour as necessarily a guide to someone's emotional state (ibid.,
p.39). When he speaks of the need to recognise the private and the public
domains of man's existence, he refers to the presumption of construing
someone's behaviour as "anxiety" just because it is agitated. Although
Kelly is defending his notion of the individual person operating under a
construct system here, his example provides information on his attitude to
emotions as well.
Finally, Kelly provides some evidence that he believes that people can
control their emotional states. When discussing his Organisation Corollary
Kelly refers to the painful personal conflict that arises when people have
different constructs leading to incompatible predictions (ibid., p.56). He
says that the Organisation Corollary, which deals with the construct system
each person evolves, is basic to our understanding "of that most common
of all clinic commodities, anxiety" (ibid., p.58). He then adds that a person
may choose to preserve or alter his or her construct system according to
which choice will make his/her anticipation of events more effective (ibid.,

p.59). The implication is, of course, that such aiterings of the construct
system will also alter anxiety levels and presumably enhance the levels of
positive feelings. This kind of control over our emotional states is clearly
presented as a product of being aware of and actively working on our
construct systems (ibid., p.22).

The role of reasoning
Once the place of emotions is visible in Kelly's theory, the connection
with reasoning is not difficult to find.

When looking at the relation of

philosophical systems to his theory, Kelly describes the process of
construing and re-constnjing in scientific terms with an emphasis on the
principles of empiricism, and as a rational process (ibid., p.17).

This

emphasis on a personal "scientific method", which enables people to form
hypotheses, to test them and then form alternate hypotheses for better
predictability, is echoed throughout Kelly's references to construing which
is inescapably presented as a reasoning process.

Reason and emotions
It is a short step to give the relationship between reason and the
emotions in Kelly's theory, having established:
(i)

that Kelly views control over emotional states as possible through the
process of construing, and,

(ii) that construing is a reasoning process.

It is by virtue of the reasoning process, then, that we learn to control
our emotional states, thus enabling us to seek actively and maximise the
emotional states we want.

For the purposes of my earlier broader

hypothesis (that it is difficult, if not impossible to look at emotions in the
context of human personality without positing some relationship between
reason and the emotions), it is precisely this implied relationship in Kelly's
theory that is so significant. I have claimed further that such a relationship
will occur in complex theories of personality whether or not the theorist
intends this. Kelly clearly did not intend to say anything about emotions in
a formal way so the occurrence of this relationship supports that
hypothesis.
Finally, although Kelly did not intend to take a position on reason and
emotions, the position that emerges is not in fact incompatible with his
overall view of motivation. That there are emotional states and that reason
is the means of controlling them through the process of constnjing, does
not necessarily make the seeking of desirable emotional states the prime
motivator. The prime motivator may still be, as Kelly says, anticipation of
events and validation of predictions (ibid., p.158).

The control of one's

emotional states could merely contribute to the general freedom of the
individual to pursue prediction and validation with greater assiduity.

Section II: The role of emotions in construing
Given that Kelly does deal with emotions within his theory of
personality, at least indirectly, what kind of role can emotions be perceived
as playing in the process of construing? Although at one level, construing
(reasoning) can be seen as a way of predicting and controlling emotional
states, emotions or emotional states are still present in one form or another

during the process of construing. If, as Kelly claims, our mental processes
have as much claim to reality as external things and events, then emotions
must be given reality status and, as such, they must be an active part of
the changing universe. If, as claimed earlier, emotions fall into positive and
negative categories within Kelly's system, and if we are concerned in our
construing to seek happiness and avoid misery (even at a secondary
motivational level), then our feelings must play a role in the way in which we
perceive certain events and subsequently construe those events.
Further, our feelings may be the objects (mental objects) being
construed at any given time, just as our thoughts or existing construct
systems are available for re-construing. Our feelings may be construed
and reconstrued in the light of and in the presence of other feelings, while
at the same time influencing that construing. In other words, while
perceiving a relationship between certain feelings of our own, we may
simultaneously be influenced by other feelings (or our own) and be having
new feelings about the relationship being discovered. Taken slowly, this is
not as complex as it seems. It merely gives feelings (i.e., our awareness
and concepts of emotions and emotional states) the same status as our
thoughts and as objects in the external world.
But the notion of influence does cause complexity. Kelly claims that
what influences our construing most powerfully is whether or not our
constructs are validated when we put them to the test. However, what
influences whether or not, or how, we test constructs, is our awareness of
the hazards of impending change, this awareness being defined as anxiety
or fear. Although valid at a certain conceptual level of reality, this does not
say much about the direct experience of anxiety or fear. Kelly concedes
that even on his definition, anxiety is associated with painful conflict (the
Organisation corollary), and painful conflict is directly, subjectively
perceived as distress. Individual distress is coloured by personal images

associated with our existing concepts (or constructs) of distress. Distress
can, both physiologically and psychologically, affect our perceptions of
things, as can any other strong ennotional experience. And our construing
will certainly be influenced by such perceptual variations.

Emotions as real mental objects
If emotions can be given the same reality status as mental objects i.e.,
concepts or thoughts or constructs, then they become just another part of
the changing universe in Kelly's framework. This is not incompatible with
Kelly's essential philosophical position as outlined earlier since he gives
reality status to mental processes. Further, if we look at Kelly's universe as
being integral in the way he describes, then emotions too stand in some
sort of exact relationship with everything else.

There is a relationship

between emotions and thought, between emotions and awareness,
between emotions and construct systems, between emotions and all other
objects in the real world, including people. Whatever these relationships
are, they affect and change other relationships between other objects and
as we perceive these changes, our constructs also change. Given that in
Kelly's system, it is a normal and desirable process to seek actively to
elaborate one's perceptual field (defined as "aggressiveness") then it would
seem that our awareness of emotions as real mental objects, would be a
rich source of elaboration of our perceptions.

That is, we need only to

focus our attention on our feelings to begin noticing (perceiving) the ways
in which our feelings provide the scope for any number of variations or
interpretations of the reality we are regarding.

Feeling as a way of thinking
To the extent that the process of construing may in part also be a way
of modifying and developing emotional awareness, the two processes (i.e.,
construing and feeling) seem to be creatively locked together.

The

experience of emotion followed by the emotional awareness yielded by the
cognitive element (i.e., the interpretation, articulation, and categorisation of
emotion) suggests that emotional constructs have a dimension of their own
- a dimension within which the use of an emotional constmct becomes a
way of thinking and feeling at the same time. To think about something
sadly, for example, is both to experience an emotion and enter into a way
of thinking. It is reasonable and appropriate to think of some things sadly,
just as it is to think of some things mathematically or some things
economically, or otherwise in any context.
Each context yields its own set of new experiences, new ways of
looking at things. If construing is indeed, in the final analysis, the attempt
to perceive the real relationship between things in the real world, at any
given time, then choosing the appropriate context within which to seek new
experiences and think about them is of obvious importance. Being able to
establish (perceive) an appropriate emotional context (or world, or
framewort^, or system) becomes as important as any other framework.
Insofar as the emotional context is such a rich source of perceptual and
cognitive variations, it is a context that may be applied more often than
most others when we seek to modify our constructs or to test and re-test
them.

Identifying emotional worlds
If

emotions

or emotional

experience

can

be

perceived

and

understood as a way of thinking when that experience moves beyond the
level of sensation, then it becomes important to be able to identify one's
own system of emotional constructs and one's own way of thinking within
that context. This gives rise to a complex problem.
If emotions are given reality status as mental objects (i.e., ideas) then
they are the mental objects of an internal reality - a part of the real world,
but an inside part. If we regard people as real objects in the world and
mental processes as the "inside" reality of people (just as there is an inside
to a piece of fruit or an inside to a book, or any object) then emotions
become a part of this inside reality with the structure, language and logic of
mental processes. The difference between emotional mental objects and
other mental objects, though, is that other mental objects represent some
sort of external reality, whereas emotional mental objects represent an
internal reality, something that goes on inside a person, and usually "in the
dark".

Identifying our emotional worlds and structures then becomes

rather more difficult than identifying mental structures (constructs) that are
connected to an external reality.

One of the difficulties is that of

distinguishing between our emotions and other mental processes, i.e.,
distinguishing between emotion as a way of thinking, and other ways of
thinking (e.g., ordering).

Another difficulty is that of recognising the

difference between emotional sensation, and emotion as a way of thinking
(i.e., levels of emotion).

A third difficulty is recognising the relationship

between emotion as a way of thinking, and objects in the real worid.
Emotion as a way of thinking begins with a perception and interpretation of
objects in the real world that is different from other ways of perceiving and

thinking.

This gives rise to a particular kind of perceived relationship or

connection between objects in the world.
In the following chapters I will argue that the psychoanalytic approach
to emotions could provide an effective way to sort out our emotional worlds
by being able to experience and identify our emotions as real mental
objects rather than feelings attached to mental objects. This would yield, in
turn, the emotional framework needed to develop the emotional dimension
of construing in the most useful way. I will argue that Freud provides firstly,
a way of identifying our emotional worlds and throwing light on them, and
secondly, a theory of emotions (much richer than has hitherto been
formally recognised) that throws light on the complex problem of levels of
emotion, and the relationship between the internal, real world of emotion
and external reality.

The identification of our emotional worlds and

language will in turn provide a more visible and effective dimension to
Kelly's process of construing.

CHAPTER FIVE
THE PLACE OF EMOTIONS AND REASON
IN FREUD'S DRIVES THEORY

Section I: Repression and the unconscious mind at the beginning of
Freud's theory
As a neurologist, Freud was concerned with answering specific
questions

about

mental

disorders

when

he

embarked

upon

his

investigation of the mind from something other than a neuropathological
point of view.

His first major account of the mental phenomena was

understood as resulting from the operation of certain material elements
according to basic laws (Maclntyre, 1965, p.19).

This contained the

concept of the human personality as a system seeking equilibrium, a
concept Freud was to retain. His change of emphasis from neurology to
psychology began in earnest with the ending of the partnership between
himself and Dr Joseph Breuer.
Breuer had been working with a theory that hysteria was the product
of a psychical trauma which had been forgotten by the patient. Breuer's
treatment consisted of inducing an hypnotic state to recall the forgotten
trauma.

Freud began working with Breuer but then branched away,

changing both the procedure and the underlying theory.

He replaced

Breuer's use of hypnosis (the results of which Freud found unsatisfactory
in the quality of therapeutic catharsis) with his own technique of "free
association" (Freud, SE., Vol.XIX, p.195). Ultimately, this step led to the
development of Freud's system of ideas which he called psychoanalysis
(Strachey, in Freud, 1982, p. 15).

Repression
The most immediate questions Freud was dealing with related to the
cause of neurotic symptoms in people suffering from mental disorders. As
his thinking changed from the mechanical/material model to a psychical
model of the personality, the appearance of neurotic symptoms became
the system's way of seeking equilibrium by the channelling of repressed
ideas into some type of expression, thus "levelling out" the psyche or
fulfilling the instinctual wish (Maclntyre, 1965, p.26).

In his early work,

Project for a Scientific Psychology, Freud claimed however that it was
"impossible to form a satisfactory general view of

neuro-psychotic

disorders unless they can be linked to clear hypotheses upon normal
psychical processes" (Freud, S.E., Vol.1, pp.283-4).

In the Project he

makes the first organised attempt to present such hypotheses, introducing
such notions as "pathological defence" and "repression" although the work
was primarily neurologically based, and, as Strachey points out, it is
essentially a "pre-id - a 'defensive' - description of the mind" (Freud, S.E.,
Vol.1, p.292).

However, even as a biological mechanistic, "scientific"

account, the Project contains an account of the problem of consciousness
and the difference between physiological processes and "conscious
sensations".

Freud saw the former as "quantitative" and the latter as

"qualitative", but still spoke in terms of unconscious processes

and

conscious sensations, thus leaving a high cognitive level of explanation
aside, that is, the level of awareness of consciousness (Maze, 1983, p.90).

Freud also introduces the notions of a pleasure/unpleasure quality to
"conscious sensations", as well as pleasure/unpleasure being related to
degrees of pressure in the neurone system (Freud, S.E., Vol.1, p.312). The
idea of "affect" emerges as a "sudden release of tension" as a "residue" of
the experience of pain (i.e., a rise in level of tension), which results in a
"repulsion, a disinclination to keeping the hostile mnemic image cathected

... a primary defence" (Freud, S.E., Vol.1, p.322). "The primary defence" is
also referred to as "repression", where Freud links up the idea of
pain-causing images "flowing away from the memory" with a "biologically
taught" psychological system (Freud, S.E., Vol.1, p.322).
However, he also establishes the beginning of a notion of personality
as a psychical entity, with the cognitive idea of "wishing" as a central
process, where the mnemic image associated with degrees of tension is
attractive, not hostile, and where the consciousness or "ego" engages the
"memory" and "judgement" to re-form the image (Freud, S.E., Vol.1,
pp.330-1). Although a neurological/biological account of these processes
is the basis of his theorising here, Freud does give the beginnings of the
concept of repression, and its importance, and also the concept of
cognitive processes, in connection with personality. When he goes on to
discuss repression in connection with pathological defence, repression is
already a central force in the psyche, though pathologically it takes on a
different character (Freud, S.E., Vol.1, p.351).
Central, then, to the develojDment of the notion of personality as a
psychical entity is Freud's idea of repression.

The positing of an

unconscious part of the mind wa^ the answer to the question of where
repressed ideas could be stored.

For Freud, the psychical concept of

repression led inevitably to the concept of the unconscious mind (S.E.
VoLXIV, pp.166-7).

He claimed later that repression was a theoretical

formulation of a phenomenon which it was possible to observe as often as
one pleases if one undertakes an analysis of a neurotic without resorting to
hypnosis. In such cases a resistance was encountered, which invariably
coincided with an amnesia and such a coincidence led Freud to posit
unconscious mental activity.

For Freud, the "essence of repression lies simply in turning something
away, and keeping it at a distance, from the conscious" (S.E., Vol.XIV,
p.147).

The thing that is turned away is an instinctual wish; it is turned

away not because the gratification would not bring pleasure, but because
the gratification of the wish conflicts with other claims on the psyche.
Unable to deal with the frustration of the conflict, the conscious mind
attempts to eliminate the cause of the conflict, namely the instinctual wish.
The power of the primal instincts however, is such that this elimination is
not possible. The repressed instinct "proliferates in the dark ... and takes
on extreme forms of expression ..." (S.E., Vol.XIV, p.149). Thus Freud, with
his formulation of the psychical concept of repression, begins to describe
some contents of the unconscious mind.

It is in part a collection of

instinctual wishes that, for one reason or another, cannot be consciously
gratified.

Further, each one of the wishes is the centre of a network of

associations, the outer limits of which reach into the conscious mind,
providing pathways back to the original wish which can be pursued in the
course of psychoanalysis (S.E., Vol.XIV, pp.149-50).

Freud calls these

associations "derivatives and connections" which are "put out" by the
repressed wish (S.E., Vol.XIV, p.149).

Only the derivatives that are far

enough removed from the repressed wish to not be recognised directly are
allowed access to the conscious mind.
Neurotic symptoms follow the same pattern according to Freud - they
are those actions which are sufficiently unlike the actions required for the
gratification of the original instinctual wish while constituting expressions of
it. Thus the conscious mind admits them to the conscious range of actions
(S.E., Vol.XIV, pp.149-51).
unconscious
personality

The purpose of all this conscious and

mental activity is still bound to Freud's model of the
as a system seeking balance.

Repressed ideas are

continuously seeking expression in the conscious mind and the conscious
mind is continuously exerting a counterpressure to prevent them (S.E.,

Vol.XIV, p.151). But with the elaboration of his theory, Freud puts greater
emphasis on the psychical constructions that overlay the neurological
processes

The unconscious mind as a basis for a broader theory of personality
In dealing with the concepts of repression and the unconscious, it
becomes evidence that these two notions give rise to whole groups of
derived theories.

To further explain the process of repression, Freud

develops a concept of a superego or conscience; the conscious mind is
put forward as a complex notion of a "self" or an ego and the unconscious
becomes the id (S.E., Vol.XIX, pp.19-39). These three aspects of human
personality form a whole theory, broad in scope and giving even more
scope to derived theories.

Hence the unconscious mind, once posited,

together with repression, as an explanation of neurotic behaviour,
becomes an account of the very essence of human nature. The questions
Freud is attempting to answer have now extended from questions such as
"What is going on inside a person suffering from hysterical, or from
obsessional neurosis, or schizophrenia, or sexual malfunctions, or anxiety
... etc?" to questions like "What is the pattern and motivation of human
nature, what is the reality of the mind, of existence ... etc?" At this level,
Freud's description of the unconscious mind begins to include more
components than repressed ideas or instincts. "The repressed" he says,
"does not cover everything that is unconscious" (S.E., Vol.XIV, p.166).
Knowledge of the further contents of the unconscious mind would be
gained by overcoming resistances.

Freud describes his assumption of the unconscious mind as
"necessary" and "legitimate" (S.E., Vol.XIV, pp.166-9), citing as proofs the

"gaps" in the data of consciousness, dreams, the symptoms of the sick,
ideas "that come into our head we do not know from where", and
"intellectual conclusions arrived at we do not know how ..." (S.E., Vol.XIV,
pp.166-7). He describes the scope of the unconscious as including "latent
acts" and "repressed acts", the former differing only from conscious acts as
being unconscious, as contrasted with the latter which, "if they were to
become conscious, would stand out in the crudest contrast with other
conscious processes ..." (S.E., Vol.XIV, p.172).
Three distinct aspects of the mind are finally described - the
unconscious, the pre-conscious, and the conscious. The preconscious
contains those psychical acts which, having been latent in the
unconscious, are "tested" by the conscious, passed and relegated to the
pre-conscious to await further use, given the occurrence of favourable
circumstances. If these occur, the act can become an object of
consciousness without encountering any special resistance (S.E., Vol.XIV,
p. 173). At this stage Freud has shifted from trying to locate repressed
ideas in the mind to trying to locate all ideas in the mind. This appears to
be an "eternal" location; that is, he is attempting to account for past,
present, and future ideas in any given individual. The position relates back
to Freud's earlier, physiological stance; that is, he appears to view the
personality as existing whole from birth in the same way as the body, with
its physical potential entire, exists whole from birth with nothing essentially
to be added or lost. Each individual becomes a tiny universe acting out its
internal laws in response to a wider universe or environment, fuelled by the
libido or pleasure principle (S.E., Vol.XIX, pp.46-7).
Within this universe Freud finds a place for the many aspects of
human nature with which we are familiar: emotions (affective impulses
attached to conscious and unconscious ideas), ideas (instinctual wishes),
humour (a special relation between the unconscious and the

preconscious), and the reasoning process (the means by which instinctual
wishes

are

processed from the timeless,

reality-less world of the

unconscious to the gratifying world of the conscious).

The distortions

connected with each of the natural mental processes are included and
form, partly, the world of mental illness. The unconscious, deriving from
the perception of resistance and repression, is the foundation stone for this
entire theoretical superstructure.

The superego as a regulator
The superego, partly conscious and partly unconscious, is that part of
the mind which is responsible for the admittance or banishment of
instinctual wishes in the conscious mind - "a special critical and prohibitive
agency which we have named the superego" (S.E., Vol.XXII, p.28). The
superego can detach itself from the conscious mind sufficiently to observe,
judge, and punish the conscious mind. Freud describes the process as "...
it [the ego] splits itself during a number of its functions - temporarily at
least.

Its parts can come together again afterwards" (S.E., Vol.XXII,

Pp.58-9).

In the case of the superego, the ego splits itself in order to

observe, judge, and punish, so one function of the detached piece is that
of a conscience - "... scarcely anything else in us that we so regularly
separate from our ego and so easily set over against it..." (S.E., Vol.XXII,
p.59).
The superego is not simply a substitute phrase for a conscience
however.

Freud carefully stipulates that "it is more prudent to keep the

agency as something independent and to suppose that conscience is one
of its functions and that self-observation, which is an essential preliminary
to the judging activity of conscience, is another of them" (S.E., Vol.XXII,

p.60). The superego is split sufficiently from the ego to "enjoy a certain
degree of autonomy, follow its own intentions and is independent of the
ego for its supply of energy ..." (S.E., Vol.XXII. p.60).
Freud uses the symptoms of melancholia to illustrate a superego
which functions with cruelty and excessive severity towards the ego and
uses the same illustration to give an explanation of morality. Freud claims:
"The superego applies the strictest moral standards to the helpless ego
which is at its mercy; in general it represents the claims of morality and we
realise all at once that our moral sense of guilt is the expression of the
tension between the ego and the superego" (S.E., Vol.XXII, p.61). In the
melancholies, this "morality" functions as "a periodic phenomenon". Once
the melancholia lifts, the ego reasserts itself and enjoys "all the rights of
man" until the next attack (S.E., Vol.XXII, p.61). Further, in some forms of
the disease, the ego reacts strongly against the pressures of the superego
by embarking on a spree of self-gratifications (the manic phase of the
disease) (S.E., Vol.XXII, p.61). Finally, the superego functions as an ideal
for the ego, demanding even greater degrees of perfection from the ego
which the ego strives to fulfil.

Freud attributes this function to the early

image of perfection the child has of the parents (S.E., Vol.XIX, p.36).
The development of the superego Freud connects with the child's
experience of parental authority. Young children, he states, are amoral and
possess no internal inhibitions against their impulses striving for pleasure.
However, "parental influence governs the child by offering proofs of love
and by threatening punishments which are signs to the child of loss of love
and are bound to be feared on their own account. This realistic anxiety is
the precursor of the later moral anxiety" (S.E., Vol.XXII, p.62). So long as
the parental influence functions, therefore, no part of the ego splits away to
form a separate section. As soon as the external restraint is "internalised"
however, the separated part of the ego which results, takes over the

function of observation, direction and punishment (S.E., Vol.XXII, p.62).
This account of the origins of the superego Freud recognises as
dependent on the child's long dependence on the parents and on the
existence of the Oedipus complex, the latter being one of Freud's
observations of the process of repression.
The Oedipus Complex is a phase in the development of children
which Freud describes as "standing in an attitude" to the parents (S.E.
Vol.XIX, p.176). This is the attitude of desiring the parents as objects of
sexual gratification, usually with an emphasis on one parent depending on
their (the parents') behaviour.

The accompanying feelings aroused by

both positive and negative, so the complex is "doomed to eariy repression"
(S.E., Vol.XI, p.47). In its simple form, which Freud observes as being the
most uncommon, the complex is described as being dissolved (rather than
repressed) S.E., Vol.XIX, pp.31-3). More often, due to the bisexual nature
of children, a more "complete complex" is observed and so the complex
creates the type of fnjstration that leads to repression. Then the complex
remains significant, operating from the unconscious mind and, according
to Freud, it forms the "nuclear complex" of every neurosis, worthing actively
in many regions of mental life (S.E., Vol.XI, p.47).
For the child, the complex is central to the formation of the superego.
In the case of a boy, a fear of castration (punishment by the father or
identification with the mother who lacks the male sexual characteristics) will
lead the child to give up the desire for the parents as love objects, most
especially the mother. Identification with the father results in the absorbing
of the authority of the father into the ego, thus forming the nucleus of the
superego (S.E., Vol.XIX, pp.176-7).

In the case of a giri, the first

attachment is necessarily also to the mother as the provider of basic need
satisfactions, but the father is the first love-object. The detachment of the
girl from her mother occurs before the beginning of the Oedipal phase. It

occurs through feelings of hostility also excited by the castration complex,
though indirectly (S.E., Vol.XXII, pp.121-2). The hostility occurs when the
girl blames her mother for the lack of a penis (S.E., Vol.XXII, p.124). She
turns to the father also, and this for her, is the entering into the Oedipal
phase or attitude. The father or the love-object is retained for many years
as the fear of castration is absent.

According to Freud, the prolonged

Oedipal phase in women adversely affects the formation of the superego.
Though formed, it "cannot attain the strength and independence which give
it its cultural significance" (S.E., Vol.XXII, p.129). Nevertheless it operates
as observer and judges and punishes sufficiently to be a separate and
distinct part of the ego.

The ego as a thinking self
The ego is that part of the mind in which there is a "coherent
organisation of mental processes" (S.E., Vol.XIX, p.17).

Freud sees

consciousness as a quality attached to this part of the mind but not
necessarily attached to all of this part.

Some of the ego may be

unconscious, but nonetheless distinct from the repressed unconscious
(S.E., Vol.XIX, pp.17-8). Freud discusses this complex distinction in the
first part of his essay. The Ego and the /d (S.E., Vol.XIX, p.13), stating that
although the notion of an unconscious part of the ego adds yet a third
dimension to the unconscious mind (that is, the unconscious, the
preconscious, and now the unconscious ego) bringing the danger of
rendering the quality of consciousness insignificant (if not contradictory,
one might think), it would be more dangerous to ignore this characteristic
of the ego. According to Freud, its reality is far too obvious and can be
clearly perceived in the appearance of a resistance mechanism that
emanates from the ego when associations move too close to repressed

instinctual impulses (S.E., Vol.XIX, pp.17-8). The resistance mechanism
causes associations to break down, thus impeding the access to an
original repressed impulse; it also causes unpleasurable feelings so it can
be perceived indirectly by the conscious ego (S.E., Vol.XIX, p.17). In this
way, the ego attempts to preserve its original protection from an
undesirable instinctual impulse, and it does this without participation by the
conscious ego.
The fundamental occupation of the conscious ego is to be "a
representative of the external world or reality" (S.E., Vol.XIX, p.36). Freud
describes the consciousness as the "surface of the mental apparatus", the
part accessible to the external world (S.E., Vol.XIX, p.19).

Into the

consciousness come sense perceptions from the external world and
sensation or feelings which generate inside the psyche. Thoughts, though
coming from inside a person, must be connected to the corresponding
words (or visual images) before they can become conscious; these words
or images have their origins in previous sense perceptions, so originally (or
in part) thoughts also come from the external world or at least are given
form by the external world. They are certainly perceived by the thinker "as
if they came from without" (S.E., Vol.XIX, p.23).

As that part of the psyche which is in direct contact with the world, the
conscious ego is modified by the world and also seeks to modify the part
of the psyche that is not in contact with the world.

Specifically, the

conscious ego attempts to reconcile the pleasure-njied inner person with
the real demands of the world by establishing a "reality principle", thus
representing "what may be called reason and common sense in contrast
with the id which contains the passions" (S.E., Vol.XIX, p.25). Despite its
being portrayed as the communication point between the world and the id,
Freud stresses that the ego remains a part of the id, "only a specially
modified part" (S.E., Vol.XIX, p.40). The special modification is the effect of

being influenced by sensory perception.

In this connection,

Freud

describes the ego as "first and foremost a bodily ego" (S.E., Vol.XIX, p.26).
The body itself yields both internal and external sense perceptions, "it is not
merely a surface entity, but is itself the projection of a surface" (S.E.,
Vol.XIX, p.26). With its relation to the perceptual system, it "gives mental
processes an order in time and submits them to 'reality-testing'" (S.E.,
Vol.XIX, p.55).
Freud sees the ego as placed between the external world and the id,
the latter being viewed as a world in itself (S.E., Vol.XIX, p.55). Hence the
ego acts in connection with both these worlds; it enriches itself with
experiences from the extemal world and it attempts to bring the world of
the id under its control (S.E., Vol.XIX, p.55).

In this position, the ego is

always potentially under threat from three sources - the libido of the id, the
external world, and the severe superego (S.E., Vol.XIX, p.55). The libido
resists the control and fnjstration of its instinctual wishes thus attacking
reason; the external worid may yield experiences that damage the ego; the
superego may unleash too much aggression and authority on the ego.

Section II: Emotions as instinct
Given a structure of human personality where the basic driving force
is the desire for pleasure (the pleasure principle), and pleasure is named as
the aim of an instinct or instinctual drive, it is understandable that Freud did
not find it necessary to differentiate between instincts and the emotions at
this theoretical level. It seems clear enough in the first instance that, if the
drive for pleasure is an instinct and the experience or feeling of pleasure is
an instinctual experience, then the feeling of unpleasure must also be an
instinctual experience and their derivatives (that is, all feelings of pleasure in

connection with the gratification of the instinctual wishes, and all feelings of
unpleasure in connection with the frustration of ungratified instinctual
wishes) must also fall into the category of instinctual experiences. This is in
fact Freud's formal position with regard to emotions.

Theory of the instincts
In his formal explanation of his theory of the instincts (S.E., Vol.XIV,
pp.117-40), Freud defines an instinct firstly as a stimulus which "does not
arise from the external world but from within the organism itself (S.E.,
Vol.XIV, p.118), as something which "never separates as a force, giving
momentary impact but always as a constant one" (S.E., Vol.XIV, p.118)
and "since it impinges not from without but from within the organism, no
flight can avail against it" (S.E., Vol.XIV, p.118). In this definition, Freud is
differentiating between physiological stimuli operating on the mind and
"instinctual stimuli", or instincts. He completes the definition by stating that
"a better term for an instinctual stimulus is a 'need'" and "what does away
with a need is 'satisfaction'" (S.E., Vol.XIV, p.119). Although he refers to
"the mind", it is not entirely clear what Freud means this term to describe.
He states that an organism receives stimuli in its nervous substance and
then refers to something he calls the "perceptual substance" which
distinguishes between outside stimuli and inside stimuli (S.E., Vol.XIV,
p.119).

He then sets up a postulate that "the nervous system is an

apparatus which has the function of getting rid of the stimuli that reach it, or
of reducing them to the lowest possible level; or which, if it were feasible,
would maintain itself in an altogether unstimulated condition" (S.E., Vol.XIV,
p.120).

If Freud means that "the mind" is the nervous system or

"substance" of which the "perceptual substance" is a part (and this does
appear to be the case), then it would seem that only a part of the mind has

the capacity to perceive things and distinguish between things. This part of
the mind corresponds to Freud's account of the ego insofar as both the
"perceptual substance" (of the mind) and the ego (of the personality)
receive and distinguish between stimuli received from inner and outer
sources.

Both these components also deal with stimuli received; the

"perceptual substance attempts to reduce stimuli to the lowest possible
level and the ego attempts to use stimuli as a means of satisfaction and
enrichment.

While

these

different

approaches

to

stimuli

are

incompatible in one sense, they do suggest a difference in attitude.

not
The

ego also has various intellectual functions which cannot be ascribed to the
"perceptual substance" and the ego is also referred to as "a specially
modified part of the id", the modification being the effect of the influence of
the sensory perception. So, although the relationship between the ego and
the

perceptual

substance

is

very

close,

they

still

appear

to

be

distinguishable - a relationship which was set up earlier in the Project and
not fully explained then or afterwards.

Further, if the instinctual stimuli act on the mind and if the home of
these instincts is Freud's notion of the unconscious mind then it would
seem that the mind both engages in the constant stimulation of itself and at
the same time attempts to reduce stimuli to a non-existent level, or
"maintain itself in an altogether unstimulated condition" (S.E., Vol.XIV,
p.120).

In addition, "the instincts and not external stimuli are the true

motive forces behind the advances that have led the nervous system with
its unlimited capacities, to its present high level of development" (S.E.,
Vol.XIV,

p.120).

This

seems

a curiously

internal view

of

human

development, given the difficulty of imagining any form of development that
is not, in some way, based on the effect of the external world and stimuli
provided by it. The perennial chicken and egg problem is present here. It
may be said that without the instincts as a motive force, the mind (nervous
system) would not react to external stimuli in the way that is conducive to

development (or indeed, would not react at all); but, without the external
stimuli, the instincts could hardly become evident or be given any play. If,
as Freud says, the instinctual stimulus is a need, then it must be a need for
something. If the something is satisfaction, then the satisfaction must be
gained by means of something external to the need itself. In fact Freud
says "the object of an instinct is the thing in regard to which or through
which the instinct is able to achieve its aim" (S.E., Vol.XIV, p.122).

The place of emotions
Within this framework, Freud refers to "feelings" as something which
"reflect the manner in which the [nervous system's] process of mastering
stimuli takes place" (S.E., Vol.XIV, p.120). Feelings are described as the
degree of presence (or absence) of stimuli.

Freud says, "the polarity of

pleasure-unpleasure is attached to a scale of feelings ..." (S.E., Vol.XIV,
p.134). Love becomes the ego's activity to incorporate pleasurable objects
into itself, hate the ego's activity to fly from or destroy unpleasurable
objects (S.E., Vol.XIV, pp.136-7).

All feelings become degrees of love

(absence of stimuli achieved by incorporation), or hate (presence of
stimuli).

The feeling of "indifference" falls into place as a "special case of

hate or dislike, after first appearing as their forerunner" (S.E., Vol.Xlv,
p.136).
In his metapsychological discussion at this point, Freud refers to love
and hate as being themselves instincts (S.E., Vol.XIV, p.137).
appear to be identical with pleasure and unpleasure.

These

The pleasure

principle seeks satisfaction of instinctual impulses by the id.

Love is

apparently the way in which this satisfaction is sought, that is, the ego's
activity to incorporate pleasurable objects into itself. This way of speaking

about love sets up a particularly complex notion. Love is an instinct and an
activity; love obviously has some sort of primary status and seems to be
equated with the pleasure principle; love is both motivator (the pleasure
principle operating from the id) and regulator (operating from the ego). A
further complexity is introduced when Freud says that the case of love and
hate refuses to be fitted into the scheme of the instincts (that is, the
instincts as having opposite poles) (S.E., Vol.XIV, p.133). The problem is
that love has three opposites (S.E., Vol.XIV, p.133): loving/hating is one;
loving/being loved is the second; loving or hating/unconcern or indifference
is the third.
In this context love is defined as:
(a)

absence of stimuli achieved by incorporation of pleasurable objects;

(b)

an activity (or an active force in the mind);

(c)

feeling (loving or hating) as opposed to not feeling anything.
Hate is not particulariy affected by these multiple definitions since

Freud sees hate as a separate sort of feeling, not arising "from any
cleavage of an original common entity ... [having] its own development
before the influence of the pleasure/unpleasure relation made them into
opposites" (S.E., Vol.XIV, p.138).

Love derives from "the capacity of the

ego to satisfy some of its instinctual impulses auto-erotically by obtaining
organ-pleasure" (S.E., Vol.XIV, p.138). Hate, older than love, derives from
"the narcissistic ego's primordial repudiation of the external world with its
outpouring of stimuli" (S.E., Vol.XIV, p.138). Freud divides the whole of the
instincts into two groups of "primal instincts", the ego or self-preservative
instincts and the sexual instincts (S.E., Vol.XIV, p.124). The primary status
of both love and hate is emphasised and consolidated when love is seen

as deriving from the sexual instincts and hate as deriving from the ego
instincts.

However Freud defines and redefines emotions at this point, it is clear
that he regards emotions as an integral part of, if not identical with,
instinctual impulses. This is the way in which emotions fit into the general
theory of psychoanalysis and the way in which they make the most sense
within Freud's conceptual framework.

The place of reason
Freud refers to the ego as that part of the mind in which there is "a
coherent organisation of mental processes"(S.E., Vol.XIX, p.17), and
describes the ego as representing "what may be called reason and
common sense in contrast with the id, which contains the passions" (S.E.,
Vol.XIX, p.25). Clearly Freud regarded the ego as the centre of reasoning
or thought processes.

The unconscious mind he describes as being

irrational, full of incompatible impulses, "existing side by side without being
influenced

by one another, and [which] are exempt from

contradiction"

mutual

(S.E., Vol.XIV, p.186). The conscious mind seeks to

eliminate incompatibilities by engaging in the activity of either reconciling
incompatibilities or else removing the difficult ones from the conscious
mind by the process of repression.
Freud takes the unconscious mental processes once again as his
starting point in tracing the development of thought processes.

These

older, primary processes are now the residues of a phase of development
in which they were the only kind of mental process, Freud claims.

The

processes then strived for pleasure and "whatever was thought of [wished

for] was simply presented in an hallucinatory manner, just as still happens
today with our dream thoughts every night" (S.E., Vol.XII, p.219).
The

non-occurrence

of

the

expected

satisfaction

and

the

disappointment that followed led the psyche to "decide to form
conception

of the

real circumstances

a

in the external world and to

endeavour to make a real alteration in them" (S.E., Vol.XII, p.219).

This

step Freud calls the introduction of a "new principle of mental functioning ...
the setting up of a reality principle" (S.E., Vol.XII, p.219).
He proposes that this development in some way affects the sense
organs, turning them towards the external world. Consciousness, which is
already attached to the sense organs {S.E., Vol.XII, p.220), is also affected
and learns to "comprehend sensory qualities in addition to the qualities of
pleasure and unpleasure which hitherto had alone been of interest to it"
(S.E., Vol.XII, p.220).

A new and special function arose, that of

"periodically searching the external world in order that its data might be
familiar already if an urgent internal need should arise" (S.E., Vol.XII,
p.220).

This was the function of attention which was joined by the

functions of "notation" (a part of memory) and "impartial passing of
judgment" which decided, by comparison with memory traces of reality,
whether a given ideas was tnje or false. Motor discharge was converted
into action and control of action was provided "by means of the process of
thinking" (S.E., Vol.XII, p.221). Freud describes thinking as "essentially an
experimental kind of acting, accompanied by relatively small quantities of
cathexis together with less expenditure (discharge) of them" (S.E., Vol.XII,
p.221).

The "acting" referred to is the act of the conscious mind in

comparing ideas presented to it with memory traces of reality. This uses
up far smaller amounts of energy than physical acting on the basis of ideas
(S.E., Vol.XII, p.221).

This process of thinking obviously saves the

organism a great deal of time and energy by ensuring that actual action is
maximally effective.
The theory of thinking described by Freud is compatible with any
general description of the reasoning process and its effects on human
behaviour, notwithstanding differing terminologies. Assessing, comparing,
judging (coming to conclusions), reconciling incompatibilities are all forms
of rational activity or the reasoning process, carried out with a greater or
lesser degree of proficiency in each individual.

In Freudian terms the

degree of proficiency is measured by the actions subsequently carried out
by the thinker, actions that invariably aim to increase pleasure and
decrease or eliminate unpleasure.

Hence the pleasure principle remains

the ultimate motivator even in connection with the rational processes of the
conscious mind. Freud does refer to a process of "replacement of the
pleasure principle by the reality principle ..." (S.E., Vol.XII, p.219) and
describes education as "an incitement to the conquest of the pleasure
principle, and to its replacement by the reality principle ..." (S.E., Vol.XII,
p.224).

This process, he claims, however, "implies no deposing of the

pleasure principle but only a safeguarding of it" (S.E., Vol.XII, p.223). With
the advent of the reality principle, unreal (uncertain, momentary) pleasures
are given up or replaced by real (assured, definite, lasting) pleasures.
Successful education, he claims, depends on the successful offer of love
as a reward from the educators, so the development of reason by
education is still seen as being motivated by the pleasure principle, both at
the deeper level where the psyche is seeking assured pleasures and at the
surface level where the person is seeking to gain love from those around
him or her. The ultimate object remains the gaining of as much love as
possible, which is the greatest degree of pleasure, which in turn is the least
amount of stimuli, internal or external, for the psyche.

The successful conclusion of this process is generally frustrated by
the sexual instincts however, as they are much slower to come under the
influence of the reality principle than the ego or self-preservative instincts
(Freud, 1984, pp.39-40). Freud states that the sexual instincts obtain early
gratification auto-erotically so they are not faced with the frustration that the
ego instincts are. The period of latency in the sexual instincts which follows
early gratification means that the sexual instincts do not need to subject
themselves to reality testing for a much longer time than the ego instincts.
The result is that the sexual instincts remain under the dominance of the
pleasure principle for a longer time, if not, in some cases, permanently
(S.E., Vol.XII, p.222). Freud refers to the sexual instincts as being hard to
'educate' (S.E., Vol.XVIII, p.10), thus allowing the pleasure principle to
overcome the reality principle in some cases "to the detriment of the
organism as a whole (S.E., Vol.XVIII, p.10).
In making these claims about the development of reason in the
human, Freud makes some key assumptions. These are:
(a)

that the process of education is the learning to differentiate between
internal,

hallucinatory

instinctual

objects

and external

or

'real'

instinctual objects;
(b)

that reality itself is somehow exclusively connected with the 'external
world' while at the same time conceding that the ego becomes a part
of the external world in relation to the id. This gives a certain relativity
to reality. However, when speaking about the sexual instincts being
hard to 'educate' and delayed in becoming subject to the reality
principle, Freud uses the reason that "the sexual instincts ... obtain
their satisfaction in the subject's own body ... " (S.E., Vol.XII, p.222).
This suggests that he does not regard the body as external to the
psyche. In fact some sort of reality-testing needs to occur in order for

the psyche to obtain pleasure from some other part of the body.
Autoeroticism may also be hallucinatory. In Freud's terms, seeing the
body as external to the mind does not involve a mind/body split in the
light of his being prepared to see the ego as external to the id.
(c)

that the part of the mind (the ego) that has the capacity to test reality
also has the capacity to order reality, to form conscious concepts, to
communicate both with itself, with other parts of the mind and with the
external world, including other minds; the reality principle is also
apparently responsible for the ability to see time(that is, be conscious
of a past, present, and future), to predict, to judge, to have intention,
(or at least talk about having intention in a way that tests reality as well;
that is, a person may express the intention of crossing the road and
then do so, which tests reality both to him/herself and to any
observers), and to make mistakes, that is, to perceive reality either
incorrectly or in a number of incompatible ways. All these capabilities
are developed presumably in the service of the pleasure principle,
although the work is done at the prompting of the ego instincts in the
first instance.

Behind the formal framework
These assumptions are relevant to the way in which Freud refers to
the processes of the mind more informally in his works. Having given a
formal account, Freud proceeds to discuss feeling and thinking in a
number of complex ways that do not fit easily within his formal framework.
A consideration of these discussions begins very quickly to lead the reader
away from the formal framework and into a realm where a much more
complicated theory of thinking and feeling becomes visible.

In Chapters

Six, Seven and Eight, I will pursue and outline the way in which Freud
provides an underlying theory that supplements, and therefore changes,
his formal position.

CHAPTER SIX
INSTINCTS AND EMOTIONS AS SEPARATE CONCEPTS
IN FREUD'S WRITINGS

Section I: Some difficulties with the theory of the instincts

Having located emotions clearly within Freud's drives theory, it would
seem a straightforward matter to demonstrate how emotions and reason
work in psychoanalysis and how the relationship between reason and the
emotions emerges as a strong and necessary feature of Freud's theory of
personality.

However, a problem that quickly emerges is Freud's own

treatment of the concept of emotions as being distinct from his concept of
instincts. This appears to set up an undercurrent of thought in his writings
that applies to emotions in a way that is not defined within his formal
position.

While Freud formally defines the concept of emotions as,

essentially, completely bound to, if not identical with, instinctual impulses
(i.e., a manifestation of instinctual impulses), he appears to operate
informally with a concept of emotions that is far more in line with more
conventional thinking and language.
As noted in Chapter Four, people have a common language in
connection with many major concepts that makes our communication and
mutual understanding of them possible.

Further, we have "loaded" and

"unloaded" concepts. When outlining his theory of the instincts and the
place of the emotions within it, Freud takes and uses some sort of common

concept of "feelings" and loads it with the meaning that is consistent with
his theoretical framework. What he does not do is outline the common, if in
his view, erroneous, concept (the one which we all use in order to
understand what he is talking about in the first place), and explain how the
common concept must be understood or changed. However, he makes it
clear that he is dealing with more than one meaning when he says in his
lecture on anxiety: "Do not suppose that the things I have said to you here
about affects are the recognised stock-in-trade of normal (sic) psychology.
They are on the contrary views that have grown upon the soil of
psychoanalysis and are native only to it" (Freud, S.E., Vol.XVI, p.396).
On several more occasions Freud refers strongly to his uncertain
position in connection with emotions. He begins some remarks on anxiety,
pain and mourning by saying: "So little is known about the psychology of
the emotional processes that the tentative remarks I am about to make on
the subject may claim a very lenient judgement" (Freud, S.E., Vol.XX,
p.169). And again: "Anxiety, then, is in the first place something that is felt.
We call it an affective state although we are also ignorant of what an affect
is" (Freud, S.E., Vol.XX, p.132). And further: "Psychoanalysis has never
claimed to provide a complete theory of human mentality in general, but
only expected that what it offered should be applied to supplement and
correct the knowledge acquired by other means" (Freud, S.E., Vol.XIV,
p.50).

And: "Let us call what becomes conscious as pleasure and

unpleasure a quantitative and qualitative 'something' [Freud's quotes] in
the course of mental events;..." (Freud, S.E., Vol.XIX, p.22). Finally: "What
you may gather about affects from psychology the James-Lange theory for
example

-

is

quite

beyond

understanding

or

discussion

to

us

psycho-analysts. But we do not regard our knowledge about affects as
very assured either; it is a first attempt at finding our bearings in this
obscure region" (Freud, S.E., Vol.XVI, p.396).

With these kinds of statements, Freud is giving quite overt information
on his position regarding a clear understanding of emotions.

Firstly, he

recognises that the term has various meanings for various theorists,
including himself, and more importantly, that he finds it impossible to
connect his views in any way with the views of what he terms as "normal
psychology".

Secondly, he is making it abundantly clear that he is not

ultimately satisfied with this state of affairs and does not offer his definitions
as being in any way conclusive. However, he does not discuss the ways in
which "normal psychology" explains emotions and does not attempt
formally to outline anything that he regards as misconceptions in thinking
on emotions up to his time. This leaves Freud in a curious position - on the
one hand he makes some very strong claims concerning the nature of the
emotions; on the other, he backs away from giving these claims full
theoretical status by examining them in the light of different theoretical
claims, as he does do with most of his other strong claims. For example,
the cornerstone of his theory of personality, the notion of repression, is
looked at in the historical context and he notes how the concept previously
arose in work by Schopenhauer (Freud, S.E., Vol.XIV, p.15). Similarly, with
his notion of the Unconscious, Freud engages in major discussion of his
justification for such a concept, philosophically and psychologically (Freud,
S.E., Vol.XIX, pp. 13-18, and Vol.XIV, pp.166-71).

To complicate things a little more, Freud frequently expresses his
dissatisfaction with the notion of instincts as a whole, i.e., as distinct from
affects which are classed as one manifestation of the instincts. In his paper
on narcissism he claims that there is a "total absence of any theory of the
instincts which would help us find our bearings" and that therefore "we may
be permitted, or rather it is incumbent upon us, to start off by working out
some hypothesis to its logical conclusion until it either breaks down or is
confirmed (sic)" (Freud, S.E., Vol.XIV, p.78).

In the paper Instincts and

their Vicissitudes, Freud begins to conduct such a "working Out" (Freud,

S.E., Vol.XIV, pp.117-40). This is an early paper and he begins by
commenting on the essential indefiniteness of many basic ideas, abut
Freud is still proceeding on the assumption that "there is a total absence of
any theory of the instincts" and that he therefore feels obliged to produce
one. This is a curious position in that he is ignoring any previous thinking
on instincts (and therefore emotions), but it is consistent with Freud's
self-avowed attitude to established traditions of thought insofar as they
impinge on his own work. For example, in his discussion on the theory of
repression he says:
The theory of repression quite certainly came to me
independently of any other source; I know of no outside
impression which might have suggested it to me, and for a long
time I imagined it to be entirely original, until Otto Rank [1911a]
showed us a passage in Schopenhauer's World as Will and Idea
in which the philosopher seeks to give an explanation of
insanity. What he says there about the struggle against
accepting a distressing piece of reality coincides with my
concept of repression so completely that once again I owe the
chance of making a discovery to my not being well-read. Yet
others have read the passage and passed it by without making
this discovery and perhaps the same would have happened to
me if in my young days I had had more taste for reading
philosophical works. In my later years I have denied myself the
very great pleasure of reading the works of Nietzsche, with the
deliberate object of not being hampered (sic) in working out the
impressions received in psychoanalysis by any sort of
anticipatory ideas. I had therefore to be prepared - and I am so,
gladly - to forgo (sic) all claims to priority in the many instances
in which laborious psychoanalytic investigation can merely
confirm the truths (sic) which the philosopher recognised by
intuition. (Freud, S.E., Vol.XIV, pp.15-16)
I have quoted this passage fully because it makes one of the most
important statements about Freud's attitude to his theorising and explains a
great deal about his difficulties with something as complex as his theory of
the instincts. Some of the extraordinary assumptions he makes are:

(a)

that psychoanalysis is, of itself, a source of "truths" and that sufficient
investigation of it yields some sort of scientific confirmation of
philosopher's "intuitions";

(b)

that Schopenhauer intuitively sensed the "truth" of the theory of
repression long before Freud began his investigations;

(c) that being aware of the previous traditions of thinking on human nature
"hampers" Freud's discovery of the material that "confirms" the many
"truths" previously put forward;
(d) that theories can "come" independently of "any other outside source";
(e)

that previous thinking of philosophers contain truths rather than being
different ways of looking at things.
The problem with these assumptions is that they give psychoanalysis

itself some sort of truth status that presumes that it is the best and only
way

to

investigate

abnormal

(and

normal)

human

behaviour

and

personality. Further, Freud sees any information he finds that is consistent
with or identical to the thoughts of other thinkers, as being a "confirmation
of intuitively sensed truths". He obviously does not see his own ideas as
simply contributing to evidence supporting certain ways of looking at
things.

Further, Freud assumes simply because of his own theory, that

Schopenhauer

sensed a "truth" and ignores the fact that he

and

Schopenhauer could be sharing a point of view which is not necessarily
right or wrong, or at least cannot be proven to be such. Further, the idea
that knowing something about the history of thought in a given area
hampers new discovery is an odd position for a seeker after "truth". It well
befits the artist or the creative endeavour generally in that in those cases a
unique way of seeing or expressing something is being sought, but Freud

lays no claim to being a creator.

Rather he sees himself as having

discovered truths scientifically through the process of psychoanalysis. Why
he then insists on trying to make psychoanalytic theory some kind of
exclusive truth is not clear. He says that we regard truth as the scientific
endeavour to arrive at a correspondence between what we think and "what
exists outside us and independently of us" (Freud, S.E., Vol.XXII, p.170).
His claims that the thoughts of other philosophers contain intuitive truths is
extremely odd. What can Freud possibly mean by an "intuitive truth" or a
"truth arrived at intuitively"?

He claims in fact that intuition cannot be a

source of knowledge (Freud, S.E., Vol.XXII, p.170). The comparison he is
making is that while a philosopher arrives at his truth "in his head", Freud
himself arrives at his truth through the investigation of psychoanalysis.
That a philosopher may arrive at his truths through an investigation of
human concepts (based on past human thought as well as his own) Freud
somehow sees as being qualitatively different from his arriving at his truths
through an investigation of the thoughts of his patients.

This ties in with

(and is as curious as) Freud's notion that theories are arrived at from some
single source - in his case psychoanalysis - and can therefore be thought
of as in some way original.
While Freud humbly renounces his claim on originality of some
theories because they were put forward "intuitively" earlier by someone
else, his actual claim is far more ambitious. He does not say he was the
first to have a certain idea, but he does claim to be the first to confirm such
an idea, to give it the status of truth, through a process which he claims
outright to be a truth in itself.

This process, psychoanalysis, has not,

apparently, been derived from anything else, no other "outside source". Yet
its components - asking questions, seeking motives, making different
connections

between

thoughts

and

feelings,

setting

up

a

special

relationship between two people, trying to trace the patterns of thoughts
and emotions, trying to ease painful thoughts and emotions, trying to

heighten self-awareness - are all an integral part of the history of human
thought and interaction. Further, Freud's meaning and his own ordering of
these components into an internally consistent theory must necessarily
have been influenced by his own education which in turn was a process
derived from the history and- experience of human thought. He may not
have intentionally read philosophy but whether he liked it or not he
absorbed a great deal of it from his culture, education, home life, and
human interactions.
It is to be expected that although Freud formally sought to establish a
theory of the instincts, and therefore (in his terms) a theory of emotions, he
brought with him a whole world of language and meaning related to
emotions and that these components must become visible in his writings,
albeit covertly and unintentionally.

The next section demonstrates how

Freud used the language and concepts of emotions in ways that are
inconsistent with his formal position on the instincts and emotions.
Section II: Freud's use of the terms and concepts of emotions
In the first sentence of the first lecture of his Five Lectures on
PsychoAnalysis (Freud, S.E., Vol.XI, p.9), Freud refers to himself as having
"novel and bewildering feelings" about being in the "New World". Analysed
in Freud's formal framework, this means that Freud is having some activity
of the nervous system aimed at his survival or gratification. He does not
say what these feelings are precisely, except that they are new (novel) and
confusing (bewildering). At the same time he must also be experiencing
the feelings of novelty and bewilderment in themselves.

Thus Freud's

nervous activity must be occurring on two levels at least with several
different kinds of feelings - the unspecified ones (that are new and
confusing) and the feelings of newness and confusion.

According to

Freud's categorisation, feelings of novelty and bewilderment must be

degrees of pleasure or unpleasure, but it is difficult to see how this claim is
justified. Feelings of bewilderment, for example, may be pleasurable, i.e.,
accompanied by feelings of pleasure, such as in a situation where
something unexpectedly pleasant occurs, or they may be unpleasurable,
i.e., in a situation where something unexpectedly or inexplicably unpleasant
occurs. But in each case the feelings of actual bewilderment must be the
same.

The accompanying feelings of surprise, happiness or fear, and

anger, would be pleasant or unpleasant but even these would be subject to
degrees of pleasure or unpleasure depending on the circumstances and
context.
To categorise the actual feelings as degrees of pleasure or
unpleasure is to miss the nature and uniqueness of each feeling. It would
seem that it is not only indifference that is a special case (see Chapter Five,
p.106), but the feelings of pleasure and unpleasure themselves. They are
special in that they accompany other feelings in varying degrees, rather like
a colour accompanies and gives a certain character to an object. A box,
for example, will always be some colour and also a particular shade of that
colour. It may be a deep red box or light red, but in any case it is a red box
and it would be incorrect to say that the box is redness or that redness is a
box.

Similarly anger is a feeling, but it does not follow that if anger is

accompanied by feelings of pleasure or unpleasure then it is nothing but a
degree of pleasure or unpleasure.

Equally if "feelings of novelty and

bewilderment" are coloured by pleasure or unpleasure it does not follow
that they are nothing but degrees of pleasure or unpleasure. And Freud in
his opening sentence does not treat them as such. His statement that he
has feelings of novelty and bewilderment says nothing about degrees of
pleasure or unpleasure.

These two feelings in particular carry no

undertones in their concept alone to indicate whether they are likely to be
pleasant or unpleasant. It is in this way that Freud begins to indicate, at
least, that in his own usage and meaning he differentiates between his

concept of instinctual drives (of which pleasure and unpleasure are a part
or a manifestation (Freud, S.E., Vol.XIV, p.178)) and his concept of feelings
or emotions.
Freud continues to refer to emotions/feelings/affects in a way that
clearly differentiates between instincts and emotions. He refers to "a child's
sexual instinct" serving for "the acquisition of different kinds of pleasurable
feeling" (Freud, S.E., Vol.XI, p.43). He does not say different degrees of
pleasurable feeling but different kinds which indicates that the "kinds" are
something in themselves which have the added quality of being
pleasurable. Further, he says that the sexual instinct serves for the
acquisition of feelings, not "is a reflection of or a manifestation of certain
feelings". Two different things must be present for one to acquire the
other; so if the sexual instinct is the means by which a child acquires
pleasurable feelings, the feelings must be something other than the instinct
and something other than a reflection of an instinct.
Defining a complex, Freud describes it as "a group of interdependent
ideational elements charged with affect" (Freud, S.E., Vol.XI, p.31).
"Affects", he says, "may be regarded as displaceable magnitudes of
energy" (ibid., p.18). It seems unlikely that Freud means that ideational
elements are charged with instincts or even their reflections.
He has already defined instinct as a stimulus arising within the
organism (Freud, S.E., Vol.XIV, p.122). If an affect is a displaceable
magnitude of energy it would seem to be something different from an
internally-based stimulus.
That there is a recognised ambiguity in Freud's use of the term
"instinct" is only of partial help in the matter of emotions. However it does

point to the difficulty of Freud's speaking about the derivatives of the
instincts (Freud, S.E., Vol.XIV, p.111 -13).
In the editor's note on Freud's paper Instincts and their Vicissitudes
(Freud, S.E., Vol.XIV, pp.111-16) attention is drawn to Freud's use of
"instinct" as:
(a)

'a concept on the frontier between the mental and the somatic';

(b)

'a concept on the frontier between the somatic and the mental ..., the
psychical representation of organic forces';

(c)

the psychical representative of an endosomatic, continuously flowing
source of stimulation ... a concept lying on the frontier between the
mental and the physical'.
These three accounts indicate that Freud was drawing no distinction

between an instinct and its psychical representative (Freud, S.E., Vol.XIV,
p.112). However in later papers he seems to draw a sharp distinction
between them.

In The Unconscious (Freud, S.E., Vol.XIV, p.177), he

claims: "an instinct can never become an object of consciousness - only
the idea that represents an instinct can". Before 1907, when he published
the paper on Obsessive Actions and Religious Practices, the aspects of
human nature that he later came to refer to as the "instincts" were variously
referred

to

as

"excitations',

"affective

ideas",

"wishful

"endogenous stimuli" and so on (Freud, S.E., Vol.XIV, p.114).

impulses",

Section III: Emotions and sexuality
In the Three Essays on Sexuality Freud says that "the existence of
sexual needs in human beings and animals Is expressed in biology by the
assumption of a 'sexual instinct'" (Freud, S.E., Vol.VII, p.135) and from then
on he both corrects "popular" assumptions about the sexual instinct and
elaborates his concept of instinct.

In describing the development of the

sexual instinct in humans, Freud strongly emphasises the necessity of
distinguishing the sexual instinctual impulses "from the rest" and criticises
Jung's "watering down" the meaning of the concept of libido "by equating it
with psychical instinctual force in general" (Freud, S.E., Vol.VII, p.218). By
"libido" Freud refers to "a quantitative variable force which could serve as a
measure of processes and transformations occurring in the field of sexual
excitation. We distinguish this libido in respect of its special origin from the
energy which must be supposed to underlie mental processes in general,
and we thus also attribute a qualitative character to it" (Freud, S.E., Vol.VII,
p.217).

This libido is connected to an "idea of quantity" the mental

representation of which Freud called the "ego libido".

This could be

observed in action when it became "object libido" cathecting (mental)
sexual objects (Freud, S.E., Vol.VII, p.217). Libido then emerges as a part
of the sexual instincts which is attached to the ego for the purpose of
seeking satisfaction for the sexual instincts as a whole. They then must be
a part of the "unconscious ego" or else be present in the ego as ideas. It is
also distinct from, though clearly related to, the "ego instincts" (or
self-preservative instincts). This forms a very tight, complex relationship
between the sexual instincts (tied fundamentally to the id), the ego instincts
(operating from the conscious or unconscious part of the ego) and the
ego-libido which emerges as a special sex-instincts-related part of the ego
instincts. Within this close relationship, Freud makes it difficult to give place

and meaning to sexual emotions, i.e., what we commonly experience and
speak of as sexual feelings.
Theoretically there does seem to be some sort of consistency
between the notion of ego-libido (which, when it becomes object-libido "we
can then perceive it concentrating on objects, becoming fixed upon them
or abandoning them, moving from one object to another and, from these
situations, directing the subject's sexual activity ..." (Freud, S.E., Vol.VII,
p.217)) and affects (which are "displaceable magnitudes of energy").
Affects also become attached to mental objects (and Freud is referring
here to mental objects, Freud, S.E., Vol.VII, p.217, see footnote), allegedly
giving them their "colour" of pleasure or unpleasure. On the one hand this
seems to blur the distinction between an affect and a quantity of ego-libido
(when it becomes object-libido).
In his essay on Infantile Sexuality Freu6 claims that: "it is clear that the
behaviour of a child who indulges in thumb-sucking is determined by a
search for some pleasure which has already been experienced and is now
remembered" (Freud, S.E., Vol.VII, p.181). In Freud's terms, the child's
libido (or quantity thereof) attaches itself to a mental object, namely the
memory of a previously experienced pleasure, thus "directing" the child to
seek that pleasure again. If however, the memory (or idea) of previous
sucking already has an affect attached to it, i.e., a degree of pleasure, then
the quantity of libido that attaches itself to that same memory would seem
to be something quite different from the affect, which is already in place
when the libido comes searching for the memory. The affect could not
even be the manifestation of the sexual Instincts or the libido (ego-instinct
related specifically to the sexual instincts). At most it could be regarded as
a pleasurable sensation attached to the original thumb-sucking experience
and then the memory of that experience.

At the infantile stage, it does not seem appropriate to regard that
sensation as a feeling in the terms in which feelings were discussed in
Chapter One of this thesis, where it was claimed that a certain degree of
self-awareness, language and rational activity were necessary for the
development of feelings (as opposed to simply having sensations). Freud
also refers to "sexual excitation" throughout his essays on sexuality in a
way that distinguishes such excitation (sensation?) from "affective
processes" (also sensations?).
In Infantile Sexuality Freu6 claims that "comparatively intense affective
processes, including even terrifying ones" are sources of sexual excitation
(Freud, S.E., Vol.VII, p.203). He claims that: "the sexually exciting effect of
many emotions which are in themselves unpleasurable, such as feelings of
apprehension, fright or horror, persists in a great number of people
throughout their adult life" (Freud, S.E., Vol. VII, p.203). Here it seems
clear that Freud is distinguishing firmly between sexual excitement (as the
manifestation of the sexual instinct) and emotions which either accompany
such excitement or actually provoke it.
Further, he appears to distinguish between feelings of unpleasure and
other feelings such as apprehension, fright or horror. To say that fright or
horror are "in themselves" unpleasurable implies that they actually are
something in themselves to which is attached the quality or further feeling
of unpleasure. In the same essay Freud makes another observation that
requires some unravelling in connection with the notions of excitation and
emotion. He claims that: "it is an unmistakeable fact that concentration of
the attention upon an intellectual task and intellectual strain in general
produce a concomitant sexual excitation in many young people as well as
adults" (Freud, S.E., Vol.VII, p.204). To say that such attention "produces"
sexual excitation is to say something other than that sexual feelings are
produced. Excitement (tension) and affect In the form of sensations of

pleasure or unpleasure) still seem conceptually and qualitatively different
from sexual feelings which require the use of a different vocabulary and
metaphor (see Chapter One).
Still in the same essay, Freud speaks of it being "more or less" certain
that the "fullest provisions are made for setting in motion the process of
sexual excitation (in infancy) - a process the nature of which has ... become
highly obscure ..." (Freud, S.E., Vol.VII, p.201). He claims that "first and
foremost" the process is set in motion by the "excitations of sensory
surfaces" (skin and sense organs) but "apart from these sources there are
present in the organism contrivances which bring it about that in the case
of a great number of internal processes sexual excitation arises as a
concomitant effect (sic) as soon as the intensity of those processes passes
beyond certain quantitative limits". And further "that the whole nature of
sexual excitation is completely unknown to us ... (Freud, S.E., Vol.VII,
pp.204-5). Once again, "sexual excitation" seems to emerge as something
quite different from either sexual instincts or emotions/feelings, and indeed
is regarded by Freud as being highly obscure in nature. He clearly then
does not equate sexual excitation with the sexual instincts (which seem to
be connected with the "internal processes" referred to) or with affect, or
feelings.
In his essay Transformations of Puberty Freud once again addresses
"the problem of sexual excitation" referring there to "the nature of sexual
tension which arises simultaneously with the pleasure" (Freud, S.E., Vol.VII,
p.212). In this essay he treats "sexual excitation" and "sexual tension" as
equivalent thus making an even stronger distinction between excitation
(tension) and affect or feelings.

Section IV: Hysteria, neurosis, and emotions
In the Preliminary Communication of Studies on Hysteria Freud and
Breuer refer to the operative cause of the illness of traumatic neurosis as
being the "affect of fright - the psychical trauma". The claim is that "any
experience which calls up distressing affects such as those of fright,
anxiety, shame or physical pain - may operate as a trauma of this kind ..."
(Freud, S.E., Vol.VII, p.6). The "affect" is being presented as an emotion
attached to an event. An "event" is being presented as something that has
the power to "call up" distressing (or other) affects. So it seems that events
in our lives are things that provoke or "call up" emotions (presumably from
somewhere) If affects are viewed as "displaceable magnitudes of energy"
that are some sort of manifestation of an instinctual drive, that attach
themselves to ideas, then it is difficult to see how they can be "called up" by
events unless we are speaking solely of internal, mental events.
Freud and Breuer clearly are not referring to mental events only, but
to experiences that provoke the emotions of fear, shame, anxiety etc.
Further, the only way to rid the neurotic patient of symptoms is to bring
back into consciousness the memory of the experience and to evoke the
same powerful emotion (affect) in connection with that memory.

The

arousal of the distressing memory together with the full quota of its distress
(or affect) results in a complete dispersal (or discharge) of the emotion and
the disappearance of the neurotic symptoms involved (Freud, S.E., Vol.11,
p.6).

The process of recalling the event to the consciousness does

constitute the formation of an idea to which the affect can then be attached
and thus discharged - but this does not solve the problem of how the event
itself "calls up" an affect in the first instance. In Freud's terms, the event
should become an idea in the mind and the idea then calls up an affect or
affects.

If the event is so shocking that the consciousness immediately

rejects it, then presumably, the unpleasurable affect remains "floating" and

seeks to attach itself to some other idea in the mind, seeking "discharge" of
the excitation so caused.
In Beyond

the Pleasure

Principle Freud states that he relates

pleasure and unpleasure to the quantity of excitation that is present in the
mind and relates them in such a way that that "unpleasure corresponds to
an increase in the quantity of excitation and pleasure to a diminution". But
he adds immediately that this is not a simple relation and does not solve
the problem of what the meaning of feelings of pleasure and unpleasure
really are (Freud, S.E., Vol.XVIII, pp.7-8). Freud states unequivocally: "...
we

would

readily

express

our

gratitude

to

any

philosophical

or

psychological theory which was able to inform us of the meaning of the
feelings of pleasure and unpleasure which act so imperatively upon us"
(Freud, S.e., Vol.XVIII, p.7). In statements such as these Freud seems to
be distinguishing quite clearly between feelings and instincts. The instinct
towards seeking pleasure he speaks of as a "strong tendency" in the mind
that is related to the "tendency towards stability" (attributed to Fechner)
(Freud, S.E., Vol.XVIII, p.9).

The instincts opposing this tendency (or

instinct) are the ego's instincts of self-preservation which apparently
perceive the instinct towards pleasure in its primary form as "inefficient and
even highly dangerous" (Freud, S.E., Vol.XVIII, p.10). The self-preservation
instincts form the basis of the Reality Principle (Freud, S.E., Vol.XVIII, p.10)
which emerges as a strong tendency to achieve pleasure but with the
reservations of being able to tolerate postponement and temporary
unpleasure in the interests of survival (Freud, S.E., Vol.XVIII, pp.10-11).
With these explanations, Freud is not, clearly, referring to those "feelings"
which he had just classed as being indefineable and obscure.

He quite correctly senses at this point that "strong tendencies"
towards this or that state do not explain the complexity, variety, and
aesthetic status of the almost infinite array of those things we all call

feelings.

Nor does an account of the tension between pleasure and

unpleasure suffice to explain the shades, combinations, and patterns of
feeling that play across our consciousness throughout our lives.

The

neurotic may indeed be "traumatised" by an event and may indeed be
psychologically crippled by the effect of a particular and powerful feeling.
That however, does not explain the delicate and complex network of
feelings, as quite distinct from ideas and instincts, that exists in the
neurotic's make-up.

Such a network is present in everyone quite

irrespective of any trauma, except perhaps the "shock" of being born and
becoming aware of a world that is itself full of imbalances and mysteries.
Nor does any account of the mechanism of neurosis and hysteria give an
account of the power of feelings in other than the self-destructive sense the constructive sense being power that feelings have to influence other
feelings whether they be one's own or those of another person, not in
struggle but in enrichment.

Freud begins to touch on this complexity (and indeed to distinguish
between kinds of feeling) when he distinguishes between anxiety, fear, and
fright.

Referring to traumatic neurosis in Part II of Beyond the Pleasure

Principle, Freud describes "anxiety" as "a particular state of expecting the
danger or preparing for it, even though it may be an unknown one"; "fear"
as "requiring a definite object of which to be afraid"; and "fright" as "the
state a person gets into when he as run into danger without being
prepared for it; it emphasises the factor of surprise" (Freud, S.E., Vol.XVIII,
p.12). But even here, Freud does not go far enough into the complexity.
He speaks of fear, anxiety, and fright as "states" and quite rightly,
since it is of the most common of experiences to be in a state of fright or
fear or anxiety and not be aware or fully aware of the feelings of fright, fear,
or anxiety. The state of extreme fear or fright can in fact paralyse the
immediate awareness of feelings (as well as actions) completely. If action

is taken to dispel the fear or fright then very often, the feelings are
experienced well after the actual event. In a state of fear a person may
appear to act fearlessly and without feeling. The feelings of fear afterwards
may actually cause further terror, confusion or collapse.

A state of fear

may well be an instinctual reaction to an event or even the idea in the mind
of that event, but the release of feelings of fear require that state to be
broken by action of some kind.

This in fact is consistent with Freud's claim that the recalling of a
traumatic event and its affect is necessary to dispel hysterical symptoms.
But the event which "calls up" the state (affect?) of fear is repressed by the
conscious mind before any action can be taken to break the state and
release the feelings; so the patient is "caught" in the state of paralysis
induced by the unbroken state of fear. By recalling the event to the
consciousness, the patient is acting to break the state of paralysis which in
turn breaks the state of fear, which then releases or allows the feelings to
emerge. That is, it allows the person to attend to his or her feelings and
thereby experience them, thus feeling a sense of release from what were
virtually unknown pressures. That Freud believes a state of anxiety cannot
produce a traumatic neurosis (Freud, S.E., Vol.XVIII, p.12) is also
consistent with this distinction between states and feelings. The "state of
expecting danger or preparing for it" (Freud defining anxiety, S.E., Vol.XVIII,
p.12) allows action and indeed demands it. It also gives time to attend to
feelings that arise in connection with the expected danger, so emotional
paralysis does not occur.
Freud touches directly on this process when he states in Studies on
HysteriaXhaX: "The fading of a memory or the losing of its affect depends
on various factors. The most important of these is whether there has been
an energetic reaction to the event that provokes an affect. By 'reaction' we
here understand the whole class of voluntary and involuntary reflexes -

from tears to acts of revenge - in which, as experience shows us, the
affects are discharged. If this reaction takes place to a sufficient amount a
large part of the affect disappears as a result" (Freud, S.E., Vol.11, p.8).
Once again, Freud seems to be talking about two different things
when he speaks of the affect provoked by an event and the display of
feelings or affects that occur when a person reacts to the event. To say
simply that the original affect is "discharged" does not explain the feelings
that accompany that process of discharge, i.e., that accompany the tears,
act or revenge, or whatever. What appears to happen, in fact, is this - a
traumatic event "provokes" an affective state. Then there occurs a
"reaction", or rather an action, to break that state and only then is that state
dispersed by an outflow of feelings and more actions in some cases. If no
action is taken in the first affective state, i.e., if the person is paralysed and
helpless in the face of an event that cannot be dealt with effectively, then
the second stage, the outflow of feelings cannot occur and they remain
pathologically inside the psyche.
In the quoted passage two more points of complexity arise. Firstly,
when Freud speaks of a 'reaction' being the whole class of voluntary and
involuntary reflexes from tears to acts of revenge, he is not distinguishing
sufficiently between physical and emotional reactions. Tears, for example,
do not tell us much about feelings - we may cry with sorrow, joy, terror,
hatred, frustration and love, or cry without knowing why, or feeling anything
specific. We may perform an act of revenge or atonement with different or
mixed feelings. The act itself, while it may indicate a discharge of feelings
or affects, cannot tell us with any real accuracy, what those feelings are,
even with regard to ourselves let alone others. When Freud says: "If there
is no such reaction (to an event) whether in deeds or words, or in the
mildest cases in tears, any recollection of the event retains its affective tone
to begin with" (Freud, S.E., Vol.II, p.8), he does not say anything about

feelings, neither the feelings that accompany the reactive deed, nor the
feelings that make up the "affective tone": attached to the original event.
This brings us to the second point of complexity - when Freud says a
large part of the affect "disappears" as a result of a "sufficient" reaction he is
once again telling us only about a kind of emotional tension that is attached
to an event.

It is again the most common of our experiences to feel a

surge of emotion or emotional tension in reaction to an event without, quite
often, being able to define precisely what our feelings are. That tension
may be dissipated by an action to "counter" the event and we are
conscious of release from the tension, but we may still have many differing
feelings about the entire incident.

Freud appears to allow this when he says: "an injury that has been
repaid, even if only in words, is recollected quite differently from one that
has had to be accepted" (Freud, S.E., Vol.11, p.8). Freud cannot be saying
that the "repaid" incident is recalled without any feelings or affect. What he
seems to be saying rather is that such incidents are recalled with different
feelings or affects. In fact we may observe that such incidents are recalled
with feelings devoid of acute tension. This indicates that there are feelings
"charged with affect" or "affective energy" which gives the degree of
passion attached to any given feeling.

This does not seem to be

incompatible with Freud's general position except that he has not gone so
far as to distinguish between feelings in this way. What he sensed of this
problem he covers by speaking of the degree of pleasure or unpleasure
attached to an affect, relating pleasure and unpleasure to the "degree of
excitation that is present in the mind but is not in any way 'bound'" (Freud,
S.E., Vol.XVIII, p.8). A high degree of excitation (or tension, which Freud
himself equates with excitation) relates to unpleasure, a low degree to
pleasure.

That Freud was so essentially dissatisfied with this account as a
complete

explanation

of "the meaning of feelings of pleasure

and

unpleasure which act so imperatively upon us" (Freud, S.E., Vol.XVIII, p.7)
is consistent with the diverse ways in which he speaks of "affective states",
"affects", "emotions", and "feelings". That he decided to use pleasure and
unpleasure as descriptions or measures of the effect of excitation or
tension in the psyche raises another set of questions.
Firstly, to say that pleasure corresponds to a low degree of excitation
does not really tell us anything about feelings of pleasure.

We all

commonly experience states of emotional tension and release of that
tension where the state of tension can in fact be pleasurable for any
number of reasons - anticipation, readiness for desired action, or simply
the simple pleasure of "feeling alive and vital".

Equally, a low degree of

excitation can be unsatisfactory or unpleasurable in a situation that requires
tension and action. It is not enough to claim that when we have feelings of
tension and excitement that are pleasurable, we are in some way "really" in
a state of low excitation, or that when we have unhappy feelings of a lack of
tension that we are "really" in a state of high excitation. This simply does
not explain our feelings as we directly experience them, though it does, in
an important way, say something of the mix-up of feelings that occurs in
the cases of hysteria and neurosis.

That Freud constantly

takes

psychoanalysis, and therefore abnormal states of mind, as his starting
point, makes his own position understandable, but at the same time it
makes his perspective on feelings correspondingly unacceptable (even to
himself).
Secondly, to take pleasure and unpleasure as primary states of some
sort or degrees of states is difficult to justify.

Certainly it can readily be

observed that a range of feelings have commonly attached to them the
notion of being pleasurable or unpleasurable.

Anger, fear, hatred, pain,

etc, are for example, regarded as states of unpleasure. But, it can also be
readily observed that there are situations in which anger "feels good". To
say that it feels good or pleasurable because there is some sort of
discharge of excitation going on does not explain our direct feeling and
experience of pleasure while in the state of anger and certainly does not
explain our direct feeling of, for example, sadness or emptiness when such
an incident is over.
With the "discharge of the affect" one should, in Freud's terms, be
conscious of pleasurable feelings as the product or manifestation of a low
degree of excitation. Freud would argue perhaps that the discharge was
not "sufficient",, but it is not satisfactory to say "sufficiency" is to be
measured by the very presence (or absence) of pleasurable feelings. The
most violent discharges of emotion are frequently followed by feelings of
low grade pain, sorrow and tiredness.
Further, why must pleasure or unpleasure be the primary states or
measures? Why not take "anger" and "non-anger" or "fear" and "non-fear"?
It would seem just as valid to say that anger is the measure of excitation in
the psyche, that we operate fundamentally on a "Peace Principle" but that
self preservation demands a state of protective anger from time to time.
However to propagate the species and fulfil our human nature by
expressions of mutual attachment, we need a state of peace (pleasurable
activities, especially sexual ones, certainly distract us from any possible
dangers and leave us vulnerable) so we strive instinctively for peace. The
raising and discharge of anger protects our peace in appropriate
circumstances. Where the peace is violated (i.e., where the anger is
insufficient to protect it or ineffective because faced with greater anger)
then such violation constitutes trauma and the raised anger begins to
operate unappropriately in the psyche.

From here on, Freud's psychoanalytic technique operates just as
effectively as it does on the pleasure/unpleasure scale. Fear and non-fear
can be rolled out in exactly the same way. It is not sufficient to argue that
we can say that fear, anger, etc, are unpleasurable because we can equally
say that pleasure is angerless or angerful (to degrees thereof) or pleasure
is fearless or fearful and soon. To define pleasure in terms of degree of
excitation as Freud does is essentially to rob it of its own quality and
uniqueness of feeling which is what we directly experience when we speak
of "feeling pleasure".
Thirdly, the whole notion of primary states in connection with feelings
is indeed most obscure, as Freud says. To speak of primary states in
connection with tension and lack of tension seems useful in terms of the
successful operation of many things, including the human psyche, but
even then there is the problem of extremes and how to deal with them.
Each can be constructive or destructive depending on the context; and at
the extremes of each, definition becomes blurred as does the very
distinction. Freud demonstrates this very well in his discussion on love and
hatred, which he cannot class as opposites in any simple way, and which,
Freud claims, refuse to be fitted into the scheme of the instincts, i.e., the
instincts as having opposite poles (Freud, S.E., Vol.XIV, p.133).
So far in this chapter I have sought to demonstrate that Freud's use
of emotional terms and concepts does not fit easily into his formal
theoretical explanation of the instincts, emotions and feelings. I have
sought to establish that Freud refers to instincts, emotions, feelings, affects
and states in ways that indicate a real difference between them either
directly by his usage, or indirectly by the inconsistency or problems that
arise when the attempt is made to relate his explanations to his usage. I
have also sought to demonstrate that there is a real conceptual problem
with Freud's use of polarity in connection with emotions. In the following

chapter I shall discuss Freud's concepts of love and hatred and his
concept of anxiety to demonstrate further that his thinking has an
undercurrent of emotional concepts that seem to form a separate theory of
emotions - one that does cause problems with some of his theoretical
structure, but which, nonetheless, adds another useful dimension to
psychoanalysis.

CHAPTER SEVEN

INSTINCTS AND EMOTIONS AS SEPARATE CONCEPTS
IN FREUD'S WRITINGS (continued)

Section I: Love as instinct
In his discussion of love Freud makes it very clear that while he
recognises the many ways in which language uses the word "love" and
indeed that such uses do describe different forms of love, those forms
were nonetheless all originally fully sensual (genital) love and remain so in
man's unconscious (Freud, S.E., Vol.XXI, pp.102-3).

Freud says in

Civilization and its Discontents that the "careless way in which the
language uses the word 'love' has its genetic justification". He claims that
people give the name "love" to the relation between a man and a woman
"whose genital needs have led them to found a family" and also give the
name to the positive feelings between parents and children, and siblings,
the positive feelings between strangers, and so on (Freud, S.E., Vol.XXI,
pp.102-3).

These other loves, he claims, must be described as

"aim-inhibited love" or "affection".

What man came to call "love" was,

originally, the sexual desire of a man for a woman and the desire to keep
the sexual object near, thus providing the foundation for the formation of
families.

For the woman, love was also originally sexual desire and the

need to remain close to children and protection (Freud, S.E., Vol.XXI,
p.99).

With the claim that all love is fundamentally "fully sensual love" (Freud,
S.E., Vol.XXI, p.103), Freud is classing love as one of the most powerful
instincts, powerful enough to form one of the "two-fold foundations of
human beings - the compulsion to work, which was created by external
necessity, and the power of love which made the man unwilling to be
deprived of his sexual object" (Freud, S.E., Vol.XXI, p.101). On this basis,
Freud is seeing love as an internal force in man (a sexual instinct) and an
external force in civilisation, shaping the ways in which people relate to one
another and mature (Freud, S.E., Vol.XXI, p.98). As an internal, sexual
instinct, love emerges as the sexual energy of the libido and is
recognisable in Freud's formal theory of the instincts.

Freud also speaks of love as "positive feelings" for the sexual object
and other people (Freud, S.E., Vol.XXI). He also states in Civilization and
its Discontents that "one of the forms in which love manifests itself - sexual
love - has given us our most intense experience of an overwhelming
sensation of pleasure and has thus furnished us with a pattern for our
search for happiness" (Freud, S.E., Vol.XXI, p.82). In connection with this
experience he claims that: "We are never so defenceless against suffering
as when we love, never so hopelessly unhappy as when we have lost our
loved object or its love" (Freud, S.E., Vol. XXI, p.82). To counteract this
helplessness and suffering, while attempting to retain the happiness
brought by love, "a small minority" of people protect themselves by
directing their love to all men alike and "they avoid the uncertainties and
disappointments of genital love by turning away from its sexual aims and
transforming the instinct into an impulse with an inhibited aim. What they
bring about in themselves in this way is a state of evenly suspended,
steadfast affection feeling which has little external resemblance any more to
the stormy agitations of genital love" (Freud, S.E., Vol.XXI, p.102).

For

Freud, this constituted one of the "techniques" for fulfilling the pleasure
principle.

With these kinds of claims, Freud is attempting to establish love as an
instinct. But he is doing this in a curious way. It is as though he is saying
"all love is essentially genital love" in the same way as he could claim "all
beverages are essentially water". In other words, genital love is elemental
in the same way as water is elemental. While this may be a claim that can
be broadly justified, it does not in the end tell us very much about the
nature of different feelings (or beverages) and, in particular, feelings of
love.

Section II: Love as feeling
Within the history of human thought on love, sexual desire and love
have not been considered identical even within sexual relationships
between men and women. To put it even more finely, sexual desire and
sexual love have not been understood as identical.

It is a common

experience in the lives of most people to feel a desire for sex which may
possibly be satisfied by any one of several agreeable partners ("sex
objects"), and to feel a desire for sex with a particular person where no
other partner can possibly satisfy. Our vocabulary, mirroring our human
experiences,

distinguishes

between

all

possible

alternatives

and

combinations here. There is:
(a)

sexual desire with sexual love where the object of desire is exclusive
and particular;

(b)

sexual desire without sexual love where the object(s) of desire is not
exclusive or particular but conforms only to general criteria of appeal
(i.e., preferences for particular types or characteristics);

(c) sexual desire with sexual love and "love entire" where the first two are
joined by feelings of love for the whole person as an object of love,
where that person's desires, feelings, needs, and personality are taken
into account and dealt with lovingly;
(d) sexual desire and sexual love without "love entire" where the exclusive
and particular object is needed, wanted and even "owned", whether
they like It or not;
(e) there is also "love entire" without sexual desire or sexual love, where
the well-being of the love-object(s) is important; and
(f) "love entire" with an exclusive and particular love object where the
well-being of a particular love object is important, and sexual love and
desire are not present. There is also the relationship with self-love to
be considered in each of these variations.
Freud's claim that we must view these variations under the general
heading first and foremost of genital love and then with sub-headings of
sexual love and aim-inhibited love (with its "steadfast feelings of affection")
tells us nothing of the multiplicity of personal feelings of love, for which we
have a most elaborate and complicated vocabulary, that are evoked in the
various circumstances described above. As argued in Chapters One and
Three, a sensation of pleasure and a feeling of happiness are two different
experiences (though they may be had concurrently) which are different by
virtue of their cognitive status. Similarly, sexual desire (sensation,
excitation) and sexual love are cognitively different, and they may be
operative separately or together.
Further, Freud's division of love in this way does not explain why
those who use "aim-inhibited love" as a "technique" for fulfilling the pleasure

principle are not in fact as immune from suffering as they ought to be on
his definition. Pursuing genital love outright is too dangerous and causes
the most acute suffering, Freud claims. Aim-inhibited love is the protection
against this, especially in the form of directing love to all men alike (Freud,
S.E., Vol.XXI, p.102). These "affectionate feelings" bear little resemblance
to the "stormy agitations" of genital love.
It is difficult in fact to find examples of the kind of love that Freud has
set up here.

He evokes pictures of benign parsons or religious people

smiling serenely at the world and professing love for all, but the reality,
even of these kinds of people is very different. For Freud to argue, as he
does, that the "love thy neighbor as thyself" injunction is a way civilisation
has of protecting itself against man's natural aggression by asking man to
go against his natural instincts, hardly bears up when the consequences of
such love are considered in the real world (Freud, S.E., Vol.XXI, p.112).
Such love may indeed go against natural instincts (though this is arguable
if one examines the complexity of the term "natural") but it leaves the lover
in a most vulnerable and dangerous position personally, thus making this
love extremely difficult to practise on two counts.

There is of course the well-known pseudo-love practised by many
"lovers of mankind" which is a kind of benevolent detachment, a
generalised air of good-will which hardly recognises individuals at all, but
the hollowness of this sort of love with its well-meaning platitudes has long
been obvious. We recognise from our language and our experience that
love assumes a certain character - it is involvement (not non-involvement),
it reaches out, it is offering something (not merely taking), it is generous, it
has strength, and so on. It also carries pain as well as joy in any of the
forms we personally recognise and practise. It increases vulnerability as
well as strength. It is a way of being as well as a way of feeling.

When compared with what we see of love, Freud's notion of
"aim-inhibited love" is a difficult one.

To say that it is a love that is "far

removed from the stormy agitations of genital love" may describe some
sort of ideal gentle love but it bears little resemblance to actual friendships
in the real world, or other non-sexual love relationships. Most friendships
are just as vulnerable to misunderstandings and stormy agitations (though
of a different kind to sexual love). What is implied in Freud's claim of the
transformation of genital love from a powerful instinct to "an impulse with an
inhibited aim" (Freud, S.E., Vol.XXI, p.82) is that the love becomes in some
way less powerful, less stormy, less passionate.

But is the infidelity or

carelessness of the sexual lover any more painful than the carelessness
and disloyalty, or treachery, of a friend?

Many would argue most

emphatically not.
Once again our language mirrors our experiences. Betrayal in family
and friendships is treated no less passionately in our literature than
betrayals by sexual lovers. The loss of a friend breaks hearts no less than
the loss of a lover. The very removal of friendship from the uncertainties of
the sexual sphere has made it more precious (and therefore more
dangerous) than sexual relationships in many cultures throughout the
ages. As Cicero wrote in 44 BC, "All I can do is urge you to put friendship
ahead of all other human concerns", and "What could be finer than to have
someone to whom you may speak as freely as to yourself? How could you
derive true joy from good fortune if you did not have someone who would
rejoice in your happiness as much as you yourself? And it would be very
hard to bear misfortune in the absence of anyone who would take your
sufferings even harder than you", and finally, "friendship is so concentrated
and restricted a thing that all the true affection in the world is shared by no
more than a handful of individuals (Cicero, trans. Copley, 1971, pp.53, 55).

The language used in Cicero's essay On Friendship and the ideas
expressed are familiar and comprehensible. We have experienced the pain
of loss in connection with friendships, we know their value and their power.
We distinguish between powerful feelings of friendship and powerful
feelings of sexual love and the different kinds of power they have over us.
Of course they may co-exist in any one relationship, but that does not
make them identical, or one "safer" than the other. Freud may argue at
some meta-level that the passion of friendship and other aim-inhibited loves
is a proof of love's essential genital nature (something of a circular
argument!) but this is not our conscious experience. It is not our
conscious way of being and understanding as it is reflected in human
history, and our understanding of our experiences cannot completely be
dismissed by Freud or anyone else in favour of a meta-level explanation. At
least, the meta-explanation would need to be able to co-exist with our
conscious understanding, not as individuals only, but as nations, cultures,
ages, eras and civilizations, that is on very wide empirical grounds based
on different types of human relations, not only neurotic ones.
Freud concedes this indirectly with his oft-stated uneasiness about
emotions, his multiple ways of referring to them and the very language he
uses, even within his psychoanalytic language system, to describe himself
and others. As he says in part II of Civilization and its Discontents, love
clings to and seeks an emotional relationship with objects in the external
world and "we are never so defenceless against suffering as when we love"
(Freud, S.E., Vol.XXI, p.82). To have an emotional relationship implies the
sort of cognitive involvement discussed in Chapters One and Three. When
speaking of the sources of suffering Freud mentions the suffering of the
body in time (ageing), the suffering caused by the "external world which
may rage against us with overwhelming and merciless forces of
destruction" and the suffering "from our relations to other men ... the
suffering which comes from this course is perhaps more painful than any

other ..." (Freud, S.E., Vol.XXI, p.77).

Here he does not specify the

primary, sexual relations but speaks as though "relations to other men" is
to be taken in the broad historical sense (Freud, S.E., Vol.XXI, p.778).
Freud complicates his notion of love in a particularly difficult way when
he speaks of the difficulty of fitting love (and hate) into his scheme of the
instincts (Freud, S.E., Vol.XIV, p.133).

in his paper, Instincts and their

Vicissitudes, he speaks of there being "no doubt that there is the most
intimate relation between these two opposite feelings (love and hate) and
sexual life, but we are naturally unwilling to think of love as being some kind
of special component instinct of sexuality ... we should prefer to regard
loving as the expression of the whole sexual current of feeling ..." (Freud,
S.E., Vol.Xlv, p.133). Looked at in the context of emotions, Freud is clearly
attempting to distinguish between the components of the instinct of
sexuality (such components being discussed by him as opposites such as
sadism and masochism, scopophilia and exhibitionism) and the feelings of
love and hate, though he is also attempting to define love and hate in some
special way as related to sexual instincts.

It is here that the distinction

between instincts and feelings seems crucial. It is indeed difficult to see
love as the manifestation of an instinct in the way that sadism, for example,
can be seen as the manifestation of an instinct.

But it is certainly

comprehensible to see love as a feeling closely related to the sexual
instincts and appearing alongside the instincts, coloured perhaps by the
nature of the instincts (and thus being perceived sometimes as its
opposite, hate). Hate though is not the only opposite to love, Freud claims.
There is also being loved (as the opposite to loving) and indifference (as
the opposite to loving/hating).

Freud's classification here is an example of the complexity that lies
right at the heart of his thinking on emotions.

He is classifying together

three qualitatively different things and each reflects a level of his dealing

with emotions. When speaking of love/hate he is speaking of emotional
states] when speaking of loving/being loved he is speaking of emotional
feelings and the giving and receiving elements; when speaking of
indifference/loving, hating he is speaking of non-feeling as opposed to
feeling, i.e., degrees of excitation.

Looked at in the context of his other

ways of referring to instincts, affects, feelings, emotions, we see the real
beginning of a threefold theory of emotions that is consistent with all the
references but that gives emotions a new position within the theory of
psychoanalysis - and which, incidentally, makes sense of the apparent
contradictions in Freud's ways of speaking. This theory will be outlined
further in Chapter Eight, but to underiine this development I will look at
Freud's notion of hate, and then of anxiety.

Section III: Hate
Whereas in the use of the word "love", an intimate connection with
sexual pleasure and function is discernible, the use of the term "hate" yields
no such connection, Freud claims (Freud, S.E., Vol.XIV, p.138).

In

Instincts and their Vicissitudes Freud traces the origins of hate stating that
"the relation of unpleasure seems to be the sole decisive one" (Freud, S.E.,
Vol.XIV, p. 138).

Hate emerges as the instinct of the ego to abhor and

pursue, with intent to destroy, all objects which are a source of
unpleasurable feeling and "it may be asserted that the true prototypes of
the relation of hate are derived not from sexual life, but from the ego's
struggle to pursue and maintain itself" (Freud, S.E., Vol.XIV, p.138). Love
and hate become opposites only in the context of the pleasure/unpleasure
relation (Freud, S.E., Vol.XIV, p.138). The difficulty with regard to hate is
that Freud gives no explanation of what it is for the ego to "hate and abhor"
other objects which are a source of unpleasurable feelings, as distinct from

"pursuing with intent to destroy" such objects. It is comprehensible enough
to claim that the self-preservative instincts of the ego pursue and attempt to
destroy objects which cause unpleasurable feelings, but what is the
dimension added by reference to hating and abhorring such objects? If it
is the case that the hate instinct triggers the instinct to destroy, then it
would seem that the activation of the one instinct is dependent on another
instinct which is dependent on some further instinct.

In this instance,

destruction is triggered by hate which is triggered by unpleasure which is
triggered by an object in the world or an internal mental object of some
kind. So far, so good - but what can such an explanation possibly tell us
about our conscious experience of hate? Firstly, we may experience hate
in many different ways and contexts.

Sometimes we recognise that we

want to destroy the hated object, but more often the urge to destroy is not
part of our conscious feeling. We may turn away from the hated object,
remove ourselves from its sphere of influence, do battle with the object in
order to transform the hated feature of it; but whichever of these actions we
take to alleviate our distress, we still have our feelings of hate to contend
with and understand. Here we have to sort out hate from fear, from
distress, from anger, from frustration, from rivalry, from injustice, and from
many other feelings (sometimes including love), all of which we recognise
as being different from one another though often co-existing.
Any one of the emotions just mentioned could trigger the instinct to
destroy in certain circumstances, could be the result of feelings of
unpleasure caused by some external (or internal) object, and indeed any
one of these emotions is easier to define than hate itself.

Though our

language and culture allows the term "pure hatred" and seems to have
some concept of it (especially in relation to evil), it is exceedingly difficult to
describe such a feeling. We feel that it would be implacable and terrible,
and we know of deeds, in history certainly, that appear to have been
inspired by such a feeling. We may explain the deeds by positing the "hate

as an instinct" theory, but this is once more at a level removed from the
actual experiencing of emotion. When looking at the explosion caused by
an atomic bomb one may be told of the physics of the process, but that
bears little relation to what one is looking at, i.e., to one's experiencing the
sight and sound of the explosion. The physics of the matter and the
experiencing of it are two different though equally valid and necessary
kinds of explanation. Similarly, while psychological explanations or theories
may explain what is "really" going on when we experience emotions, it is
not enough to explain what they are, to give them meaning that is related to
and consistent with our vital experiencing - without which no theories would
be possible. Again, Freud concedes these things indirectly with his
reservations about the nature of feelings, with references to their
complexity and obscurity.
In connection with hate, Freud says in An Outline of Psychoanalysis
that he eventually decided (at the age of 82) to assume the existence of
only two basic instincts - Eros and the destructive instinct (the final aim of
which made it also a death instinct). As he defines hate in terms of the
instinct to destroy (Freud, S.E., Vol.XIV, p.138) and refers finally to Eros as
"Eros (or the love instinct..." (Freud, S.E., Vol.XXIII, p.149), we come to the
basic instincts that appear to be love and hate where love encompasses
the notion of unity and the urge to bind together and establish even greater
unities, and hate encompasses the coming apart, the undoing of
connections, destruction as opposed to construction (Freud, S.E.,
Vol.XXIII, p.148). In this context it is easy to see why Freud sees love and
hate as instincts, forces that move us and shape our lives as individuals
and as species. It is also clear however that these "instincts" are not his
final explanation and understanding of our conscious feelings - a point I will
elaborate at the conclusion of this chapter.

Section IV: Anxiety
It is perhaps within his treatment of the concept of anxiety that
Freud's multi-level approach to emotions is illustrated most dramatically. In
his lecture Anxiety Freud refers to the problem of anxiety as being "a riddle
whose solution would be bound to throw a flood of light on our whole
mental existence" (Freud, S.E., Vol.XVI, p.393). He says that up until a
certain point he studied anxiety as a neurosis of the vagus nerve and then
found that nothing interested him less in understanding anxiety than a
knowledge of "the path of the nerves along which its excitations pass"
(Freud. S.E., Vol.XVI, p.393).

He claims that neurotics describe anxiety as their "worst suffering"
and that "everyone of us has experienced that sensation, or, to speak more
correctly, that affective state at one time or another on our own account"
(Freud, S.E., Vol.XVI, pp.392-3). He goes on to describe "realistic anxiety"
as contrasted with "neurotic anxiety" when he sees the former as being
"something very rational and intelligible" on the one hand (i.e., in so far as it
gives warning of danger) but not so rational on the other hand (in so far as
it, or an excess of it, can paralyse action). Then he states that "by 'anxiety'
we usually understand the subjective state into which we are put by
perceiving the 'generation of anxiety' and we call this an affect". At this
stage anxiety is a sensation, a state, something rational (possibly), an
affect, a warning (i.e., a manifestation of the self-preserving instinct) and
something that we can perceive in ourselves (Freud, S.E., Vol.XVI,
pp.394-5).

That Freud sees anxiety primarily as an affect suggests that it is closer
to an emotion than to an instinct. Freud continues this analysis by stating
that an affect "includes in the first place particular motor innervations or
discharges and secondly certain feelings; the latter are of two kinds -

perceptions of the motor actions which have occurred and the direct
feelings of pleasure and unpleasure which, as we say, gives the affect its
keynote" (Freud, S.E., Vol.XVI, p.395). As Freud says here, an affect is
something "highly composite" and, (significantly for my inquiry), it is made
up of motor innervations or discharges and certain feelings, thus
distinguishing between affect, discharges of energy and feelings.

Freud

then goes further and claims that this still does not give the essence of an
affect, and that the repetition of some particular significant experience is the
"core which holds the combination we have described together" (Freud,
S.E., Vol.XVI, p.396). In this way an "affective state" is constructed and
Freud likens it to the construction of an hysterical attack, the hysterical
attack itself being a freshly constnjcted affective state and the "normal"
affective state being the expression of a general hysteria which has
become a heritage, i.e., "a very early impression of a general nature placed
in the prehistory not of the individual but of the species" (Freud, S.E.,
Vol.XVI, pp.395-6).
By likening the constnjction of an affective state to an hysterical
attack Freud adds yet another dimension to his treatment of emotions. At
this

stage,

Freud's

intention to distinguish

between

"displaceable

magnitudes of energy" (tensions), affects, instincts and feelings is very
clear.

But if emotions are to be seen as certain states then this is

conceptually different again. According to Freud, an hysterical attack (as
opposed to chronic hysterical symptoms) is constructed when a person,
who had previously enjoyed good mental health, undergoes an occurrence
of "incompatibility in their ideational life" where the ego was faced with "an
experience, an idea or a feeling which aroused such a distressing affect
that the subject decided to forget about it because he had no confidence in
his power to resolve the contradiction between that incompatible idea and
his ego by means of thought activity" (Freud, S.E., Vol.111, p.47). However
this task, a defensive one by the ego, cannot be carried out, the memory

trace and the affect which is attached to the idea "are there once and for all
and cannot be eradicated". The ego can, however, rob the idea of its affect
and this sum of excitation is then attached to some "mnemic symbol" in the
conscious mind (Freud, S.E., Vol.111, pp.48-9). Hysterical attacks continue
each time a "fresh impression of the same sort succeeds in breaking
through the barrier erected by the will" whereby a fresh affect is supplied to
the original weakened idea and the original affect finds its way back to the
idea. The hysterical attack lasts until a further conversion takes place, i.e.,
the affect is once more transferred to a mnemic symbol (Freud, S.E.,
Voi.lll,p.50).

To follow Freud's parallel between an hysterical attack and an
affective state we can assume that an affective state (such as "normal"
anxiety) is constructed by some original event that gave rise to excitation
and that each time a fresh impression of the same kind takes place the
original excitation is added to and strengthened becoming identifiable by
the ego as a particular kind of excitation such as a state of pleasure,
distress, etc - what, in short, we all call emotional states. The original event
that began the construction of an emotional state ascribes to genetic
makeup, thus we are all born with a predisposition to feel certain things in
connection with certain events (Freud, S.E., Vol.XVI, pp.395-6).
Freud's use of the term "state" here suggests something rather
stronger and more encompassing than any single "feeling" or emotion. An
hysterical attack (to follow the parallel) is something that briefly dominates
the organism and an "emotional state" suggests that same domination unlike the more usual human condition of feeling a mixture of emotions at
any given time and not being dominated by any one of them. A strong or
significant event certainly alters this balance from time to time but we
commonly refer to someone being in an "emotional state" when some
dominant feelings are strongly present.

Once again the presence of

feelings suggests some cognitive relation, a certain degree of
self-awareness. An "affective state" in Freud's terms, however, does not
necessarily suggest personal awareness of any particular feelings. To be
in an affective state one needs only to be in a state dominated by a high
degree of excitation and, as argued in Chapter Six, one may be in such a
state without being able to identify one's feelings correctly at all.
This distinction between emotional and affective states continues to
be present as Freud interprets and analyses anxiety. As an affective state,
anxiety begins with the original impression in the mind of the act of birth
(Freud, S.E., Vol.XVI, p.396) which has become the prototype of the affects
of mortal danger with its "combination of unpleasurable feelings, impulses
of discharge of excitation and bodily sensations". This may recur as an
affective state whenever events stimulate a person back to that original,
overpowering condition of complete anxiety - or it may recur as an
emotional state when a person experiences an inflow of anxious feelings.
The difference may be further illustrated by the way in which we commonly
refer to people as being in certain emotional states and in "highly emotional
states", which seems closer to Freud's description of an affective state, as
opposed to an idea in the mind being charged with affect to a greater or
lesser degree. A "state" implies the entire psyche being involved, as is the
case in an hysterical attack, which Freud uses as the parallel. In an
affective state the entire psyche is charged with excitation (tension),
whereas in an emotional state the entire psyche seems rather to be
"coloured" with specific, identifiable, self-conscious feelings.
This distinction in connection with anxiety can perhaps be best
perceived when comparing Freud's descriptions of "free floating anxiety"
and "phobia" (Freud, S.E., Vol.XVI, p.398). Free floating anxiety may be
perceived as a general affective state where a high degree of general
excitation is present and is ready to attach itself to "any idea which is in any

way suitable ... and lies in wait for any opportunity that will allow it to justify
itself" (Freud, S.E., Vol.XVI, p.398). Characteristically the sufferer is unable
to identify specific feelings or specific objects of fear but is "tormented" by
foreseeing "the most frightful of all possibilities, interprets every chance
event as a premonition of evil and exploits every uncertainty in a bad
sense" (Freud, S.E., Vol.XVI, p.398).
By contrast a phobia is described as a form of anxiety "which is
attached to particular objects or situations" and although the anxiety is
intense in connection with the particular object, it does not pervade other
areas of living for the sufferer (Freud, S.E., Vol.XVI, p.400). Further, this
anxiety is always readily identified by the sufferer as being a particular
feeling (e.g., fear, disgust, horror, etc) rather than a general uneasiness
that is overwhelming.

Freud says that these two forms of anxiety are

independent of one another and only appear simultaneously by accident,
neither being a natural progression or stage of the other (Freud, S.E.,
Vol.XVI, p.400). In the case of free floating anxiety, the psyche is generally
charged with excitation (tension), with specific feelings very difficult to
identify; in the case of phobia, the psyche is "coloured" for a short time (or
for short intervals) by specific emotions.
A further exploration of the concept of anxiety leads Freud to claim
that anxiety has the further quality of invariably appearing, in cases of
psychoneurosis, as a replacement of some other affect after a repression
has occurred (Freud, S.E., Vol.XVI, p.403). Freud claims that the normal
course of psychical events in the unconscious, i.e., where no repression
has occurred, is always accompanied by a particular affect. In the course
of his inquiries, he found that this affect was replaced by anxiety after
repression had occurred, "no matter what its own quality may be".

He

goes on, "thus, when we have a hysterical-anxiety state before us, its
unconscious correlate may be an impulse of a similar character - anxiety.

shame, embarrassment, or, just as easily, a positive libidinal excitation or a
hostile aggressive one such as rage or anger (Freud, S.E., Vol.XVI,
p.403). He concludes: "anxiety is therefore the universally current coinage
for which any affective impulse is or can be exchanged if the ideational
content attached to it is subjected to repression" (Freud, S.E., Vol.XVI,
p.404).
With this claim, Freud not only establishes anxiety as something
different from other emotions, feelings or affects (in so far as it is some sort
of "universal coinage"), he also refers quite clearly to the notion that affects
can

be

repressed along with events, that emotions can

unconscious.

become

Earlier, in his essay The Unconscious Freud had argued

against the notion of unconscious emotions or affects stating that so-called
unconscious affects can be misconstnjed affects, or affects that are
prevented from developing at all by repression, or are transformed during
the process of repression to anxiety. He concludes his argument in that
instance by saying that despite the linguistic usage (e.g. unconscious
anger, etc), there are no unconscious affects as there are unconscious
ideas - but there are unconscious affective structures which can become
conscious.

He claims, finally, that: "the whole difference arises from the

fact that ideas are cathexes - basically of memory traces, whilst affects and
emotions correspond to processes of discharge, the final manifestations of
which are perceived as feelings" (Freud, S.E., Vol.XIV, p.178). He adds
that "in the present state of our knowledge of affects and emotions, we
cannot express this difference more clearly".

Freud's later use of the

concept of unconscious emotions does not however sound like mere
"linguistic usage", especially when he describes the way in which
"unconscious emotions" operate in the case of the construction of
hysterical attacks. There the original affect, as well as the fresh affect, find
their way back to the unconscious idea. The unconscious affect manifests
itself under hypnosis (the discharge of intense emotion under hypnosis

being in no way conscious activity and in no way perceived as feeling by
the patient at the time).
The use of the notion of "unconscious affective structures", which
appear to harbour the "potential beginning" of affects (Freud, S.E., Vol.XIV,
p. 178) helps to resolve this apparent contradiction, but in doing so, it adds
yet another level to the way in which Freud presents emotions. What can
these affective stnjctures or potential beginnings be, if they are not affects
themselves, i.e., the excitation or tension or energy that we are beginning
to recognise as the primary level of Freud's thinking on emotions?

And

what kind of "universal coinage" can anxiety be, if it is not also some sort of
primary excitation, in the same way that pleasure and unpleasure seem to
be the "universal keynotes" of other emotions? At the same time, this
primary status seems to be different in each case.

Pleasure and

unpleasure seem to be almost a property of other emotions or a quality
attached to them as well as a way of ordering emotions into at least two
kinds. Anxiety however seems to be the "basic material" or "basic energy"
that any emotion reverts to when its development or manifestation is
impeded.
And indeed, the basic excitation or tension that an affect appears to
be and that is unpleasurable, according to Freud, when present to a high
degree, seems to bear some resemblance to anxiety also. At the same
time Freud still speaks of anxiety as the conscious feeling we all recognise the feeling of apprehensiveness, panic, worry, pessimism, fear, and their
variously potent mixtures - which is clearly on a different level or in a
different mode to the primary energies of emotion.
On yet another meta-level, Freud describes the generation of "realistic
anxiety" as the ego's reaction to danger and the signal for taking flight, and
claims that it might then be "plausible to suppose that in neurotic anxiety

the ego is making a similar attempt at flight from the demands by its libido"
(Freud, S.E.,Vol.XVI,p.405).
The link between the generation of anxiety and the libido is pursued
by Freud in a number of related ways. He states unequivocally that libido
is a term "properly reserved for the instinctual forces of sexual life" (Freud,
S.E., Vol.XVI, p.413). To some extent, then, libido is likened to the primary
energy of affects, the excitation or tension that exists in the psyche, ready
to manifest itself given the proper stimulus. Yet affect does not, in itself,
strive for pleasure as the libido has been described as doing.

Libido,

however, which has been repressed, is transformed into anxiety (Freud,
S.E.,Vol.XVI,p.410).
Affect that has been repressed (or prevented from developing) is also
transformed into anxiety.

We know that Freud did not intend libido and

affect to be seen as identical in any sense, yet he has tied them to anxiety
here in a way that makes it difficult to disentangle them, especially after he
had introduced the term "unconscious affective structures".

When

describing the generation of neurotic anxiety Freud claims that it is closely
dependent

on

unconsummated

"libidinal

excitation"

(i.e.,

specifically

inadequate discharge of "violent sexual excitation" (Freud, S.E., Vol.XVI,
p.401) which he temns as "libido put to an abnormal employment" (Freud,
S.E., Vol.XVI, p.404). Affect that is transfonned to anxiety is described as
"prevented from developing" or as "strangulated" rather than abnormally
employed. And overall, Freud most certainly allows libido existence in the
unconscious

while

he

repeatedly

maintains

that

affect

cannot

be

unconscious despite appearances and linguistic usage to the contrary.
In order to elucidate the relationship between "realistic anxiety" and
neurotic anxiety, Freud needs to relate the abnormally employed libido (of
the latter) to the ego's instinctual flight from danger (of the former). To do

this he traces the genesis of anxiety in children and comes to the
conclusion that such anxiety is generated by disappointment and longing
for the beloved mother following the first, and subsequent, separations
from her, thus bringing anxiety back to unemployed libido (Freud, S.E.,
Vol.XVI, pp.405-8). Hence neurotic anxiety stems, in the end, from infantile
anxiety.

In the case of healthy adults, momentary

longing and

disappointment are not transformed into anxiety because they have
learned to employ such libido in other ways or to hold it in suspense.
Where, however, "the libido belongs to a psychical impulse which has been
subject to repression, then circumstances are re-established similar to
those in the case of a child in whom there is still no distinction between
conscious

and

unconscious

..." (Freud, S.E., Vol.XVI, p.409).

The

emphasis is mine, to draw attention to the fact that, while he considers that
there is a time during which the distinction between conscious and
unconscious does not apply to children,he nevertheless attributes any
number of emotions as well as libido to them. Once again, the multi-level
or multi-faceted way in which Freud deals with emotions is thrown into
relief.
In his later writings on anxiety, Freud clarifies his position further and
highlights the levels at which anxiety operates - namely the "automatic" or
"involuntary" level whenever there arose a situation analogous to the
danger of birth, and the ego-level where the ego subjects itself to anxiety
as soon as a similar situation "merely threatened to occur in order to call
for its avoidance" (Freud, S.E., Vol.XX, p.162). The "involuntary" level of
course suggests an anxiety that originates in the unconscious while the
ego-level suggests a conscious anxiety with cognitive significance. Freud
in fact refers to "instinctual anxiety" as opposed to "realistic anxiety" (Freud,
S.E., Vol.XX, p.168), which of course immediately raises the question
whether other affects (or emotions or feelings) can have an "instinctual" as
well as a "realistic" level. This question is pursued in Chapter Eight in

connection with what I present as Freud's secondary or underlying theory
of emotions.
In his New Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis, Freud makes it
clear that he does regard anxiety primarily as an "affective state" (Freud,
S.E., VoLXXII, p.81 ), where he also distinguishes between an "attack" and a
"more persistent state" (thus reinforcing the idea that a "state" is different
from a "feeling"), and where he also repeats the connection between
anxiety and "the libidinal economies of sexual life" (Freud, S.E., Vol.XXII,
p.82). He also states clearly that he sees the connecting link between
neurotic anxiety (unemployed libido) and "realistic anxiety" (ego flight from
danger) as fear, i.e., in each case the sufferer is deeply afraid of something,
namely either an external danger or the internal libidinal demands and the
actions they imply (Freud, S.E., Vol.XXII, p.84). In each case the specific
fear is that of a "traumatic moment" (Freud, S.E., Vol.XXII, p.94).
In his latest summing up, Freud does place anxiety as a function of
the ego alone where "the ego alone can produce and feel anxiety", though
anxiety itself is divided into three "species" (realistic, neurotic, and moral)
related to the ego's three dependent relations (the external worid, the id,
and the Super-ego) (Freud, S.E., Vol.XXII, p.85). While the "instinctual
anxiety" may then be placed as an anxiety of the ego instincts of
self-preservation(rather than transformation of libido), this still does not
solve the problem of how the affect of anxiety "finds its way back to the
original source of fear" which must necessarily be unconscious. The
"unconscious affective structure" must still play some sort of role here; and
indeed Freud nowhere repudiates his notion of unconscious affective
structures.
Although he does repudiate the idea that the libido is transformed into
anxiety (stating instead that the ego constructs anxiety in response to the

magnitude of the sum of excitation generated by an event), this does not
really solve the problem of the relation between libido and affect since both
are still described as "sums of excitation or tension" (Freud, S.E., Vol.XXII,
p.945). The abandonment of his "old theory" may clarify the generation of
anxiety but it does not clarify its final position or "place" when it is regarded
as an affect, as a "universal coinage" and an instinct.

Section V: Emotions as psychical states
To the extent that Freud refers to the psychical life as the "mental life"
and includes everything from the physical brain to "acts of consciousness"
in the "psychical apparatus", emotions may be anything from excitations of
the nervous system to experiences related to consciousness with a definite
cognitive content (Freud, S.E., Vol.XXIII, pp.147, 157). It is precisely this
range of possibilities that Freud attempts to cover in fact with his many
references to affect, emotion, feelings, states, etc.

It can be argued,

however, that there is a further, special significance to Freud's statements
on psychical qualities in connection with feelings.
In his later paper Psychical Qualities (Freud, S.E., Vol.XXIII, p.157),
Freud begins his discussion by stating that the fact of consciousness
"defies all explanation or description" but that firstly, we all know what we
mean by it, and secondly, it is a view held by many that consciousness
alone is psychical, with the psychical phenomena being perceptions,
feelings, thought processes, and volitions.

He points out then that this

gives an incomplete view of the very processes being perceived in this way
and that the broken sequences of these processes posit physical or
somatic processes that are concomitant with the psychical ones.

Psychoanalysis treats this problem of broken sequences by asserting
that there are unconscious psychical processes as well as conscious ones,
and that the study of these processes involves the positing of basic
concepts and principles such as instinct, nervous energy, etc., just as the
older sciences talk about force, mass, attraction, etc. The claim, in effect,
is that Psychoanalysis postulates unconscious (invisible) events to fill the
gaps uncovered in conscious (visible) events on exactly the same principle
as theoretical entities are postulated in the physical sciences.
The significance of this for emotions is that Freud is admitting here
that his statements on emotions (in all their forms) are in the nature of
"plausible inferences and translations into conscious material", made using
the same perceptual and theoretical apparatus as the physical sciences. A
sequence of conscious events complementary to the unconscious
psychical processes is thus constructed. This kind of exploration of
emotions then yields knowledge of emotions only in so far as how they
appear when brought into consciousness. To say that emotions have no
complementary processes in the unconscious is to say that the broken,
fragmented knowledge yielded by consciousness is the only knowledge
there is, to which view Freud most emphatically does not subscribe.
Indeed, he pursued his theory of psychoanalysis precisely to establish that
there were complementary "invisible" processes that gave a complete
picture of "visible" or conscious processes, in connection with emotions.
This then is Freud's scientific justification for talking about something
like "unconscious affective structures" and feeling permanently uneasy
about his position on "affects". When one considers closely this scientific
position that Freud holds, that a complete picture of the psyche is only
possible by examining both the conscious manifestation of psychical
processes (by observation) and the unconscious or invisible psychical
processes (by inference and then prediction), then it seems reasonable to

assume that feelings (which we experience and observe) are underlaid by
some more primary energy (which we infer and use as a basis for
prediction), and that the admitting of these levels of emotional processes
throws some light on the problem of how to relate what happens to us
emotionally (in the passive sense) with what we experience consciously
emotionally (in the active sense).
This passive and active sense of the way in which we relate to
emotions reflects the traditions of thought that Freud brought with him to
psychoanalysis and of which he shows awareness indirectly in his many
statements on emotions.

In the following chapter I will attempt to clarify

this further and present what I perceive as a multi-level theory of emotion
within Freud's writing.

CHAPTER EIGHT
A MULTI-LEVEL THEORY OF EMOTIONS FROM FREUD

Section I: The case for an alternative theory
In Chapters Five and Six I have argued that Freud was aware that his
position on emotions or "affects" was not definitive, and that he was also
aware that a meta-explanation of emotions, in terms of "displaceable
magnitudes of energy" was not enough to give a clear understanding of
emotions as we experience and speak of them. Although Freud uses the
term "affects" to cover all types and ranges of emotion (including emotional
states, moods and emotional aspects of desires and impulses) (Sachs,
1974), it seems clear that when discussing each of these aspects of
emotion, he distinguishes between them in a way that requires a more
complex or differently oriented theory of emotions.
One of the clearest indications of the unfinished nature of Freud's
thinking on emotions is the seemingly contradictory way in which he refers
to the place and function of emotions in the human psyche. Emotions are
relegated to the conscious mind but also given some sort of existence in
the unconscious; emotions are all affects but affects, feelings and states
are given separate status.

On a meta-level, emotions are some sort of

process for the discharge of excess tension in the nervous system but they
are also our experience of that release of tension, and our experience
takes a much more complicated form.

Emotions are our experience of

degrees of pleasure and unpleasure, but Freud's reference to different
kinds of emotions (as well as degrees of pleasure and unpleasure)

suggests a difference between degrees of pleasure and unpleasure and
other feelings.
Another

indication of Freud's perplexity about emotions is his

preoccupation with and qualifications on his use of language concerning
emotions. While maintaining that the term "affects" is how he chooses to
refer to emotions, he freely and meaningfully uses other terms as well such
as "feelings", "emotions", "states", "passions", and distinguishes between
them.

It is clear that this is not just a word variation.

Freud reflects

historically early attitudes to emotions by his use of language. As Averill
(1980) points out in a paper on emotion and anxiety, the term "emotion",
derived from the latin e + movere, originally meant to migrate or transfer
from one place to another.
agitation

or

perturbation,

But it was also used to refer to states of
both

physical

psychological (Averill, 1980, p.37).

(as

in

the

weather)

and

Freud's thinking reflects this early

usage almost exactly in both senses when he speaks of "displaceable
magnitudes of energy" and degrees of tension in the psyche.
Even earlier than the Latin-derived term "emotion", is the term
"passions" which was used to refer to emotions by the ancient Greeks.
Derived from the Latin "pati" (to suffer), it is related to the Greek "pathos",
and terms such as "passive" and "patient" are related. Averill states that:
At the root of these concepts is the idea that an individual (or
physical object) is undergoing or suffering some change, as
opposed to doing or initiating change.
Thus, in ordinary
discourse, we speak of being "gripped", "seized" and "torn" by
emotion. Stated more formally, emotions are something that
happens to us (passions) not something we deliberately do
(actions), (ibid., p.38)
Once again, these early traditions reflected in the language are
noticeable in Freud's way of dealing with the very obscure idea (as he puts

it) of emotions. While he strongly denies any reliance on past traditions (as
mentioned in Chapter Six), it is inevitable that he absorbed and utilised,
albeit unconsciously, both the thinking and language on emotions as it was
represented in his culture.
Hence it is not surprising that, while using such traditions on the one
hand as his basic material, and at the same time venturing into a
completely

new

way

of

understanding

human

nature

through

psychoanalytic theory, there should arise a tension between the old
learning and the new perception.
Freud's

dealings

with

the

Again and again this is apparent in

terms

and

demonstrated in Chapters Six and Seven.

concepts

of

emotions

as

He was faced here with a

powerful dilemma - namely that of seeking to abandon traditional thinking
in the light of his new theory while at the same time being bound, as we all
are, by our heritage and language and human thought.

It is quite clear

that, as far as emotions are concerned, he could not abandon that heritage
even though he actively struggled to do so, and when he spoke and wrote
as though he had done so, he himself was not satisfied with the results.

To step back from the detail of Freud's though at this point is to have
a perception of this struggle between established and original thought, as
Freud attempts to work out his unique position. What emerges is a theory
that does incorporate established and original patterns of thinking and also
provides a synthesis between emotional and cognitive functions.

In the

remainder of this chapter I will attempt to outline this broader theoretical
undercurrent in Freud's work on emotions.

Section II: A multi-level theory
What I have perceived as emerging from Freud's many references to
emotions is a theory that has essentially three levels or stages of emotional
processes in the psyche. Each level is characterised by the presence of
certain qualities, and related to them in a certain way, the qualities (of
emotions) themselves providing a fourth dimension to the theory. To clarify
this notion of qualities, which I introduce only as a way of ordering the
components of this theory, I will begin by naming them as:
the pleasure/unpleasure quality
the sexual quality
the anxiety quality
the cognitive quality.
It is obvious of course, that this classification corresponds directly
with Freud's aspects of emotion, and it is worth noting at this point that the
theory I am speaking of is his theory, and it differs from what he has said
directly only in perspective and organisation, not in actual content.

My

case is that this "new" theory provides an organisational framework within
which the differences of the way in which Freud refers to emotions are
resolved.
Positing three levels of emotional processes is a way of organising the
different meanings Freud appears to give to the terms he uses - terms such
as instincts, affects, feelings, passions, states; and positing qualities is a
way of describing the relation between what Freud sees as major instincts,
affects and feelings. As much as possible I will keep to Freud's own terms.

Level One - Emotions as instinct or affect
This is the level that is most consistent with Freud's formal position on
emotions as outlined in Chapter Five.

At this level "magnitudes of

displaceable energy" are at work in the psyche, degrees of excitation are
operating and tensions generate and dissipate. If this is viewed as a kind
of primary level then it clarifies Freud's preoccupation formally with
emotions as instincts. If it is viewed also as a kind of meta-level it can be
seen as Freud's attempt to outline the broad principles of what is going on
in the psyche, a kind of abstraction of our direct experiencing of feelings.
By speaking of "affect" and "instincts" and "energy" and "tensions" Freud is
creating an impression of forces at wori< that are essentially beyond
individual control, in their most primitive forms, which uses the traditional
philosophical notion of passivity in connection with "the passions". He is
also creating an impression of forces that we know of by inference from
our observation of ourselves and others. We cannot directly see an instinct
or an affect or the energy, but we know that they exist by the way we
observe them manifesting themselves in various ways in ourselves and
others - just as, for example, we cannot see electricity but we observe its
manifestations in light, in heat, and in the power of electrical goods. This
notion uses the traditional scientific approach to inquiring into emotions.
At this level Freud speaks easily about affects being instinctual
experiences and instincts being stimuli arising from within the psyche or
"organism", exerting a constant force of motivation (see Chapter Five). All
these notions fall consistently within the general idea of forces at work in
the psyche". Major or primary instincts, such as the desire for pleasure,
the avoidance of pain, and the instinct for self preservation all fit in
comfortably.

Relation of Level One to the qualities of emotion
(i)

At this level, the pleasure/unpleasure quality stands in an "instinctual
drive" relation to the theory as a whole. It is a motivational force and it
is also Freud's way of classifying affects as degrees of pleasure or
unpleasure, which is a part of what we actually experience, and speak
of in connection with emotions.

(il)

The sexual quality also stands in the instinctual drive relation, being a
motivating force, a preservation force, and being in a co-operative
relation to the pleasure/unpleasure quality. At this level, one can see
the sexual instinct of mankind as well as that of individuals, acting on
lives, societies, eras, and civilisations.

(ii)

The anxiety quality stands in a "degree of excitation" relation to the
theory at this level. Here anxiety becomes "displaceable magnitudes
of energy" in certain circumstances, the way in which tensions are
generated.

"Sums

of

excitation"

can

attach

themselves

to

inappropriate objects, or be transferred to mnemic symbols in the
conscious mind, can, at any given point, dominate the psyche. (See
Chapter Seven, section on Anxiety).

Anxiety is related to the

pleasure/unpleasure quality in that it has degrees of unpleasure
present and it is related to the sexual quality in that there is almost
inevitably a sexual aspect to any manifestation of anxiety (or so Freud
claims).
(iv)

The cognitive quality of emotions is not so visible on this level
although it is foreshadowed as an aspect of emotional processes
when Freud speaks of the ego's activities in connection with the
fulfilment of instinctual wishes, the generation of anxiety, and the
manifestation of the self-preservative instincts.

However, in his statements about reason Freud claims that although it
is in the ego that there is a coherent organisation of mental processes,
representing "reason and commonsense", the original decision to form
conceptions of the external world came from the unconscious mental
processes (see Chapter Five, section on Reason).

This decision was

made, Freud claims, from a disappointed psyche which had failed to gain
expected pleasures from hallucinatory objects of desire. The result was the
setting up of a 'reality principle", a new principle of mental functioning that
enabled the psyche to obtain real and lasting pleasure from real objects.
At Level One therefore, when Freud is talking about instincts and energy,
he is also talking about some part of the psyche that could work out that it
was necessary to have some sort of communication with the external world
to gain more or better pleasure. If this was supposed to be an instinct in
itself, it must still have been in instinct with some kind of cognitive function,
a function that enabled the selection of a means (even if it was by trial and
error only) to improve its gratifications.

The complexity of the process

makes it very unlikely that it could have been a "happy accident" that the
instinctual impulses (the only original mental processes) happened to
cotton on to precisely the best way to solve its problems.
Relation of Level One to the unconscious
It is tempting at this stage to align Level One of the emotional
processes with Freud's postulated unconscious mind, but the parallel does
not work in a simple way. Firstly, Freud himself was ambiguous about the
status of affects in relation to the unconscious.

He claimed on the one

hand that affects could not be unconscious but then he refers to
"unconscious affective structures". If the term "affects" is used to cover all
aspects

of

emotion,

then

indeed,

feeling

something

requires

consciousness, but there is enough evidence to suggest that Freud did
have in mind some kind of emotional activity in the unconscious and that

this "unconscious affective structures" referred to emotion at the level of
energy, excitation, and tensions in the psyche, ail of which could be
conscious or unconscious.
Level Two - Emotions as feelings
It is when we look at emotions in terms of feelings, those things which
we experience in a particularly subjective way, though we have common
concepts and language for them, that we see how incomplete any
meta-explanation of emotions must be.

As noted in Chapters Six and

Seven, Freud remarked several times that there was great difficulty in
providing an adequate description of "affects", under which label he
attempted to include both the primary processes (affective energies) and
what I see as the secondary processes (the development of the concepts
and language of feelings).

As argued in Chapters One and Three, the

cognitive processes play a vital part in the development of feelings, as
opposed to instincts and sensations. What we experience as feelings is
very different in every way from what we believe to be primary energies,
tensions, and excitations, though they are closely related. On this
conceptual level, what we are observing and attempting to understand is
the extraordinarily complex network of the ways in which the primary
emotional

processes

present

themselves

to

our

experience

and

consciousness.
Freud did not concern himself formally with this aspect of emotions,
though the tension generated in his writings between his formal position
and the many ways in which he spoke of feelings is an indication that, in
some way, he was aware of the grappling with these differences in ways of
looking at emotions. As a psychoanalyst dealing with disturbed patients,
he was facing this level of emotions every day. As an individual, he was
dealing with his own feelings every day and in neither case did he think

always in terms of energy and excitation, as his language shows. He felt
"novel and bewildering feelings" and we all know what he meant when he
used this phrase, without knowing anything about the degree of excitation
in his psyche or the degree of pleasure or unpleasure that accompanied
these feelings.
So what is this world of feelings and how can it be organised as a
level of emotions or an aspect of emotions? Freud actually provides the
major components of such organisation himself, partly with those aspects
of emotion I have termed elements, partly with the recognition of the role of
language and partly with the division of the psyche into the id, the ego and
the superego.

I will look at each of these three ways of organising

emotions, beginning with the way in which this second level of emotional
processes stands in relation to the four qualities of emotion.
Relation of Level Two to the qualities of emotion
(i) The pleasure/unpleasure quality is a major way of categorising feelings,
as well as the terms themselves describing a particular kind of feeling,
arising from a particular kind of affect or sensation or level of tension.
As Freud describes, feelings of pleasure and unpleasure appear to
accompany other kinds of feelings providing a "keynote", and a major
way in which emotions may be analysed. As I argued in Chapter six
however, this does not make each feeling identical with the degree of
pleasure and unpleasure accompanying it as Freud suggests in his
formal argument. It is easy to see how he would settle for this when
he describes all feelings as degrees of pleasure and unpleasure (see
Chapter Four), but it is also easy to see that this is not sufficient in the
light of his subsequent references. For as long as pleasure or
unpleasure provides a "keynote" to a feeling, for example, the feeling
and its "keynote" remain distinct.

A feeling of nostalgia may be

accompanied

by varying

degrees

of

pleasure

and

unpleasure,

depending on the context, but we do not describe nostalgia primarily
in terms of pleasure and unpleasure. We think of it in terms of the past
and the effects that the past exerts upon us. Our personal concept of
nostalgia is closely related to feelings of pleasure or unpleasure only
because it is based on these effects.

The way in which pleasure/

unpleasure acts as a category of feeling puts this quality in the role of
a superordinate feeling and other feelings are related to it by being
partly described by it, just as an object is partly described by colour or
shape or function. When Freud says that what becomes conscious as
pleasure and unpleasure is a quantitative and qualitative 'something' in
the course of mental events (see Chapter Six), he indicates that
quantity (degrees of affect) and quality (kind of affect) are distinct and,
indeed, not easily defined as shown by his use of 'something' (Freud's
quotes).
The way in which the terms pleasure/unpleasure describe a particular
kind of feeling (as well as being used as a category) gives this quality
yet another dimension.

As a category it has superordinate status -

that it is used to describe all other kinds of feelings. As a feeling in
itself, it must be described or defined in terms other than itself to give
meaning to the definition.

It is pointless to say, for example, that

"pleasure is a high degree of pleasure".

Formally, Freud says that

pleasure is a low degree of excitation but if pleasure is identical with
particular degrees of excitation then this definition is as circular as the
"pleasure is pleasure" version.
In addition, it tells us nothing at all about what we experience as
pleasure. To describe it in fact, we commonly resort to other feelings
and sensations in the attempt to define something we all know to be
related, but different from, other kinds of feeling, and related to, but

conceptually different from, energy or degrees of excitation. It is when
pleasure is viewed on both Levels One and Two, in terms of
energy/affect/sensation and conceptually or cognitively, that the term
pleasure begins to take on a more rounded meaning.
The sexual quality is another major way of categorising a large number
of feelings (if not all) in Freud's system. As with pleasure/unpleasure,
it takes on a superordinate status when used as a category and must
also be understood as a feeling (or feelings) in itself.

As with

pleasure/unpleasure, its conceptual status is extremely complex.
Other emotional terms and emotive language and metaphor are used
to describe it despite its being recognised as an instinct, a force, a
powerful form of energy.

In Freud's system, pleasure is tied to

sexuality in the closest possible way, but when, for example, Freud
refers to a child's sexuality or sexual instinct serving for the acquisition
of different kinds of pleasurable feelings (see Chapter Six), then he is
clearly distinguishing between kinds of pleasurable feelings.

Once

again it is when this relationship (between sexuality and pleasure/
unpleasure) is viewed on both Levels One and Two of emotions, that
they take on full meaning - that is, they make more sense to us, both
on a meta-level in terms of "forces", and on a conceptual level in terms
of description and meaning.
In defence of my notion that Freud intended sexuality to have
superordinate status but remain distinct from other instincts (and
emotions), I draw attention again to his conflict with Jung (see Chapter
Six) and his (Freud's) emphasis on the necessity of separating the
sexual instincts from the instinctual force generally.

Indeed, he

distinguishes sexuality both quantitatively and qualitatively from the
other instincts, thus giving it the difference of kind as well as of degree.
On Level One he talks about degree or the force or status of the

sexual instincts in relation to the instinctual force as a whole. But then
he begins another kind of conceptual journey by distinguishing that
part of the sexual instincts that ebbs and flows in the context of desires
(the libido), which he sees as the "measure of sexual excitation" (see
Chapter Six).

The mental representation of the libido becomes the

"ego-libido" which in turn becomes the "object libido" observable when
it begins cathecting (mental) sexual objects.
The move from libido (in the unconscious) to "ego-libido" in the
conscious mind represents the move from Level One (sexual instincts,
energy or affects) to Level Two theoretically where the instinct is
perceived or experienced directly as sexual desires and feelings. The
"ego-libido" and the "object-libido" are experienced directly partly as a
series of physical sensations and partly as a series of related feelings
that may variously include, or be "coloured" by, pleasure, unpleasure,
joy, sorrow, anger, fear, anticipation, love, hate and a great many
more depending on the experiences and attitudes we bring to our
consciousness of sexuality.
distinguish

between

In addition, at this level we are able to

different

kinds

of

sexual

experienced at different levels of development

feeling

(those

as well as the

differences evoked by different objects, and other feelings; for
example, kindness, cruelty, gentleness, fierceness, etc, all play a part
in the range of sexual feelings), and also the differences between
feelings of sexual tension and feelings of sexual pleasure, as well as
the differences between sexual feelings and feelings about sexual
feelings. Though these may be mixed together, they need not be, and
may be experienced separately.

This is the framework within which Freud can meaningfully say "the
sexually exciting effect of many emotions which are in themselves
unpleasurable, such as the feelings of apprehension, fright or horror,

persists in a great number of people throughout their adult life" (see
Chapter Six). To make these kinds of claims, Freud needs both the
meta-level of energy and instincts and this second directly experiential,
conceptual level to his theory of emotions, which in relation to
sexuality, resolves the different ways in which he refers to sexual
excitation, sexual pleasure, sexual feelings and the sexual instincts as
a primary force (see Chapter Six).
(iii)

In connection with the anxiety quality, Freud says directly that anxiety
is something that is experienced personally and with intensity.

He

again defines an affect in the context of anxiety and in this definition he
speaks quite clearly of there being different parts to an affect - that it
consists of "particular motor innervations" and "certain feelings".
These feelings themselves are of two different kinds, the first being the
perception of motor actions and the second being the direct feelings
of pleasure and unpleasure (see Chapter Seven). At no other point in
his references to emotions does Freud state as straightforwardly his
acceptance and acknowledgement of emotions as being as much a
part of our personal experience and interpretation as a form of energy
or excitation that seems to operate of its own accord in connection
with the unconscious instincts.

To say that an affect consists of motor

innervations and certain feelings draws a sharp distinction between the
energy of emotion and the personal perception that also makes an
emotion what it is. To say that the feelings themselves have two parts,
being both a perception of the motor innervations and direct feelings
of pleasure and unpleasure, is to make the distinction even finer, and
presents a very clear case for attempting the kind of organisation of
Freud's thinking on emotions that I have undertaken here.

It is significant that these indications of a more complex theory of
emotions occur in connection with Freud's inquiry into the nature of

anxiety when it is noted that Freud regarded anxiety as the "riddle
whose solution would be bound to throw a flood of light on our whole
mental existence" (Freud, S.E., Vol.XVI, p.393). He variously refers to
anxiety as an affective state, a sensation, as being something rational
(and irrational), as a warning (a manifestation of the self-preservative
instincts) and as "something" we perceive ourselves experiencing (see
Chapter Seven).

As I claimed earlier, it is in connection with anxiety

that one becomes really aware of the existence of different levels to
Freud's thinking on emotions. A sensation is certainly a feeling, but
what we call a feeling is more than that. It has a rational component,
and it has a function or purpose.

Anxiety does demonstrate these

things very well and very obviously. To define it adequately in terms of
degrees of excitation or pleasure/unpleasure is simply not possible,
even for Freud, though of course it may be clearly perceived that
excitation and sensations of unpleasure are central to anxiety.
These components have their context at Level One of this theory, but it
is at Level Two that the complexities of the notions of direct experience
and perception of anxiety find their context. At Level Two the element
of anxiety can also be used as a way of categorising feelings related to
but different from the first two elements. Anxiety itself also remains a
distinct feeling described in the context of other feelings and needing
such description to be understood.

At Level Two, Freud's link

between anxiety and the libido can be more clearly followed where
anxiety is described in the context of direct conscious experience and
libido described as an instinctual force but in its rational form of ego
and object libido.

Here we may speak of being, for example, fearful

and unsettled (anxious) in a situation where our sexual instincts are
not finding adequate expression (the ego-libido is being thwarted in its
plans for the fulfilment of the aims of the sexual instincts).

The link

between anxiety and repression can also be described in meaningful

emotional terms. We may speak of being fearful, panicky, confused in
a situation where we know we do not have understanding of our true
feelings or when we have inconsistent feelings that seriously impair our
lives. We may say that whenever this happens that the feelings we are
confused about make us unpredictable to ourselves, so those feelings
are perceived only under a cloak of fear, tension and apprehension
(anxiety).

We may say that we cannot find the right reasons or

explanations (ideas) for these feelings so the fear and apprehension is
attached to any ideas that are related that we can find. In this way
unknown

or confused

(repressed)

feelings

are

perceived

as

(transformed into) anxiety until the right reasons or explanations
(ideas) are found.
Further, Freud speaks of at least two levels at which anxiety operates the involuntary level and the ego level, the former being the instinctual
anxiety generated at birth and to which we are all pre-conditioned, and
the latter being generated by the ego in response to situations
indicating similar threat (see Chapter Six). These levels posited by
Freud represent Levels One and Two of this theory respectively as do
Freud's references to anxiety as "instinctual" as opposed to "realistic".
This idea that affects may have an instinctual as well as a "realistic"
level indicates that Freud was surely leaning towards a theory of
emotions that allowed for directly cognitive as well as Instinctual levels
of reality.
(iv)

At Level Two the cognitive quality of emotions is the quality that gives
feelings their comprehensible form - that is, the quality that allows the
categorisation and description (or the perception and ordering in a
pre-language sense) of emotions.

I argued earlier that a cognitive

aspect of emotions could be sought for at Level One, but at Level Two
it is a necessa/y condition for the formation of feelings, as defended in

Chapter One.

It is also a necessary element to allow us to have

feelings about things, to connect feelings and their objects, thus giving
us a better understanding of feelings when viewed in the context of
their objects. In Chapter Five, I quoted Freud as viewing the ego as
that part of the mind in which there is a coherent organization of
mental processes and which represents reason and common sense
"in contrast with the id which contains the passions". This is of course
consistent with Freud's formal position (i.e., that the instincts and the
passions or emotions are identical) but it is a curious reference in the
light of Freud's subsequent discussions of emotions, once he
acknowledges the conscious experiential level of defining emotions.
The conscious part of the ego we know, from experience, can be filled
with our perceptions of feelings that are inconsistent, confusing,
irrational (or seemingly so) and incompatible). It may be one function
of reason to reconcile these incompatibilities, but it is also a function of
reason in the first instance to recognise, categorise, describe and, in a
very real sense, bring into being conceptually, feelings, as opposed to
sensations, impulses, tensions and levels of excitation. As argued in
Chapter One, the nature of a feeling is irrevocably bound up with our
cognitive experience of it. Our world of sensations could exist without
cognition - our world of feelings could not. Freud acknowledges this
indirectly with his use of the technique of psychoanalysis, where his
theorising about the nature of the human psyche is dependent on the
cognitive, conceptual, articulated world of feelings from which he
draws his primary data.
Relation of Level Two to the unconscious
Freud has viewed feelings in one way as being the
manifestations" of the instincts (see Chapter Five).

"final

In that sense. Level

Two of this theory can be seen as the mind's translation of the instinctual
forces into a comprehensible pattern of experiences in the conscious mind
- a level where the experience of feeling is ordered and then articulated with
the use of language. Freud sees reason as having been developed by the
psyche as a means of finding satisfactory of "better" means of meeting the
instinctual demands of the id.

In this context, reason creates a level of

emotions that enables it to understand and therefore serve the id more fully
- so emotions at Level Two become the ego's expression of feelings (and if
the ego represents the "reality principle" in the psyche, then its
interpretation or presentation of feelings would appear to have more
objective reality status than the id's completely subjective instincts).
Sufficient for this theory of emotions however, is that there is a direct and
consistent link between Level Two and the unconscious which also
provides the necessary consistency between Levels One and Two
generally.
The role of language
Having attributed to Freud some sort of indirect leaning towards a
more complex theory of emotions and having posited his use of language
as part of the evidence for this, it is easy enough to locate the role of
language on Level Two of the subsequent theory. As mentioned in the
previous section, language becomes the means of articulation of feelings
that have been recognised and organised by the conscious mind. It is a
way of further organising and categorising feelings as well as providing a
means of communicating and comparing such organisation by other
minds, thus providing a further dimension of meaning to our feelings. That
Freud consistently made use of the established language of feelings (which
would make no sense if the world of instincts only was given reality status)
must be seen as his acknowledgement of the reality of the meaning of
feelings as conveyed by that language. All that is really necessary though

for the existence of feelings in the Level Two sense is the capacity of the
conscious mind to recognise and experience certain internal phenomena
that are able to be organised into some sort of comprehensible conceptual
picture.

Language adds creatively to that meaning, but does not

necessarily of itself create it; it reflects the original phenomena without
necessarily being a part of it.
There is a sense however in which language does become a part of
the phenomenon of feelings. Words can and do become the objects or
ideas to which affects can become attached in the Freudian sense. To this
extent, language takes on the same relation to feeling as does any other
object of feelings. The relationship between feeling and its object, though
not directly examined in the context of this thesis, is one that must be
connected with the meaning of emotion, so that language in that sense
would appear to play a role in the development of feelings.

It can be

readily observed for instance, that words have the power to evoke feelings,
and it is arguable that this is only because the word evokes the idea to
which feeling is attached.

There are words, for example, that sound

sinister (and evoke feelings of fear) even when the idea they represent is
not. There are also situations in which the words used to describe some
feeling can be seen as responsible for the creation of other, different
feelings arising from the description. As mentioned in Chapter One, the
role of language in this and many other contexts, has yet to be fully
explored.
The role of the id, the ego, and the superego
To some extent, the role of the id, the ego and the superego as
organising components of a theory of emotions is already obvious - but
specifically at Level Two, this division of the psyche allows an extra
dimension of organisation for feelings. If we take the conscious experience

of feelings as the central indication of the nature of emotions, then Freud's
division of the psyche adds meaning by providing a starting point for
emotions (with the instincts in the id), a flowering or maturing of the
emotions (with the understanding organising and measuring provided by
the ego), and a regulator of the emotions (with the powers of the
superego).
This organisational or developmental dimension is consistent with
Freud's use of the id, ego and superego to explain how emotions may fail
to develop properly, may fail to mature or flower and may fail to be
regulated or be over-regulated - which was after all, the beginning of
Freud's inquiry, prompted by the riddle of repression.
Level Three - emotions as a state
I have taken the notion of an emotional state as the basis for a third
level of Freud's theory of emotions because his references to emotional
states indicated something different from either an instinct or a feeling in
ways previously put fonvard.

If we see instincts as primary energy or

affect, and feelings as the development of that energy into organised
cognitive as well as sensual forms in the consciousness, then states, in
Freud's terms, can be seen as related to both these levels in a quantitative
way. In an affective state, the entire psyche is charged with a high degree
of excitation; in an emotional state the psyche is rather "coloured" by some
temporarily dominating feeling or feelings (see Chapter Seven).

I am

treating states as a level of emotions, rather than simply presenting them in
their relation to Levels One and Two, because of Freud's use of states as
some sort of primary level of emotional development as well as an
intermittent manifestation of a certain kind of affect and a certain way of
experiencing emotions.

An "affective state" is constructed of motor innervations, feelings, and
with the repetition of some particular, significant experience which is the
"core" holding the combination together (see Chapter Seven). Ordinary or
"normal" affective states occur with genetic pre-conditioning so there is a
predisposition to feel certain things in connection with certain events.
Neurotic affective states occur when the "displaceable magnitudes of
energy", or affect, are moved around by the Ego (i.e., are attached to ideas
other than the original ones) to counteract the distress caused by
ideational incompatibilities.

So "affective" states, normal or neurotic,

become that level of emotions where energy and feeling are seen in
relation to ideas and events.

This level provides both a different

perspective on emotions and also a way of relating affect (or primary
energy) to direct feeling, which incorporates the cognitive aspect including
the function of analysis and organisation, which would in turn deal with
ideas of, and in relation to, emotion.

The relation is not a necessary one however as Freud distinguishes
between "affective states" and "emotional states". An affective state occurs
whenever events are sufficiently powerful to stimulate the psyche back into
the original state of complete dominance by a particular affect, whereas an
"emotional state" occurs when a person experiences an inflow of feelings
prompted by events which carry only a suggestion or reflection of original
events, so the "emotional state" does not carry the full force of the primary
affect.
A resolution of some problems
The organisation of Freud's references to the emotions into a more
complex theory of those phenomena does solve some of the problems
raised by seeming incompatibilities in his writings.

(i)

It allows for Freud's distinction between affects and feelings, instincts,
sensations and states without affecting his formal position on
emotions. He can still speak quite consistently about the instincts and
of feelings as being their final, conscious manifestations. Freud's use
of terms has been adjusted so that "affect" refers to the instinctual
force or energy where an emotion is generated, feeling refers to the
conscious level of emotions, and state refers to a quantitative relation
between emotions and idea. The term "emotion" covers both affect
and feeling. Terms like "instincts", "affects", "sensations", "tensions",
"excitation" belong to the first level of exposition of emotions; terms like
"feeling", "experience" and the analysis of the complex language and
vocabulary of emotions belong to Level Two or the second mode of
exposition of emotions.

(ii)

The alternative theory allows for the way in which emotion, in some
form, has unconscious and conscious status. Saying emotions must
be conscious is compatible with Level Two as a way of explaining or
analysing emotions where the very concept is dependent on the
cognitive functions, and where the conscious experience of drives,
needs and desires depends on cognition for identification and
classification.

"Unconscious affective structures" fit in at Level One

where these structures represent the genetic pre-conditioning, the
pre-disposition to feel certain things in connection with certain events.
In this way a fairly complex unconscious emotional structure may be
posited, and gives a context for "feelings" of which we are not fully
conscious, or do not allow ourselves to admit to having.

At the

unconscious level a relationship can be posited between instincts and
affects, the latter, according to Freud, being one manifestation of the
former. At this level it may be posited that instincts generate needs
and the frustration of those needs generate affect which is the basic
energy of emotion.

When consciousness and cognition are joined to affect, feelings are
generated. Affect plus feeling together constitute emotion. Emotional state
is a quantitative relation between emotion and idea, i.e., a state depends
on the amount of emotion that is attached to a given idea or set of ideas at
a particular time.

The idea is generated by instinctual and cognitive

processes or experiences; the emotion is generated by affective and
cognitive processes or experiences.

In this way there is a difference

between instinct and affect that still allows for Freud's close connection
between them.

Cognition applied to instinctual experiences equals ideas;

cognition applied to affective experiences equals feelings. In this context it
is also possible to throw some new light on Freud's claim that affects
"attach" themselves to ideas, by looking at the relation between cognition,
ideas and affect.

If cognition acts on affect to produce feelings, then

feelings must be made up of conscious experience of feelings and ideas of
feelings. In this light we may meaningfully talk about "affective ideas" and
"instinctual ideas" (i.e., the latter being the ideas produced by cognition
acting on instinctual experiences).
An affective idea, originally generated by the fnjstration of an
instinctual drive will naturally (in the normal course of psychical events)
attach itself to the instinctual idea, originally generated by the instinctual
drive in question. For example, sexual desire and love are generated. In
the meantime cognition also acts on the sex instinct (without frustration
being present) and produces an idea and memory of sex experience(s).
The feelings of desire and love are present in the mind as affective ideas,
which join with the idea in the mind of sex experience(s).
mind acquires a whole, balanced concept.

In this way the

This concept is immensely

varied, depending on the sex experiences subsequently added that involve
the outside world, the amounts of fnjstration and thus affect generated,
which in turn give rise to more instinctual ideas and more affective ideas,
so the concept grows wider and wider. An emotional state can be said to

occur on the one hand when the degree of frustration and affect (and thus
the number of affective ideas) outweighs the number of ideas gained by
sex experiences, so affective ideas smother and swamp the instinctual
ideas, creating an imbalanced psyche. At this stage the problem could be
solved either by seeking to increase the sex experiences (not very
satisfactory for a number of reasons) or seeking to reduce the generation
of frustration, and therefore affect, by gaining more knowledge of the
instinct and the way in which it motivates the psyche. The latter method of
course was adopted by Freud using, ultimately, his technique of
psychoanalysis.

I have used the sex instinct in the example, but any of the instinctual
drives could be substituted. States of depression, anger, obsession (i.e.,
unpleasurable states) are produced by the imbalances described above.
States of joy, happiness, satisfaction, elation, etc (i.e., pleasurable states)
are

produced when the affective ideas and instinctual

ideas are

appropriately attached and in balance. In this way reason and emotion are
in harmony. To the extent that reason has some control over action, it may
seek experiences to maintain the balance between affect and idea. To the
extent that instinct is subject to frustration, affect will push the psyche
towards seeking the experiences needed.

The role of reason
Freud does attribute to reason (the cognitive function) the function of
seeking to satisfy the instincts using the principle "whereby it may, to some
extent, regulate affective energy to gain real and lasting pleasure" (see
Chapter Five). This, he claims, was the way in which the psyche dealt with
the problem of instinctual drives and frustration. With Level Two of this
theory of emotion however, reason plays an even wider role. Firstly, if it is
seen partly as a problem-solving capacity, then, in some form it existed

before taking conscious form in the ego. It existed enough to organise the
development of the ego in the first place, which is a perfect example of very
efficient problem solving. Secondly, if reason is seen partly as an ordering
function, then it also is responsible for the organisation and classification of
concepts in response to experiences at all levels of the psyche. That an
instinct in the unconscious seeks satisfaction is a rational process. That
the psyche has instincts that are capable of being satisfied is a rational
thing.

At the conscious
conceptualising,

level reason not only

but also of developing

has the function of

a whole

and

complicated

conceptual world (or worlds), the reality of which is strong enough to have
an effect on our behaviour in a number of ways. Reason also recognises
and conceptualises relations and connections between things and events,
and is capable of certain conceptual manipulations which may manifest
themselves (verbally or in actions) in physical manipulations of the
environment (the environment here including people as well as objects,
minds as well as bodies). Positing a second level in the theory of emotions
in Freud then, also opens the way to a much wider concept of reason and
a

more complicated

relationship

between

reason and emotion,

a

relationship that is also illustrated by Freud's own activities as a thinker,
and is aligned more consistently with the traditions of thought that Freud
brought to (and used in) his theory.
This theory provides the means whereby an analysis of personal
emotional worlds becomes feasible. Any such analysis must be able to
yield a conceptualisation and articulation of the conscious experience of
emotion, as opposed to an explanation of emotion only.

Such a personal

conceptualisation depends on our awareness of the levels upon which our
emotional processes occur. With the multi-level theory posited here, Freud
has provided a framework for our being able to perceive our emotional

processes at work at the physiological level, the cognitive level and at the
level of a general disposition, or "emotional trait".

His technique of

psychoanalysis provides the method for exploring these levels of
awareness,

and

allowing

us to

conceptualise

and

articulate

our

experiences at all three levels. In Chapter Nine I will elaborate on how I
conceive the psychoanalytic method as a means to our private emotional
worlds, and discuss the importance of such worlds to our ways of
perceiving the world in general.

It is my contention that while we have

been aware of our emotions, we have not been aware of our personal
emotional worlds and their structures. Because they provide a context ior
our ways of perceiving external reality (ie, the world around us), I argue
that our awareness of such worlds is essential to a perception that is least
confused by conflicting emotions and self-deception.

CHAPTER NINE
FREUD AND KELLY - AN EVOLUTIONARY STEP
FOR EMOTIONS

Section I: A new direction in theory and practice

I have attempted to demonstrate in Chapters Four to Six that Freud
and Kelly have both said a great deal more about emotions than either of
their formal positions would suggest, and that each has implied various
levels of awareness in connection with emotional processes. I have argued
that these levels of awareness represent an evolutionary step in the
development of emotional processes as they become, and are seen to
become, more fully integrated with our cognitive processes. It is through
such integration that the personality may become more developed, more
whole (the central aim of Freud's work, as especially well pointed out by
Bettelheim (1985) in Freud and Man's Soul), and our perception of the
world and its realities may become more accurate (the central aim of
Kelly's work).

As I said in the Introduction to this thesis, many of the

world's most serious problems both past and present, have been closely
related to the ways in which we are aware and not aware of our emotional
processes, the complexity of our feelings about things. In Chapter Three I
explored some evolutionary approaches to emotion theory and posited a
level of development where new levels of emotional awareness became a
part of the survival adaptations. As I also stated in the Introduction, the
central aim of this thesis has been to trace the development of emotional

awareness within our Western Culture and to show that each age and
generation of thinkers have in some way articulated stages in this
development, thus making it visible or self-conscious. I have tried to show
that the development in our own age has been initially and fundamentally
articulated by Freud, and then by Kelly, and that, by relating these two
perceptions a further developmental path becomes visible - one where
feeling and thinking become a synthesised

process of interpreting our

worlds.

Freud's contribution - access to emotional worlds

Within the broad scope of his theory of psychoanalysis, Freud has
touched upon all the aspects of emotion yielded by previous thinkers. The
physiological, motivational, cognitive, ethical and creative aspects of
emotion are all visible in Freud's references to emotion, and within the
context of a multi-level theory of emotions, each aspect has its place.
Freud has also demonstrated the great power of emotions, very
dramatically within the pathological context, and with subtlety and
complexity in a more ordinary context.
On the practical side he has provided a structure for emotional
processes that enables us to explore kinds of emotion, and a technique of
analysis that allows a conscious journey into our personal emotional
worlds, a journey which Freud regarded as vital to human progress
(Bettelheim, 1985, pp.32-3). The depth and complexity of meaning that
Freud gave to his concepts of repression and the unconscious mind has
had a powerful effect on the ways in which we perceived ourselves. The
unconscious was put forward as a whole world with its own laws, a world

which was ours personally, and yet needed to be discovered and explored
if the human personality was to move towards wholeness. Notably, this
attempt to articulate the reality of inner worlds stemmed from Freud's
perception and contact with his patients' emotional worlds.

These

emotional worlds however, appeared to Freud in their most distorted,
disturbed forms, becoming visible only because they were causing acute
distress and illness.

To explore them and their implications for the

structure of the human personality was more than enough work for many
lifetimes, but Freud repeatedly referred to emotions in a more ordinary
context and implied many times, as I have tried to show, that there was
much to articulate still. He provided the means for such articulation directly
with the techniques of psychoanalysis, and indirectly by saying enough
about emotions to enable us to form a consistent structure, which I have
attempted to do in Chapter Eight. This stnjcture enables us to begin to see
relationships between "blind drives" (or instincts), and our conscious
experience of feelings, between how we feel, and how we interpret and
organise how we feel.

It also enables us to begin to see possible

relationships between thinking and feeling that help us to make more sense
of

our

perception

of

ourselves

and others.

The technique

of

psychoanalysis can be adapted to explore personal emotional worlds (as I
will attempt to demonstrate later in this Chapter) and to see how these
worlds condition and colour our perceptions of events.

Kelly's contribution - construing

Within the scope of his Theory of Personality, also arising from
psychotherapy, Kelly speaks of emotions less directly but with many
dimensions of emotion still visible. As I sought to show in Chapter Four,

Kelly takes a conceptual leap that lands emotions right in the heart of the
cognitive processes. Feelings emerge as ways of thinking. He sees the
rational process of construing as the way in which people perceive and
make sense of the world; the emotional processes become a strong
component of the overall process, falling within the rational framework. At
one level, Kelly sees emotions and emotional states as being subject to
control by reason, but at another level, feelings are present in, and a part of
the actual construing process, forming a significant part of the way in which
we perceive the world. At a further level still, some feelings become a part
of the changing universe when we perceive and construe them, while other
feelings remain a part of that very construing. Finally, our construing takes
part within various systems or frameworks of knowledge, of which our
framework of emotional knowledge is one, as outlined in Chapter Four.
With this sort of role given to emotions, it becomes obvious that our
emotional worlds (i.e., our systems of knowledge of emotions) need to be
perceived and understood at a personal level before our construing can
become more elaborate and more self-aware.

By leaving the actual

process of construing as something of a mystery, Kelly also leaves blank
the emotional worlds that form part of that process. It is in this sense, I
believe, that Kelly "presupposes" the development and use of Freud's
work.

A multi-level theory of emotions from Freud together with his

psychoanalytic technique for exploring emotional worlds, provides a means
whereby Kelly's assumption of the close association between feeling and
thinking can be justified.

To put it another way, Kelly may more validly

assume a blend of feeling and thinking to characterise the construing
process, provided that the means for such a development in human
awareness (and the articulation of it) is available. A multi-level theory of
emotions from Freud and his technique of psychoanalysis based on
associations, provides such a means.

It becomes a pre-requisite or

adjunct to the use of Kelly's method of approaching and understanding our
on-going experience of the world.
Some connecting links

There are some other associations also that can be made between
Freud and Kelly that support my claim that together they present a new
way forward in cognitive/emotional development. These associations form
the kinds of connecting links which indicate that Freud and Kelly were
essentially concemed with the same kinds of issues in connection with
human development and survival.

Further, they indicate that there are

similarities between the ways in which (both) Freud and Kelly perceived
people as making sense of their worlds.
Both Freud and Kelly refer to the importance of accurate prediction in
connection with what they each see as the aims of human life. For Kelly,
accurate prediction means the difference between "happiness and misery".
It means having some control over events as opposed to feelings of
helplessness and being trapped by circumstances. It also means moving,
each time, a step closer to reality, to perceiving the way things really are in
the worid, as opposed to living in the unpredictable, more senseless, world
of "illusions". For Kelly, an illusory world would be one where the system of
constructs does not reflect to any degree the correct or real relationships
between things perceived at any given time. Freud also sees the outcome
of accurate prediction (which he calls "assessment") in terms of happiness,
particularly the happiness or well-being connected to a feeling of security.
This feeling reflects the absence of neurotic anxiety, as opposed to realistic
anxiety experiences in the face of real external dangers (Freud, S.E.,
Vol.XXII,p.82).

Freud and Kelly each refer to the need to construe or assess both the
past and the present with some degree of soundness in order to make a
prediction of the future world secure.

In his essay, The Future of an

Illusion, Freud speaks of people needing to put themselves at a distance
from the present (that is, to allow it to become the past) before it can yield
"vantage points" from which to judge the future. "The less a man knows
about the past and the present" claims Freud, "the more insecure must
prove to be his judgement of the future" (Freud, S.E., Vol.XXI, p.5). Kelly
implies the same when he says that people abstract replicated properties
of events already experienced (the past), and events being experienced
(the present) to make it possible for them to chart events to come, in terms
of these same properties (Kelly, 1963, pp.120-1).

Both theorists see prediction as being closely linked with the idea of
control.

Although Freud speaks from a deterministic viewpoint which

suggests that a person is essentially controlled by his or her instinctual
drives, he also refers to the need for people to control their instincts. In his
lecture Explanations and Applications, he says: "Let us make ourselves
clear as to what the first task of education is.

The child must learn to

control his instincts" (Freud, S.E., Vol.XXII, p.149). Without such proper
control, Freud argues, both the children and, in due course, societies
would suffer grave damage. However, the educator needed to be able to
predict the effects of such control to ensure that it resulted in gain and not
further damage.

Ultimately, to be able to predict and control the flow of

instincts was the key to the survival of civilisation (Freud, S.E., Vol.XXI,
pp.95-6).

Kelly does not proceed from a deterministic position when stressing
the importance of control, though in the end he is putting forward a similar
conclusion - that survival ultimately depends on man's ability to predict and
control the flow of his personal experience and so restructure his life in

positive ways (Kelly, 1963, p.9).
may constme
domination.

Kelly daims that to the extent that man

his circumstances,
To

construe

and

he may gain freedom from their
reconstrue

one's

perceptions

and

experiences emerges as a creative and renewing process, and within that
context, represents a powerful form of control in both a personal and social
sense.
Kelly and Freud were both concerned with order within their ideas of
human survival and development. For Kelly, man's construing is his way of
ordering his perceptions, in order to make sense of the realities he
perceives.

Man creates "patterns or templets" which he then attempts to

"fit" to reality with varying degrees of success (Kelly, 1963, pp.8-9).

Man

must also order his system of constructs to allow systems within systems,
and to allow events to be construed within various systems representing
different contexts and different bodies of knowledge (Kelly, 1963, p. 10).
One of these systems represents man's emotional context and here too,
there emerge systems within systems, or levels of emotional perceptions.
For Freud too, ordering of events takes on personal significance and is a
crucial aspect of any individual psychoanalytic experience. The ordering of
personal experience to find the right associations or relationships is central
to the process of psychoanalysis.

Freud also refers to order in the social

sense as being in a "special position among the

requirements of

civilization", along with beauty and cleanliness (Freud, S.E., Vol.XXI, p.93).
The articulation and communication of a personal and social sense of
order was of equal concern.

For Freud, a part of a successful

psychoanalytic experience was precisely the effective articulation and
communication between analyst and patient, where articulation brings to
light

the

hidden

connections

between

psychical

events,

and

communication brings understanding of the nature of and reasons for such
connections. The complex nature of this process at times is suggested by

Freud's reference to "the secret language which so easily grows up
between two people who see a lot of each other" (Freud, S.E., Vol.XXII,
p.49).
Kelly speaks of the need, especially in the therapeutic context, to find
creative ways of articulating and communicating various construct
systems. Construct systems may be unverbalised and require the creation
of a language or some other means of communication.

In the most

general sense, people's ability to articulate and communicate their
construct systems is one of the very many ways to broaden their construct
systems and to make a whole new range of experiences easily available
(Kelly, 1963, p.95).
The development of the ideas of prediction and control, and their
dependence on ordering, articulation and communication have reached a
very complex and sophisticated level in the work of Freud and Kelly. The
idea that such development represents an evolutionary step fon/vard for
emotional processes is supported in the following way:
(i)

The primary objects of prediction, control, ordering, articulation and
communication in Freud's work have been the instincts - of which, I
have argued, the emotions are a large part.

(ii) For Kelly human circumstances and events have been the primary
objects of prediction and control.
(iii) The emphasis on these concepts emerge from these theorists precisely
at a time in human history when the survival of mankind and this planet
depends to a great extent on man's accurate control and prediction of
his instincts, feelings and circumstances or events.

Control and

prediction depends on the adequate ordering, articulation and

communication of the

ways in which such control is achievable.

As I

indicated in the Introduction to this thesis, the kinds of self-generated,
self-destructive problems with which the world is now faced are closely
related to the way people feel about their environment and their
personal relationships. It is fair to argue, I think, that in the course of
human history the present age holds the most power for mass
self-destruction in a number of ways - and possibly also the most
power to prevent this.
(iv)

As well as providing complementary theoretical frameworks within
which these concepts were developed, Freud and Kelly provide
complementary processes or methods for the realisation of the
concepts.

Section II: Ways for exploring emotional worlds, and applying them
to the process of construing
A direction for exploring personal emotional worlds comes from
Freud's basic psychoanalytic technique, though for emotions it could be
described as an "in-width" analysis rather than an "in-depth" analysis (as
described by Freud).

The analysis described here is based on the

multi-level theory of emotions from Freud described in Chapter Eight. In
this theory emotions are perceived to operate on three major levels - firstly
at the level of instinct or affect where the energies, excitations and tensions
of emotion manifest themselves; secondly at the level of personal,
conscious experience where feelings take on their cognitive nature and
become a part of our knowledge; and thirdly at the level where emotional
energies and conscious feelings combine to create a state in the psyche
which has a particular emotional character for the duration of its
domination of the psyche.

This domination may be "acute" (as when

particular events cause high degrees of excitation and a particularly
concentrated experience of feeling), or it may be "chronic" (as when a large
quantity of excitation and a particular feeling are present as a part of the
whole personality).
The exploration of the second and third levels of emotional processes
in

any

person

perspectives.

yields

knowledge

of

personal

emotional

worlds

or

As noted, the second level gives the cognitive nature to

feelings (transforming affect to feeling), and for each individual this level of
emotional understanding is very subjective, based as it is on personal
interpretation of experience and personal use and understanding of
language.

It has something of a less subjective dimension based on the

shared use of emotional language and the observation of apparently similar
emotional

experiences

in

others.

However,

the

experience

and

understanding of feelings remains essentially intensely personal even when
external events are fully shared. This phenomenon has been particularly
explored as the philosophical problem of "other minds" which deals with
whether or not we may know the contents of other minds, or even whether
we may know that other minds truly exist.

For the personal analysis I

propose here the problem of the existence of other minds is not at issue,
though the problem of other minds elucidates very well the personal,
private nature of experience, and the language we use to articulate and
communicate experience (Ayer, 1967, Malcolm, 1967, and Strawson,
1967). I raise this problem only in order to emphasise that the analysis of
emotional worlds is necessarily a personal task, as is our construing of
experience, and cannot, at any time, be accomplished by the adoption of
models

from

other

people's

emotional worlds

only, though

shared

communication of personal emotional words can add to the understanding
of our own worlds. The exploration of our personal emotional worlds gives
us the context within which we do much of our construing, that context
being itself a part of the construing process, a point to which I will return a

little later when discussing the relationship between emotional worlds and
constnjing.

Some differences between psychoanalysis and emotion analysis
Although Freud's basic technique of association is used in the
emotional analysis I propose, the analysis differs stmcturally from standard
Freudian analysis in the following ways.
(i)

The aim of emotional analysis is to become aware of, and articulate
the stnjcture of our emotional worlds at the conscious level, to learn
the order and organisation of our feelings at the present time, rather
than to delve into the origins of our feelings. In other words, it is not
meant to be used as a therapeutic analysis, but as a preparation for
learning to use our emotional worlds to constme our experiences
more fully, and to open up possibilities for constnjing in a greater
variety of ways.

(ii)

Whereas Freud's psychoanalysis attempts to reach the unconscious
level of mental processes by following a chain of associations "down"
or "into" the psyche, emotional analysis follows associations "across"
the psyche, seeking connections between feelings and preferences,
feelings and choices, feelings and the chosen use of language, to
create an image or concept of a specific and personal world or "way of
feeling".

(iii) Emotional analysis is not based on any presupposed psychological or
moral laws or beliefs about the psyche, in the sense that any personal
emotional worids emerging from the analysis would be seen as
subscribing to, or breaking any mles. In other words, what is found,

what is brought into the awareness is what will be used subsequently
in construing until this changes naturally within the ongoing process of
construing. As Kelly says, we live in a constantly changing universe
and must be prepared to enter into change constantly. So emotional
analysis will not aim to produce what we "ought to feel at any time, but
what we actually feel, and that may be used to reconstnje.

The

distinction is an important one because too often we constnje on the
basis of what we think we ought to feel, which can have confusing and
distressing consequences for prediction and validation. Awareness of
our emotional worlds (as opposed to a clutter of feelings) should
enable us to distinguish between what we feel and that which we think
(or feel) we ought to feel in any given experience.

I mention this

attitude as a difference from Freud's psychoanalysis in that Freud
does presuppose a system of "good" and "bad" adjustments at the
various stages of the development of the psyche. I don't dispute this
at all, but point out that emotional analysis is not concerned with this in
the context I propose.

(iv)

Finally, emotion analysis is not meant to be the long process of
psychoanalysis necessarily becomes. It is meant to disclose to us our
emotional worlds, and may stop at one such world if desired, or
uncover other such worlds at any stage of our lives. Also, although it
is probably more useful, at least in the beginning, to share such
explorations with an "emotional analyst", it is possible, within the scope
of the analysis proposed here, to explore alone. This, of course, does
not constitute a difference from Freud's methods entirely, since he did
explore the full implications of psychoanalysis using self-analysis.

A basic technique for emotion analysis
An analysis or exploration of emotions begins with the technique of
association.

But whereas Freud used the technique of association as a

way to interpretation of the psyche (through dreams, for example), in the
present context, association is used to articulate and make visible the
structure of personal emotional worlds, as illustrated in Appendix I.
In many ways, the opening up of an emotional world is not unlike the
opening up of a "dream world". Freud speaks of the necessity to focus on
"the separate portions" of a dream's content and to report in succession
everything that occurs in relation to these portions, the associations that
present themselves (Freud, S.E., Vol.XXII, p.11).

In connection with an

emotional world the place to begin is also with some "separate portions",
those being in this case, particular feelings present in the consciousness at
that time. And as with "dream portions", free associations are first called
into play.
It will be noticed fairly soon that the flow of associations will fall into a
number of categories.

For example, let us say that the "portion" being

focussed on is "a feeling of well-being".
The first category of associations will be the language associated with
a feeling of well-being, such as "comfortable, relaxed, happy, energetic,
satisfied, healthy, etc", or, "busy, successful, rich, clever, powerful, etc". I
specify language as a category here because the first free flow of
associations is usually aimed at giving meaning to the central concept
being focussed upon (in this case "well-being") rather than aimed at
introducing new concepts immediately. The words are used to elaborate
on a first meaning initially. The three examples of clusters of words that I
have given add three different kinds of meaning to the concept of

"well-being" very clearly, but it is more likely that a greater mixture of words
will be produced in most cases. However, the balance will usually fall to
one kind of meaning more than to another, giving the subject of the
analysis the beginning of one of his or her emotional worlds.

If several

meanings emerge quickly, then several emotional worlds are emerging.
Within that first category of language, the content is again divided into
"portions", yielding further categories. I emphasise here that the initial free
association, using one of the feelings present in the consciousness, needs
to yields good supply of associations before continuing, enough to yield at
least one (and possibly two or three) dominant meaning(s). The further
categories are related to the perspectives on emotion which emerged at
the end of Chapter One, and these in turn are related to the three levels of
emotional processes yielded by Freud, as described in Chapter Eight.

The categories of associations
Having outlined five perspectives on emotion earlier, these may be
used to provide categories of meaning to show us the different ways in
which we experience and interpret our feelings, thus creating our emotional
worlds.

To demonstrate this, I'll continue with the examples related to

"well-being". The three general meanings were indicated by
(i)

comfortable, relaxed, happy, energetic, satisfied, etc

(ii)

busy, successful, rich, clever, powerful, etc

(iii) free, flying, running, jumping, shouting, singing, etc.

In the case of group (i), the meaning is related to an easy-going
contented emotional state; in the case of group (ii) the meaning is related
to tense, excited, driving emotional state; in the case of group (iii) the
meaning is related to a moving, flowing, also excited emotional state. Let
us assume, for the sake of the example, that these three meanings were
extracted from the first flow of associations from a single individual. We
may now look at each of the "portions" contained in these meanings and
categorise them further, in terms of the five perspectives on emotion.
Within the physiological category we could include "relaxed,
energetic, satisfied, flying, running, jumping, shouting, singing".
Within the cognitive category we could include "powerful, clever,
successful, free".
free".

Within the ethical or evaluative category we could include "powerful,

Within the motivational category we could include "busy, energetic,
satisfied, successful".
Within the creative category we could include "free, singing,
powerful".
So far, "happy" and "rich" have been left out and may need more
associations before they would fall into any category, though "happy" could
slip into "cognitive" perhaps.
In this particular example, the physiological category emerges as the
one with the most content, so we could assume that at least one of the

personal emotional worlds of the subject of the exanfiple is based on strong
physiological interpretations of the experience of feeling.
At this stage the analysis could stop if desired, and the subject could
use his or her awareness of a strongly physiological world of personal
feeling to construe and reconstrue the events in his or her life. I'll return to
this example at this point, a little later.
If however, the content of other emotional worlds is to be explored,
the "portions" of each category need to be broadened with further
associations, which may serve to strengthen existing worlds or open up
new ones.

For example, if we were to focus on the creative category,

associations would be explored for the kinds of metaphor used to articulate
emotion, images of feeling, the way in which feeling was used in
connection with physically creative activity etc. This in turn, could lead to
stronger connections with any of the other categories. Similarly with the
ethical category, the associations would need to be explored for evaluative
content, for feelings connected with ideas of "right" and "wrong", and then
connections sought with other categories.
always be found.

Such connections may not

Some emotional worlds within any individual may

overlap, or they may be "self-contained".

Emotional worlds and construing
Even with the use of terms such as "associations", "connections" and
"categories", all of which suggest some sort of system, the notion of
emotional worlds is difficult to communicate in precise terms.

Firstly

emotional worlds, the emotional framewori<s within which we experience
and interpret events, remain essentially private. We may share our feelings

at any given time, but it is difficult to share the complex structure of
emotional associations and meanings each of us carries around inside our
minds.

An awareness that there is such a structure is also a personal

experience.

Such an awareness may be prompted by the theories of

others. In the case of Freud's references to emotion, if a multi-level theory
is perceived, we may think about the levels of emotional processes and
become aware of the physiological, sensational world of feeling, then the
cognitive world of feeling (encompassing the creative, ethical and
motivational dimensions of feeling), and then the states of feeling where the
emotional world is coloured by a quantity of a particular feeling or
associated groups of feelings. But these,though conceptually necessary,
are very general, structural worlds of feeling and may only be used as a
springboard to personal emotional worlds.

Kelly has claimed that people are naturally "construing beings", that,
viewed over the centuries, people emerge as scientists, interpreting events,
then testing those interpretations by making predictions based on them,
and seeing whether those predictions are validated by subsequent events.
In seeing a need to articulate this theory however, Kelly is suggesting that
people are not really, or fully, aware of themselves as construing beings.
He says in fact, that he is giving us a completely new way of seeing
ourselves. In articulating our construing nature, Kelly makes it available to
us as a context within which to construe ourselves. He gives us awareness
of ourselves within a socio-evolutionary, scientific context.

The basic analysis of our cognitive emotional worlds using the
technique described above may uncover whole "sets" of feelings which
influence the ways in which we interpret (constme) events and the actions
we take. The awareness and articulation of these emotional perspectives
makes them also available to us to use as contexts for construing, as
illustrated in Appendix I.

To return to the example where analysis stopped with the awareness
of just one emotional world, a physiological emotional context, there are
many possible ways such a world may be used to constaie and reconstnje
events. The recognition of a strong personal world within which emotions
are perceived and experienced as primarily physiological processes will in
itself influence the construing of the self. A person, in recognising that the
physiological aspect of emotion is important to him or her, will obviously
begin to notice the degree to which events are construed with this
emotional tone. Constructs about one's own emotional responses and the
emotional responses of others may be tested using predictions based on
the physiological framework. If the predictions are validated, that emotional
perspective will be strengthened and will, presumably, yield greater
validation of predictions. If the predictions are not validated often enough,
there remains the possibility of exploring other emotional worlds and
testing constructs based on their stnjcture. The existence of a strong
physiological worid of emotion would influence the choice of alternative
emotional worlds - possibly ones that come nearest to a physiological
model but containing wider concepts, such as a motivational world of
emotion.
Following an analysis of emotions where ma/?/emotional worlds were
discovered, or one world that encompassed many aspects of emotion,
Kelly's process of constming may be utilised more fully, and greatly
enriched. Any given experience may be consciously construed in as many
emotional contexts as available, rather than unconsciously construed in
one "set" emotional context. Further, it would become obvious in time that
events were most appropriately constmed in particular emotional contexts
relevant to their type. For example, many events are best construed within
an emotional context (or climate) of tolerance, and other events in an
emotional context of intolerance, where feelings of tolerance/intolerance
form the basis of an emotional worid. If a bipolar categorisation of feelings

is pursued, each feeling and its opposite forms an emotional context within
which certain kinds of events are most appropriately construed.

The

bipolar categorisation of feelings may be a substructure of a larger
emotional world based on the ethical or creative category of feelings.
There are many other possibilities, made available by returning to
emotion analysis whenever predictions are not being validated. To change
one's construing means to seek new ways of perceiving, to seek new
relationships between things, based on the way two things are alike and
different from a third.

The way we feel about ourselves and the world

greatly influences our choice of the way we will seek a "similarity and
difference" relationship.

Therefore, until we become aware of our

emotional dispositions and the contexts we have established on the basis
of them, our construing is limited by an ill-perceived relationship between
feeling and thinking.

Our prediction and control is limited in turn.

As I

sought to demonstrate within an exploration of a theory of emotions from
Freud, our emotional processes and dispositions are infinitely complex,
and always ready to yield new information about ourselves.

Conclusion

As the title of this thesis, "Thoughtful Feeling and Feelingful Thinking",
suggests, my exploration of emotional processes began with the simple
idea that feeling and thinking were really two sides of the one coin, and that
both were needed in a complementary relationship for a more accurate
and satisfying perception of the world. That "simple" idea swept me on
three long journeys - one being an historical journey to find when and

where people in our Western traditions of thinking articulated concepts of
emotion. Another journey was a conceptual one, to explore how concepts
of emotion relate to one another, and have changed in time.

A third

journey was a psychological one, to explore personal emotional worlds and
to seek ways in which such worlds could be communicated. From these
journeys, this thesis emerged, a blending of the "loot" gathered into an
argument for an evolutionary nature to the development of both feeling and
thinking, where they can be seen to become as closely related as my
"simple" idea suggested. This study has been limited to the developments
in the Western Cultural environment and as such presents only half (or
less) of the picture. Three more journeys into Eastern and other cultures
could yield concepts and frameworks different enough to change the
nature (if not the direction) of the development of the thinking/feeling
processes.

However, the Western tradition has seemed to be the

strongest exponent in the past of the idea that thinking and feeling should
be in some way separated, perceived as in opposition to one another, one
being "rational", the other "irrational". It seemed therefore appropriate to
consider the strength of these attempts at separation, and to consider also
the strength of the attempts to overcome such separation. The historical,
philosophical journey yielded evidence of both strengths - and also
evidence of the many perspectives on emotion, each having strong
conceptual roots.

The psychological journey yielded the concept of

personal emotional worlds and the ways in which these seemed to be an
essential part of how we perceived and interpreted the world around us.
The direction for further evidence and exploration would seem to lie, at this
point, towards the empirical possibilities of the concept of emotional worlds
and their usefulness to our thinking, and interpretation of events (see
Appendix II).

As stated in the Introduction, the main aim of this thesis has been to
find and present the developmental picture of thinking on emotions within

Western tradition and to show how that picture represents a coherent and
on-going development of our emotional processes.

The five major

perspectives on emotion outlined at the end of Chapter One have provided
the general framework within which to provide such a picture.

As a

framework it represents, both historically and now, the ways in which we
think about emotional processes.

The five perspectives - physiological,

cognitive, moral, motivational and creative - are all major contexts for
thought on emotion. A limitation of this framework may be that it is too
general, and that each context presented is, in itself, too complex and too
closely entwined with the others to be truly separated.

Many writers on

emotion mentioned in this thesis have commented on the difficulty of
separating the perspectives given here. I think the separation /s justifiable,
but I have been very much aware of the difficulties of presenting contexts
that clearly "stand on their own". Obviously "physical", "cognitive", "moral",
"motivational", "creative" could each be defined in terms of the others, and
equally, could each be explored further to give them more distance from
one

another.

Philosophically

however, thinkers

have

consistently

separated the contexts within which they presented their thoughts on
emotion and the outline of such contexts has, I think, been useful.

In connection with the secondary aims arising from the major aim, I
would like to mention each aim again and comment on them:
(a)

to establish that modern psychological theories, though appearing to
start again, did not abandon the strands developed by philosophers,
and indeed contributed to them further.
Once again, the limitations of this work, as presented in Chapter

Three, may be that there are simply too many approaches to emotion in
Psychology to be tied in to earlier thinking as I have attempted to do. To
claim that each one has arisen fundamentally from some previous tradition

could be rather like claiming that there have been no truly new ideas since
Plato and Aristotle. And, in any event, why must there be connecting links
through the generations? Why not begin afresh from our experiences in
each generation? Both Descartes and Freud argued strongly that
traditions merely inhibited and distorted their perception of reality. This
would be a fair approach I think if the work yielded by each generation did
answer the questions about emotional processes, but as Solomon (1976),
Reymert (1973) and Rosenberg (1990), have pointed out, the mystery of
emotions has gone on deepening, rather than being clarified, so it would
seem reasonable to seek the links between the "mysteries", and especially
the links between the past approaches and the new direction of
psychology.
(b)

To claim that Kelly within his Theory of Personal Constructs has
presented a theory of emotions that posits the closest relationship
between thinking and feeling yet presented.

As Kelly did not formally present a theory of emotions, the task has
been to find evidence for such a theory and to show how it relates to
thinking processes. There are always dangers in abstracting theories from
a writer where he/she did not intend to present them, but Kelly himself
justifies the attempt by claiming that we are free to reconstrue events (in
this case, his writings), especially in the search for validation. Construing a
theory of emotions from Kelly did in fact yield such validation (for this
writer) in terms of the subsequent awareness of the importance of
emotional worlds to construing.
(c) To establish that the emotional awareness necessary for the full use of
Kelly's method of construing as a way of making sense of the worid,
was to be found in the work of Freud.

To go through the writings of Freud seeking new dimensions to his
theory of the instructs carries its own particular problems. As many writers
on Freud have commented, not least his official translator, Strachey (1964),
there are many inconsistencies to deal with, and the complexity of his work
will always yield new dimensions for those seeking them.

In addition,

Freud's most recent biographer. Gay (1988), points out that Freud openly
set out to make things as difficult as possible for his future biographers by
throwing away much of his work and leaving behind much that was difficult
to organise.

There is a problem then, with putting forward a theory of

emotions and claiming that the evidence for it is at all conclusive. I offer the
Freudian Chapters therefore as an attempt to find the means for providing
a stnjcture and some doorways to our personal emotional worlds.

(d)

To establish that, on the basis of Freud's theory of emotions, and his
analytic technique, and Kelly's Theory of Personal Constructs, we
have the direction to go forward to a new awareness of thinking and
feeling.
This of course, is a substantial claim, but one that seemed to "make

itself" as this thesis progressed. To have "established" such a claim is too
hopeful an attitude in a thesis that only begins to touch on the "new
direction" suggested in the final Chapter.

I needed in fact to turn to the

empirical implications of the theory to begin to explore ways to establish
this last claim. That there have already been empirical investigations that
may be related to wort< in this thesis, is a hopeful sign at least, that the sort
of empirical possibilities mentioned in Appendix II, could begin to provide
further evidence for the claims I have been pursuing. However, if the claim
may be viewed in its component parts - that is (i) as a claim that the
theories of Freud and Kelly, as I have related them, provide a new

direction, and (ii) that the direction actually will lead to a new awareness of
thinking and feeling - then I think it would be appropriate to propose that
the first part of the claim has been reasonably met. The second part of the
claim, I suggest, would be a suitable topic for empirical investigation.
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APPENDIX I
An illustration of Emotion Analysis and the way in which it is
related to Construing

I would like to comment briefly on some problems associated with the
presentation of this illustration. Firstly, the methodology used is specifically
constructed to illustrate the relationship between the process of emotion
analysis and the construing process. To do this as clearly as possible, the
subject of the analysis was asked to choose and present in writing, a
problem (event, situation, attitude) which was fairly long-standing and had
been clearly construed in some way, without being resolved. The subject
was then asked to choose an emotion or feeling (any feeling) and to give a
stream of free association words in connection with that feeling.

The

stream was analysed in the way shown below and the problem was
construed, or reconstrued, in the ways illustrated. By "any feeling" I mean
any feeling that the subject felt was easily accessible at the time, a feeling
that was currently being experienced. This was because I am hoping to
show that emotional worlds or contexts can be explored beginning with any
feeling at all, not one necessarily related to the problem stated.

The

subject was asked to state the problem first only in order to be able later, to
compare the construing of it before and after emotion analysis. This order
of events will, I hope, become clearer in the description of the procedure
which appears a little later. The problematic aspect is that a methodology
in connection with any given theory usually takes years of empirical
investigation to be developed. Certainly in the case of the theory proposed
in this thesis, such years would be essential to the proper development of
the process described here. Therefore, I would like to emphasise that this
illustration is only a demonstration and not offered or intended as any sort
of empirical "evidence" to support the theory at this time.

Secondly, it was a possibility that an illustration be attempted from
some work of literature, either poetry or fiction. While I believe that a
version of the analysis is possible in connection with literary works, that too
is still in the process of development, and would not illustrate the
procedure in the way that is required for reasons which willl I hope become
clearer.

Briefly, the analysis depends on the free-association technique

and is not intended primarily as an analysis of language only, still less the
considered and deliberate language of writers, (with perhaps one or two
exceptions such as, for example, James Joyce or Virginia Woolf). Though,
having said that, a variation of the process could be used to detect
possible emotional worlds within a writer's works. However, that would not
illustrate the relationship between emotion analysis and construing directly.

The Illustration
The following material is an illustration of how I perceive the
relationship between emotion analysis and the process of construing to
work. It is based on the description in Chapter Nine, and presented in the
format of a report (loosely) for clarity, though as stated earlier, it is not
intended as any sort of empirical evidence at this time.
Aim of the Illustration
The aim of this illustration is to show how personal emotional worlds,
or contexts, may be elicited from a subject, and then used to reconstrue a
problem. The procedure is meant to demonstrate how the use of personal
emotional worlds may enhance and elaborate construing, thus showing a
close,

complementary

relationship

between

emotion

(feeling)

and

construing (thinking) as discussed in this thesis.
The subject was a male in early middle age. He was married, with
one young male child.

Procedure
It was decided after some discussion that the procedure would take
place in the subject's home where he felt most comfortable and most able
to allow his feelings to emerge freely. We began by sitting at a table (the
subject and myself), both equipped with pen and paper.
1.

The subject was asked by me to write down some problem that he

could think of, that was a long-standing source of some concern, and
about which he had done some thinking, without being able to come to any
resolution. When the subject had done this, he was asked to list some of
the main issues that were connected with the problem for him, and then to
identify what he perceived to be the main obstacles to a solution.

The

purpose of this was to establish the subject's way of constming a problem
before emotion analysis (a problem about which he had already done a lot
of thinking) so that this could be compared with his construing of the
problem within the context of his personal emotional worlds.
2.

The subject was then asked to put the problem aside and thrn his

mind to the task of choosing a feeling which was currently active for him in
his life and that he had no difficulty in "bringing to the surface".

The

purpose of this was to begin the access to the subject's personal
emotional worlds, a process which can be commenced with any current
feeling being experienced. When he identified such a feeling, the subject
was asked to allow images to form around that feeling. For this task the
subject was asked to make himself as comfortable as he could (e.g.
walking, sitting, lying down, eyes closed etc, as desired).
3.

The subject was then asked to give me a flow of words that expressed

for him the feeling he was experiencing. The subject chose to write the
words down himself in a flow that lasted for a few minutes. I then asked

the subject to rest for a short time and allow the feeling to ebb away. To
facilitate this process we made a cup of coffee and chatted lightly about
some things of mutual interest such as vegetable gardening, favourite fruits
etc.
4.

When the subject felt refreshed and suitably "neutral" (after about

15-20 minutes) he was asked to list the words that he had given under the
categories

of "physical/physiological",

"cognitive",

"moral",

"creative",

"motivational", and "uncategorised", listing any words twice if so wished.
These categorisations were to be based on the subject's personal meaning
and interpretation of the words that he had originally given. He was asked
to remember his experience of the feeling and to consider why he had
used those particular words, i.e., what the meanings of those words were
to him in terms of his experience.

The purpose of this was to begin to

uncover the ways in which the subjct interpreted his emotional experience
and the personal contexts that experience raised for him.
5.

The subject was then asked to choose the category he wished to

explore further in relation to the problem stated at the beginning of the
process. When he chose the category he thought most suitable he was
asked to provide the "opposite pole" as he understood it, for each word in
the category chosen.

The purpose of this was to provide a series of

bi-polar units or concepts that formed an initial emotional worid or context
within which to reconstrue the original problem.
6.

Finally the subject was asked to reconstrue the problem within each

bi-polar unit in the chosen category, thus giving a number of elaborations
on the problem related to the context he had chosen to explore. To do this
he was asked to give his personal meaning of the bi-polar unit and then the
way in which he related this to the problem.

Outcome
1.

The problem presented by the subject was:
The unwarranted value and encouragement given
appearances as against substances (in society in general).

to

This problem was presented as being the cause of long-standing
disturbance and perplexity. It was construed as being related to "deceit in
public behaviour, short-term thinking and lack of planning, concealing of
inadequacies, profit-driven exploitation and environmental damage". The
blocks to solutions were construed as (i) "the perception that individuals
can't (or don't desire to) influence or change substantially the external
environment", and (ii)

"the problem of whether a personal resolution is

self-deceptive if the external environment hasn't really changed".

The

central problem as presented above, was the one related to the emotional
contexts outlined below.
2.

The feeling chosen by the subject for analysis was panic.

It was

defined by the subject as a feeling of panic and not a stateoi panic since it
was not pervasive or overwhelming, but was within reach, or accessible, to
him at the present time, due to his being involved with study, assignment
deadlines, duties at work, and family responsibilities.
3.

The initial stream of associations was as follows: assignment, time,

result, good, people's estimation, hard, boring, do well, tired, sleep,
holiday, relax, time off, family, Abram, break, fulfilment, future, investment,
motivation,

long-term,

price,

balance,

temporary,

dream,

idea,

expectations, happiness, purpose, life, meaning, value, worthwhile, hope,
recognized, unrecognized, self-knowledge, knowledge of others, skills,
utilized, wasting time, pretending, earning living, stupid, non-priority,

unavoidable,

avoidable,

hope,

expectation,

economic

pressure,

non-acceptance, realistic, shouldn't be.
4.

The words were categorised by the subject in the following ways:

Physical/
Physiological

Moral

Cognitive

Motivational

assignment
result
hard
tired
sleep
holiday
relax
time off
family
Abram
break

good
people's estimation
price
value
worthwhile
hope
stupid
non-acceptance
life

do well
break
price
temporary
idea
recognized
unrecognized
self-knowledge
knowledge of others
realistic

hard
boring
motivation
happiness
purpose
life
wasting time
pretending
earning living
unavoidable
avoidable
hope

Creative

Uncategorised

Categorised twice

fulfilment
investment
balance
hope
skills
utilized
expectation

time
future
dream
expectations
meaning
non-priority
shouldn't be

hard (physical and motivational)
break (physical and cognitive)
price (cognitive and moral)
life (motivational and moral)
hope (creative and moral)

When categorising each word, the "subject" gave the meaning the
word held for him in the context of the emotion being analysed to explain
why he categorised it thus.

Most of the categorisations seem clear but

some not. For example, "life" was categorised as having a meaning within
a moral framework, the meaning being "life is good and to be respected",
which forms a part of the "subject's" moral world of feeling.

It is also

categorised as having a meaning within a motivational framework, that is,
"life is something that pushes and pulls on you ..." which feeling forms a
part of the motivational world of feeling.

In each case, the "subject" is

speaking of the "feeling-meaning" attached to the word - that is, "I feel that

life pushes you along ..." or "I feel pushed and pulled by life

so these

are not statements of fact or general meaning, but personal association,
personal meaning.

Similarly, in the physical/physiological category, the

subject stated that these were the words he associated with physical
sensations and actions. For example, "holiday" for him meant being more
in a physical or "body" mode rather than in a mental mode, being more
aware of physical experiences than thinking experiences.

The word

"Abram" (his son's name) was also, for him, strongly associated with the
physical experiences of body contact with his child etc. In each case the
words in this category had some specific physical meaning. In the case of
uncategorised words, a personal meaning was unable to be defined so
further associations were planned at some later time.
5.

The subject chose to use the moral category to begin to explore the

world it indicated and to reconstrue the problem originally stated.

The

bi-polar structure of this category was as follows:
Moral Category

- Bi-polar Structure

good
people's estimation
price
life
value
worthwhile
hope
stupid
non-acceptance

-

destructive
bad opinion
enrichment
deadness
facade
futile
despair
wise
acceptance

6.

The subject reconstrued the original problem in the following ways:

1.

good V destructive

Personal meaning: This means being yourself as opposed to pretending

Relation to problem:

The value given to appearances encourages

people to develop their steel-lined hollow insides and
to become incapable of entering into life-giving
relationships.
5.

value V facade

Personal meaning:

This means substance as opposed to emptiness.

Relation to problem:
6.

Appearances are empty in the long run.

worthwhile V futile

Personal meaning:

This means naturalness and harmony as opposed
to temporary monuments.

Relation to

problem:

We are building a society of temporary

monuments physically and mentally, which is slowly
destroying all naturalness and harmony.
7.

hope V despair

Personal meaning:

This means proper self-love as opposed to lack of
self-love, or self-hatred.

Relation to problem:

The social pressure to "keep up appearances"

can lead to self-hatred, instead of developing proper
self-love which leads to fulfilment as a person.
8.

stupid V wise

Personal meaning:

This means forms of idolatry as opposed to forms
of communion.

Relation to problem:

Worlds built of appearances make idolatry the

only form of interaction between people and between
people and the environment. Reality and substance

are needed for creative communion.
9.

non-acceptance V acceptance

Personal meaning:

This has two levels of meaning - one being the state
of

being

unconscious

of things

and therefore

non-accepting of them, as opposed to conscious and
also accepting. The other meaning is having a lack
of respect for others (non-acceptance) as opposed to
respecting others (acceptance), and also being
respected oneself, or not being respected.
Relation to problem:

With value given to apearances, being respected

may involve contributing to appearances rather than
substance. Also, in the first meaning, if people are
conscious of nothing but appearances then they will
also be accepting of them.

Equally, if people are

unconscious of one another, in terms of substance
and reality (what lies beneath the appearances) they
will be essentially non-accepting of one another.
Commentary
From these personal meanings and the way they are related to the
problem as originally stated and construed, it may be seen that the first
analysis of the stream of moral associations used as the basis for an initial,
simple bi-polar moral "world" yields quite a rich amount of reconstruing of
the problem to increase the subject's own understanding of what, for him.
constitutes some of the moral underpinnings of the problem for which he is
concerned to find resolutions.
which

form the

Some distinct moral principles emerge

basis of this subject's

conscious

(and

possibly

unconscious) system of morality. Looked at from this moral "worid" the

problem originally stated takes on new shapes and perspectives which will
shape possible avenues of resolution.
As described in Chapter Nine of this thesis, the procedure involves
seeking words associated freely with the experience of any current
emotion, categorising or "clustering" the words which are associated in
meaning by the subject and seeing how the words fit into the five
categories first described at the end of Chapter One. The categories are
bi-polarised and used to reconstme problems (or events). The emotional
words, or contexts, disclosed by the categories may be used to elaborate
construing of oneself also. The procedure fits within the epistemological
framewori< of personal knowledge as used in the thesis.

In Polanyi's

terms, the two poles of each bi-polar unit in any category can be used as
the subsidiaries to focus on a new meaning or interpretation of any given
problem, or event.
In connection with the moral world, or context, disclosed in this
illustration, it is interesting to note also that no internal contradictions or
inconsistencies were present in this initial stage of the analysis.

Further

associations, with each bi-polar unit for example, could possibly yield
contradictions
significant

role

in the categories where contradictions would play a
in behaviour

(e.g.

moral

and

motivational

contexts

especially). Contradictions could also come to light possibly if the process
was focussed on the exploration of the emotion itself, rather than on the
wider context of using the "worlds" elicited for the reconstruing of a
problem. The exploration of the emotion itself (in this case panic) was not
the focus of this illustration, but if it had been, the methodological path
would have been slightly different. The subject would have been asked to
elaborate on the reasons for his initial categorisations, and the personal
meanings attached to the bi-polar units would have been explored further.
One or two such examples were in fact explored a little further when I

asked the subject why he had included "Abram" (his 18-month old son) in
the initial stream of associations connected with the feeling of panic. The
reason given was that Abram was at the stage of climbing all the time and
had more than once seemed in danger. Another example was "holiday",
the reason given there being that the subject associated holidays with
"letting go" of mental activities. At the time of the analysis he was under
pressure to get some work finished after which he anticipated a holiday.
However, the thought of "letting go" before the work was finished induced a
sense of panic. Connections with panic were also accessible through the
bi-polar units.

For example, in the moral context the personal meaning

given to the first bi-polar unit was:
good V destructive - "This means being yourself as opposed to
pretending".
For this subject, the idea of pretending one's way through life, and
being unable to do much about it because so much of social life was
constructed on various forms of pretence, was associated with a feeling of
panic.
In asking the subject to choose the feeling to be used initially, I was
attempting to show that an analysis could begin with any feeling and still
yield fruitful contexts for reconstruing problems. Had the subject chosen a
feeling more directly related to the problem (e.g. possibly anger) the
meanings given to the initial stream of associations would have opened up
a different kind of perspective on, for example, his moral world, which
could then have been compared with the moral context arising from the
feeling of panic.

It is within such comparisons that contradictions,

signfiicant to behaviour, may begin to occur.

At this stage however, I

would propose that it is better to explore an emotion that the subject is
currently experiencing and to use that as a beginning.

Presenting an illustration of an analysis and its relation to construing
in written form does not give anything, unfortunately, of the actual
emotional experience involved in this procedure. The sessions, for
example, are tiring concentrating as they do on evoking emotions. More
than one feeling per session could not be explored without detriment to the
whole procedure. The process of evoking the emotion concerned needs
care also. Firstly the subject chooses the feeling most accessible at the
time. Secondly the person doing the analysis (in this case myself) needs to
co-operate in drawing the feeling out and allowing it to heighten as much
as possible with a set of responses tuned to the feeling concerned. This
requires careful empathic interaction, and is difficult to describe on paper
though easily enough demonstrated in a "live" setting.
With these kinds of problems evident even at the preliminary level
upon which this illustration takes place, it may be seen that, as suggested
earlier, the empirical research in connection with this thesis would require
considerable exploration, as would the contexts within which such research
would be best carried out. The aim of the illustration was to apply, as
clearly as possible at this stage, the claim that ideas from Freud and Kelly
may be combined to provide new and richer ways of understanding
thinking and feeling, and their relationship to one another. Without the
support of full empirical studies, the example provided was necessarily a
partial and modest attempt to fulfil this aim. I hope however, that the
possibility of establishing a formal context for research is at least visible.

Some closing remarks
The technique I have proposed in this Appendix for the exploration of
personal emotional worlds is based partly on my own exploration of
personal emotional worlds, and some exploration of the emotional worlds
of other people.

What I have attempted to give was an indication of the

possibilities arising out of the central purpose of this thesis, which was to
establish,

through

an

inquiry

into thinking

on

emotion,

that

the

development of our emotional processes is an actively on-going event,
helped or hindered by ourselves, and greatly influencing our lives at a
personal and global level of interaction.

I also sought to establish that

thinking and feeling were both rational, creative activities, two sides of the
same coin, two forms of the same activity, of making sense of the world.
Within my personal explorations I have discovered, gradually that
emotional worlds may take many forms. One such world of mine manifests
itself as an "inner geographic terrain", or country, with emotional
topography, climate, activities. This "world" emerged from an exploration
of the physiological/physical category of associations, by following
associations through several levels of development. "Emotional storms",
"the winds of change", "upheavals", "floods", all take on new meaning within
the context of this world. Many events may be construed, reconstrued and
richly understood within an "emotional geography".
manifests itself within the realm of colour.

Another such world

Emotions are subject to the

same "shadings" (degrees) as colours and a perception of events in such a
context of degrees of feeling, where the differences are construed in
"colourful terms" provides an understanding not yielded by other images of
degrees of feeling, for me.

This "world" emerged from an exploration of

the creative category of associations.

For others, words symbolising

degrees of feeling may be very different. What I have found is that the
process of emotional analysis uncovers a structure that already existed.

created by my use of words and images, the v^ays in which I feel and
interpret those feelings. The analysis does not of itself creaXe emotional
worlds, nor should this be its purpose. A proper attention to language and
the meaning we attach to words, through our experiences, will show us our
emotional worlds. The awareness and articulation of them, the
understanding of them through the signposts provided by Freud and Kelly,
gives us the kind of attitudes to our experience that Kelly believes is the
closest thing we can achieve to the reality of ourselves.

APPENDIX II

Some empirical possibilities

In Appendix I I described a possible context for research in
connection with the theoretical claims of this thesis. In this Appendix II I
hope to indicate some of the areas in current research where the
exploration of feelings as proposed could be useful.

Not all studies in

emotion are of the kind that would make use of this conceptual aspect of
emotion.

For example, in the British journal Cognition and Emotion the

studies concentrate on "the emotional reactions in clinical disorders of
mood, or emotion, responses to naturally occurring stressful events and
responses to experimental procedures (inside front cover. Cognition and
Emotion, all volumes). In this, and in the journal Motivation and Emotion,
the studies focus primarily on highly-structured response situations, or
relationships between certain emotions and actions, and these, while
obviously very valuable, did not seem to me, at this stage, to be directly
related to the idea of emotion analysis.
The following studies are selected on the grounds that they could
possibly be elaborated by the use of emotional worlds as described in this
thesis. The areas of research that seemed most relevant at this stage were
those related to self-deception, to a lack of awareness of complicated
emotions and their effect on behaviour, to the area of manipulation of the
feelings of oneself and others, and to the area of personal relationships.
That we have quite strong emotional processes that we may be
unaware of, or at least not fully aware of, is suggested by studies carried

out in connection with emotions and self-deception.

Whisner (1989)

speaks of the ways in which we "engage in self-deception" in order to
maintain certain emotional states, to escape from other emotional states, or
to hold on to emotions one feels morally obliged to have. He claims that
self-deception makes one unaware of one's emotional states, and also
that, in some cases one can move from self-deception to the actual
emotional state. A study by Flett, Blankstein, Pliner and Bator (1988) which
looked

at

whether

self-reports

of

emotional

experience

contained

components of "impression-management" and self-deception, suggested
further that people have some sort of cognitive control over their emotional
states, and over the ways in which they articulate emotional experiences.
Although Flett et al focussed on the role of self-presentation in the
expression of emotion, they stated that it was clear on the basis of their
findings that the relation between self-deception and the expression of
emotion was worthy of further consideration. They found that subjects with
higher

self-deception

scores,

compared

with

subjects

with

lower

self-deception scores, tended to rate their anger experiences, for example,
as less frequent, less intense and shorter in duration.

Such a general

pattern

emotions,

was

evidence

in connection

with

negative

and

self-deception was also associated with a tendency to report the increased
presence of positive emotions.
self-deception
self-esteem.

could

be

Flett et al also suggest that the

motivated

by a general

need to

protect

According to Whisner, self-deception "can pose a serious

threat to reflective growth", can encourage people to have false beliefs
about their emotional states (and act on them), and can lead people to
being generally misinformed about themselves, others, and the world
(Whisner, 1989, pp.392-98).

It would seem then that a knowledge and

awareness of personal emotional worlds could possibly be of use in
counteracting the effects of self-deception in connection with emotion. It
would be interesting to know, for example, whether the subjects with a high
self-deception rating in the study by Flett et al would have a lower rating

after undergoing emotion analysis and consequently, a more accurate
report of the duration, intensity and frequency of anger experiences, and a
difference in attitude to impression management. In connection with the
need to protect self-esteem, the concept of emotional worlds has the
advantage of being essentially a non-moral concept. That is, in personal
emotional worlds, negative emotions would be a part of a whole structure
having their justifiable "place", and balanced by the positive emotions.
Becoming aware of strong negative emotions in a balanced context, and
within an "emotion metaphor" could be less threatening, or not threatening
at all, to self-esteem. For example, in a "geographic" emotional world, such
as the one I described in Appendix I, negative emotions become part of a
system of nature where my anger experiences may well be perceived as a
"flood" or "volcano" or any other "natural disaster" which will have its
consequences and, will need to be counteracted by other "natural forces" if
the "world" is to survive. Such an emotional metaphor may well be more
acceptable in terms of self-esteem than the idea that one is "an angry
person who easily flies off the handle" etc. Having access to one or more
personal

emotional worlds could perhaps

minimise the

need for

setf-deception in connection with emotions - or at least significantly affect it.
This in turn, may be useful in a number of research areas that require
self-report on emotional states.

In connection with deception and manipulation (as distinct from
self-deception), a study by Draper and Belsky (1990) found that people
high in self-monitoring skills were particularly responsive to social
interpersonal cues, and skilled at hiding their own preferences and feelings.
People with low self-monitoring skills had more difficulty in masking their
underlying attitudes and were less facile in social situations requiring deceit
and manipulation. With this study a number of questions could be raised
by introducing the notion of personal emotional worlds. Firstly, would the
subjects with low se If-monitoring skills have a high self-monitoring rating

after undergoing emotion analysis?

Secondly, would knowledge of their

own and others' personal emotional worlds facilitate social interaction and
provide skills other than deception and manipulation in complex situations?
The second question would relate to subjects with both high and low
self-monitoring skills.
In the area of personal relationships, Felmtree, Sprecher and Bassin
(1990) explored the relationship between emotional self-disclosure and the
maintenance of personal relationships over time. They found that there
was a significant

relationship between self-disclosure

and

intimate

relationships remaining intact. They also argued that "the ease of being
oneself" in relationships was conducive to stable relationships, and that
such ease implied direct knowledge of oneself. The problems connected
with obtaining "direct knowledge of oneself" are considerable, and few
methods have been developed. Brown (1990) argues that it is now evident
that self-enhancement, self-assessment and self-verification motives all
influence the search for self-knowledge, and that these need to be taken
into account. As well as yielding self-knowledge directly, the exploration of
personal emotional worlds need not be negatively affected by these
motives.

Enhancement, accuracy and consistency may be dealt with

constructively by being accepted as a part of an emotional world, or being
able to be resolved within a world.

For example, a personal emotional

world constructed within an aesthetic framework could satisfy the drive for
self-enhancement while still yielding accurate knowledge of a range of
feelings.

The drive for consistency could actively contribute to the

formation of many worlds (further metaphors) in attempts to resolve or "live
with" contradictions.
Working within a social constructionist framework, Kippax, Crawford,
Benton, Gault and Noesjirwan (1988) argue that emotions are constructed
in reflections, that through reflections we "make sense of our experience of

the world and negotiate the meanings that we and others attach to them".
Their study explores the ways in which emotions are "constructed" by
incorporating the meanings of past experiences (obtained through a
"memory work" methodology) and present experiences (appraisal). The
complex study itself forms a part of the appraisal process. Conceptually it
relies on meanings derived from experiences in the social world, making a
distinction between feelings and emotions (the latter being socially
derived), and regarding them as possibly overlapping, but not coextensive.
Using that distinction, it is possibly the world of feelings with which the
notion of personal emotional worlds is most concerned, but equally, it
could be explored whether the "social world" is not in itself an "emotional
world" that yields a certain understanding of emotions. Such an "emotional
world" may possibly be socially constructed by those personal meanings
people have most in common, thus providing a "social core" around which
other feelings develop at the personal level. To explore this idea, emotion
analysis could be conducted to compare the various personal emotional
worlds of subjects and to relate widespread similarities to the social
patterns in present society.

Although I have said elsewhere that emotion analysis is not being put
forward as a therapeutic technique at this stage, the advantages or
possibilities for therapy are visible to some extent, especially in connection
with guided imagery therapies (Feinberg-Moss and Oatley, 1990) and in
connection with the prevention of mental illness and self-diagnosis
techniques (Ericson, 1990). As mentioned in Appendix I, emotion analysis
seems to be a way also that may yield more knowledge of disturbed
emotional associations related to clinically disturbed people.
As with presenting the illustration in Appendix I, there are difficulties
with discussing the empihcal possibilities of the theory presented without
the development of the research necessary to discover the wider uses of

emotion analysis. Such uses, if they existed, could only become apparent
as a proper methodology was developed, or a number of methodologies,
for use in different research areas. As with any area of research, there is
no shortage of problems to address, and the problems related to work with
emotions are still as much conceptual as practical, as discussed In Chapter
Three of the thesis. The theoretical framework described in this thesis and
the practical technique proposed address, I hope, some of the difficulties of
defining and understanding emotions, and some of the difficulties of
eliciting data on emotions.
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